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Abstract 
 ii 
Abstract 
Index combination constitutes the most recent development within the scientific field of 
democratic quality assessment. In the course of this study, a genuine experimental 
meta-index, notably the QD-Index, is theoretically conceptualized as well as practically 
operationalized. Concretely, the Worldwide Governance Indicators, Freedom House 
and Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization are combined for the year 2006. In general, 
the QDI enables a more reliable and more valid assessment of democratic quality on a 
global scale, because it combines the constituent indices’ respective strengths.  
The QDI results are, however, also biased to some extent, which is due to the 
methodological particularities of the processed indices.  
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1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces to the topic of the present diploma thesis, notably the 
assessment of democratic quality. Subsequently, a short review of the state of 
research of the empirical study of democracy will be provided. In a third step, the 
central research question will be deducted from the thesis’ focus of research. For the 
purpose of enhancing transparency, this chapter also entails information concerning 
the methodology applied. The final part constitutes a comprehensive overview of the 
diploma thesis’ structure.  
1.1 Topic of the Diploma Thesis 
“Democracy” is undoubtedly one of the most contested concepts in modern political 
science. This development has accelerated enormously since the end of the Cold War 
and the emergence of the “Third Wave of Democracies”1. The number of countries 
classified as “democracies” has increased significantly over the past decades, which is 
schematically illustrated in figure 1 (Lauth et al. 2000b, 7). Especially, African and Latin 
American countries have been focused on by democracy research efforts (O’Donnell 
1999; O’Donnell 2004b; Bogaards 2007). Unsurprisingly, sub disciplines within 
comparative political science, such as the empirical study of democracy, have 
flourished and now represent a diverse and dynamic field of research.  
 
As illustrated in figure 2, the empirical study of democracy can be classified roughly 
into three different streams of research, which of course interrelate to some degree 
(Kaiser/Seils 2005, 133; Munck 2006, 129). The most prominent sub discipline may be 
labeled as “transition research”, which deals with the transitional developments and 
implications of countries moving from totalitarian and authoritarian to democratic 
political systems (Carothers 2007a; Krastev 2006; Fukuyama 2004; Berman 2007; 
Mansfield/Snyder 2007). Transitional research predominantly emphasizes the 
determining role of elections as a minimum criterion for regime differentiation (Munck 
2006, 130; Schmidt 2000, 393).  
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 Concerning the global expansion of democracy, three „waves of democratization” are 
distinguished within scientific research: The first wave comprises OECD countries in the 
aftermath of the 2nd World War. The second wave represents countries of the decolonization 
era in the second half of the 20th century. Finally, the third wave comprises countries, which 
have transformed into democracies after the Cold War. (Keman 2002b, 42) 
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The second sub discipline, “consolidation research”, focuses on the factors, conditions, 
and circumstances of consolidating new democracies. Sometimes this consolidation 
research is also referred to as the research in “democratic stability”. In this sense, 
consolidation is the continuation of democratic transition (Munck 2006, 143). As 
compared with transition studies, consolidation research is much more difficult to 
conceptualize due to the lacking of a clear-cut indicator for consolidation (Munck 2006, 
142). 
 
Finally, the third and youngest sub discipline, “quality of democracy research”, explores 
the principles, dimensions and related components that define democratic quality of 
political systems. Similar to the research in democratic consolidation, no single, clear-
cut indicator can be derived to identify the democratic quality of a country (Munck 2006, 
146). Hence, research in democratic quality represents the final stage in the continuum 
of the empirical study of democracy, whose foci of research range from transition to 
stability and consolidation to the quality of democratic regimes (Munck 2006, 146). It is 
this third sub discipline that will be focused on within the deliberations of the present 
diploma thesis.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Global Regimes by Type, 1946-2006 
(Source: Polity 2008, slightly adapted) 
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1.2 Review of the State of Research 
As has already been outlined above, measuring democratic quality of countries and 
political regimes is a comparatively young discipline within democracy research (Lauth 
2006, 92; Pickel 2006, 111). Since the late 1960s political scientists began to 
concentrate on measuring democratic regimes (Pickel/Müller 2006, 135). Especially 
Robert Dahl (1971; 1998) and his concept of “polyarchy” gave direction to the 
development of measuring democratic quality as a separate field of research over the 
past three decades (Kaiser/Seils 2005, 133). Dahl’s “polyarchy” concept focuses on 
procedural and institutional aspects and omits output-oriented elements of democracy 
(Schmidt 2000, 394-5).  
 
His concept is neutral in terms of different democracy subtypes, such as presidential 
vs. parliamentary democracies, etc. (Schmidt 2000, 395). Although Dahl acknowledges 
that certain levels of socio-economic and politico-cultural conditions must be met for 
the development of democracy, he avoids a comprehensive democracy definition and 
focuses on political democracy instead (Schmidt 2000, 397). This approach has been 
decisive for many democracy conceptualizations of the subsequent study of 
democracy.2 
 
After the debate on methodological issues had been increasing during the 1970s and 
1980s, scientific efforts focused on measuring democratic quality on a comparative 
basis, internationally as well as historically (Lauth et al. 2000b, 11; Schmidt 2000, 397). 
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 See for example Vanhanen (1997; 2000; 2003)  
Democratic
Quality
Democratic 
Transition
Democratic 
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Fig. 2: Subtypes of the Empirical Study of Democracy 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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In this context, democracy evaluation must always be seen against the backdrop of 
advances in political theory as well as real political developments, such as 
modernization theory and the era of decolonization during the second half of the 20th 
century, respectively (Lauth et al. 2000b, 11). Over the last decades an increasing 
variety of quantitative and quantifying democracy indices 3  has emerged, including 
Freedom House, Vanhanen’s ID, Polity, Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), etc. 
(Lauth et al. 2000b, 11).  
 
Apart from these, qualitative approaches have been developed, as well, such as the 
democratic audit. The bottom line of this approach is that there are many elements of 
democracy, which can only be assessed properly by qualitative means (Beetham 
1994a; Beetham 1994b; Weir/Beetham 1999). Besides, democratic audits 
acknowledge the fact that assessing the quality of democracy is an extremely complex 
issue (Beetham 1994b, 25). Especially Weir/Beetham (1999; 2000) have promoted the 
approach of a country’s democracy assessment that is conducted by its citizens 
themselves (Beetham/Weir 2000, 75). Thereby, a democratic audit represents an open, 
multi-criteria concept, which avoids data aggregation, weighting of certain democracy 
dimensions, setting minimum thresholds, or benchmarking against other democracies 
(Beetham/Weir 2000, 75-6; Dunleavy/Margetts 1994, 155; Beetham 1994b, 34).4  
 
Democratic audits omit the aggregation of data due to the potential bias that 
structurally different countries may be classified at the same level of democracy. Due to 
this uniqueness and specificity of democratic audits, no comparative country rankings 
can be generated (Beetham/Weir 2000, 76).5 Democratic audits rather emphasize the 
educational effects, the initiation of internal political debate, the context specificity of 
democracy, as well as the complex interrelationships of democracy dimensions within a 
specific country (Beetham/Weir 2000, 87; Beetham 1994b, 31).  
 
As the emergence of diverse concepts and approaches underlines, the measurement 
of the quality of democracy has developed from a pure dichotomous classification of 
regimes to a more differentiated assessment (Abromeit 2004, 73-4; Schmidt 2000, 
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 Quantitative (objective) indices: “hard facts”, statistical data, etc.  
 Quantifying (quasi-objective) indices: quantified, subjective expert judgments 
 Qualitative (subjective) indices: “soft facts”, subjective evaluations without quantifications, 
(Pickel 2000, 245-6) 
4
 
 See 2.3 Problems of Conceptualization and Operationalization, 16 
5
 
 
“This is the simple but ambitious project of assessing the state of democracy in a single 
country.” (Beetham 1994b, 25) 
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390). 6  Within modern empirical democracy research, democratic quality no longer 
represents an all-or-nothing question, but rather a question of degree (Almond et al. 
2004, 27). Modern democracy indices, therefore, are based on polytomous 
conceptualizations (Pickel/Müller 2006, 136).  
 
Against the backdrop of the ever increasing number of democracy indices, most recent 
research efforts focus on evaluating their concept quality, as there is still a research 
gap regarding the adequate operationalization of theoretical democracy concepts 
(Lauth 2004, 22; Aarebrot/Bakka 2006, 70). Especially Munck/Verkuilen (2002) and 
Müller/Pickel (2007) have systematically analyzed the concept quality of the most 
prominent indices.7 Based on these deliberations, there has been some scientific effort 
to combine already existing indices or rankings in order to build a meta-concept for 
assessing democratic quality (Lauth 2006; Campbell/Sükösd 2002).8 This approach 
aims at generating more valid and more reliable measurement results by combining the 
strengths while simultaneously eliminating or reducing the weaknesses of the 
respective indices.  
1.3 Thesis’ Focus of Research 
As the review of the state of research within the field of assessing democratic quality 
has shown, the number of democracy indices has increased significantly over the past 
three decades. Only recently, there has been scientific effort to combine already 
existing democracy indices to form meta-concepts, which aim at delivering higher 
concept quality, validity, and reliability. 
 
It is exactly this comparatively youngest stream of research within the empirical study 
of democracy that will represent the core of the present diploma thesis. Concretely, it 
will constitute a proposal to look differently at already existing democracy indices from 
a conceptual point of view by presenting an experimental index combination, i.e. a 
meta-concept to assess and rank countries according to their quality of democracy.  
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 See 2.2 The Need for Assessing the Quality of Democracy, 14 
7
 
 See 2.4 Assessing the Concept Quality of Democracy Indices, 26 
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 Lauth (2006) develops a meta-index by combining WGI, Polity and FH. By contrast, the 
approach of Campbell/Sükösd (2002) constitutes a model to measure the global progress of 
democracy on a biannual basis to compare countries’ positional changes over the years. 
Campbell/Sükösd include in their model not only the political, but also other dimensions, 
such as gender, economy, knowledge, health, and environment.  
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In order to delimit the focus of research in a transparent manner, it is important to name 
the scientific areas which will not be dealt with in the course of this study. The model, 
which will be developed, predominantly focuses on the political dimension of 
democracy, therefore, pursuing a narrow rather than a comprehensive/maximalist 
approach.9  
 
In addition, a discussion of necessary social, economic, and political preconditions for 
democracy in the sense of modernization theory, as well as a discussion of democratic 
regimes’ performance in terms of political output or regime effectiveness will be 
neglected. Of course, low effectiveness concerning beneficial policy outcomes may 
well undermine citizens’ confidence in politics and the legitimacy of a democratic 
regime (Roller 2005, 268). Performance as an element of quality of democracy, 
however, will be excluded due to the fact that non-democratic regime types may 
generate good economic results, as well (Roller 2005, 268). In addition, there may be 
trade-offs and conflicting interests concerning special policy issues, which makes 
political performance difficult to be operationalized in the frame of democracy 
assessment (Roller 2005, 269).10 
 
Apart from this, the research project will focus on the national state-level, thus 
deliberatively neglecting the assessment of quality of democracy on a supranational 
level as well as on a sub-national, regional level. 11 Due to the attempt of generating a 
meta-conceptual comparative country ranking, qualitative approaches, such as the 
democratic audit, will equally be omitted. Democratic audits cannot and will not be 
incorporated into the present model for a number of reasons, including the lack of 
quantifiable scores, the concentration on single countries, their inherent non-
comparability, their non-replicability, as well as their low inter-subjective verifiability 
(Kaiser/Seils 2005, 139-40; Munck 2006, 140).  
1.4 Deduction of the Research Question 
Derived from the analysis above as well as from the review of the state of research, the 
following central research question for the present diploma thesis can be deducted: 
 
                                               
9
 
 See 2.3.1 Minimalist vs. Maximalist Democracy Concepts, 17 
10
 
 See 3.2.3 Responsiveness, 36 
11
 
 For an attempt to evaluate the quality of democracy on a supranational level, e.g. the 
European Union, see Lord (2004). 
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To what extent can an experimental meta-concept, such as the QDI, generate 
added value in terms of concept quality by combining already existing 
democracy indices for the purpose of assessing democratic quality on a global 
scale?  
 
Based on this general central research question, numerous sub questions can be 
derived: 
 
• What are potential and useful dimensions and indicators for the QDI?  
• Which democracy indices can (cannot) be used for the conceptualization of the 
QDI? 
• According to the QDI, what does an exemplary country ranking for a specific 
year (e.g. 2006) look like? 
• What are differences and commonalities of the results generated by the QDI in 
comparison to its constituent democracy indices as well as external reference 
values? 
• What are strengths and weaknesses of the QDI? 
• Is it meaningful and feasible to combine conceptually and methodologically 
different democracy indices in the first place? 
• What about the QDI’s own concept quality in terms of its theoretical 
conceptualization and practical operationalization? 
1.5 Methodology 
Comparing is an integral method within political science (Lauth/Winkler 2002, 41).12 It 
aims at reducing the complexity of reality by systematically structuring empirical 
phenomena (Lauth/Winkler 2002, 43). In principle, there are three different types of 
comparisons; descriptions, classifications, and comparative analyses (Lauth/Winkler 
2002, 44; Aarebrot/Bakka 2006, 59). Descriptions analyze one case and all its relevant 
variables, whereas classifications operate vice versa, as they compare one variable for 
several cases (Aarebrot/Bakka 2006, 59). Finally, comparative analyses compare 
several variables for a number of cases (Aarebrot/Bakka 2006, 59). As these three 
subtypes show, comparative political research is subject to a trade-off in depth and 
breadth of comparing countries (Lauth et al. 2000b, 15). Consequently, the latter 
                                               
12
 
 
“Comparison is the methodological core of the scientific study of politics.” (Almond et al. 
2004, 31) 
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subtype prevails, which means that a small amount of cases is compared on the basis 
of a predefined set of variables (Aarebrot/Bakka 2006, 60).  
 
In this connection, the usefulness of the underlying theoretical concept is of vital 
importance. Either the analysis concentrates on a small number of cases by applying a 
complex concept, or many cases are researched via a simple concept (Aarebrot/Bakka 
2006, 75). In general, it seems more promising to operate with a modest concept to 
produce limited, but precise results, rather than to apply a comprehensive model with 
little added value (Aarebrot/Bakka 2006, 76).13 In order to avoid these fallacies, the QDI 
will focus on a limited number of interrelated dimensions of political democracy. 
 
Apart from the number of cases analyzed, the applied methodology in comparative 
political research can rest upon a primary vs. secondary analysis, constitute a cross-
sectional or a longitudinal analysis, and use either qualitative or quantitative, individual 
or aggregate data (Lauth/Winkler 2002, 50-2). Especially, aggregate data poses some 
difficulties to the field of comparative political research (Niedermayer/Widmaier 2006, 
85; Pickel 2000, 249). Validity problems 14 , which may be due to the invalid 
operationalization through multiple indicators for one democracy dimension, or simply 
the fact of missing data 15 , may cause substantial distortion of empirical results 
(Niedermayer/Widmaier 2006, 92).  
 
The QDI will be set up on a cross-sectional basis for a specific year, notably 2006.16 If 
the model proves valuable, longitudinal analyses may be carried out in subsequent 
research efforts with annually updated versions of the QDI.17 Besides, the index will be 
based on already existing democracy indices, including Vanhanen’s ID, Freedom 
House and the Worldwide Governance Indicators, and therefore will refer back to 
already processed secondary aggregate data. In this sense, the model uses kind of 
“tertiary data”. The only exception will be Vanhanen’s ID, which will be replicated for 
the year 2006, thus using secondary aggregate data. Analogously, the majority of data 
processed will constitute quantitative and quasi-objective data, which will be derived 
from quantified expert judgment ratings. The different scales will be transformed into 
separate scales for each democracy dimension as well as into a single overall scale.  
 
                                               
13
 
 See 2.3.1 Minimalist vs. Maximalist Democracy Concepts, 17 
14
 
 See 2.3.3 Validity and Reliability, 18 
15
 
 See 2.3.8 Data Availability, 24 
16
 
 2006 serves as the year under consideration because not all of the constituent indices have 
been available for 2007 in the course of composition of this diploma thesis.  
17
 
 See 8.2 Further Research Proposals, 105 
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Finally, countries can also be clustered according to common characteristics and 
ratings, either on a geographical or on a functional basis (Campbell/Sükösd 2002, 
10).18 Clustering may enhance the understanding of commonalities and differences of 
countries within a cluster as well as in comparison with countries in other clusters. 
However, due to the assumption of the universality of human rights or the idea of 
democracy in general, clustering may be forgone from a theoretical point of view 
(Campbell/Sükösd 2002, 10). It is this last approach of omitting country clustering that 
will be followed in the course of the present study.  
 
The methodological approach to answer the central research question, whether the 
QDI generates added value in terms of measuring democratic quality, will be twofold. 
Firstly, a correlation analysis with the QDI results and its constituent democracy indices 
as well as external reference values will be conducted. Secondly, the approach by 
Müller/Pickel (2007) will be applied to assess the concept quality of the QDI.19  
1.6 Structure of the Diploma Thesis 
On the basis of this introduction (chapter one) chapter two approaches die idea of 
evaluating democratic quality of political systems, which is graphically illustrated in 
figure 3. In doing so, a working definition of “democracy” is provided, which serves as 
the basis for the subsequent theoretical deliberations of the diploma thesis. Moreover, 
the scientific need for assessing the quality of democracy is highlighted. In addition, 
problems of conceptualization and operationalization are discussed in detail. Finally, 
two prominent approaches for assessing the concept quality of democracy indices are 
presented. One of them also constitutes the basis of critical assessment of the indices 
utilized for the QDI as well as the QDI itself in the subsequent chapters.  
 
Chapter three identifies principles and dimensions that define democratic quality. In this 
respect, the analysis is restricted to the most relevant elements according to scientific 
literature. Three principles of democratic quality are dealt with, notably liberty, equality, 
and control. The dimensions analyzed include the rule of law, rights, responsiveness, 
accountability, participation, as well as competition.  
 
                                               
18
 
 Examples for functional clustering: EU members, OECD members, etc. (Campbell/Sükösd 
2002, 10) 
19
 
 See 2.4.2 Approach by Müller/Pickel (2007), 28 
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Chapter four deals with the theoretical conceptualization of the QDI. The three 
fundamental principals as well as useful democracy dimensions, analyzed in the 
previous chapter, are discussed in terms of the theoretical setup of the QDI.  
 
Chapter five presents selected current democracy indices, notably the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, Freedom House, as well as Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democratization. The indices are analyzed in terms of their background and 
development, their dimensional focus and methodology, as well as their transferability 
to the QDI. Additionally, the indices are systematically evaluated regarding their 
respective concept quality.  
 
Chapter six deals with the operationalization of the QDI. Firstly, the indices’ processing 
and adaptations are discussed for the purpose of their combination. Secondly, the 
aggregation methodology of the QDI is presented, especially against the backdrop of 
transparency and replicability. Subsequently, an exemplary QDI country ranking of 
democratic quality is generated for 2006. Eventually, this country ranking is compared 
to the particular ratings of the constituent democracy indices as well as external 
reference values by statistical means.  
 
Chapter seven represents a reflexive element of the thesis, as the concept quality of 
the QDI is assessed on the basis of the validation approach presented in chapter three. 
Thereby, the critical evaluation comprises the processes of conceptualization, 
measurement, and aggregation.  
 
Chapter eight concludes, recapitulates the research question and clarifies whether the 
research goal has been accomplished satisfactorily, i.e. setting up a meta-index for 
democracy evaluation. This chapter also highlights the pitfalls and obstacles, which 
may have been occurred during the research process, especially with regard to the 
practicability, usefulness and operationalization of the QDI. Finally, potential further 
research proposals are commented on. 
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2 The Idea of “Quality of Democracy” 
This chapter will derive a working definition of “democracy” in order to provide a basis 
for the QDI assessments of the subsequent chapters. Secondly, the need for 
evaluating the quality of democracy will be highlighted. Thirdly, a selection of prominent 
challenges within democracy measurement will be discussed in detail. Finally, there will 
be a presentation of two important approaches to assess the concept quality of 
democracy indices.  
2.1 “Democracy” as the Central Term 
Before measuring democracy, there is a need for proper clarification of what should be 
understood under the term “democracy” in the course of a research process (Lauth et 
al. 2000b, 12; Keman 2002b, 34; Lauth/Winkler 2002, 44; Abromeit 2004, 74).  
In general, there are two alternative approaches to derive a democracy conception, 
either the deductive-absolute or the inductive-relative approach (Müller/Pickel 2007, 
512; Pickel/Müller 2006, 135). The first one refers to the empirical deduction of a 
democracy conception from real democratic political systems as well as to the 
identification of best practices in the international community (Müller/Pickel 2007, 512). 
The second approach, by contrast, emphasizes the need for a sound theoretical 
deduction of democracy conceptions and thus explicitly refuses the first alternative due 
to the potential danger of significant normative bias (Müller/Pickel 2007, 512; Lauth 
2004, 26).  
 
Naturally, the concept of democracy deals with social actions. In this sense, democracy 
always presupposes normative valuations. Consequently, it would be wrong to assume 
that democracy assessments can be conducted without normative implications (Traine 
2000, 216).20 However, this diploma thesis will follow the second alternative of deriving 
a democracy concept, notably the inductive-relative approach, in order to circumvent 
potential empirical fallacies (Abromeit 2004, 76-7; Saward 1994, 6). In addition, without 
accurate theoretical foundation, questions of validity and reliability could not be 
answered.21 As a result, democracy evaluations without a theoretical basis elude the 
possibility of scientific falsification. Nonetheless, the normative background of the 
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“Defining democracy is a political act” (Saward 1994, 7) 
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 See 2.4 Assessing the Concept Quality of Democracy Indices, 26 
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research process will be revealed as transparently as possible (Lauth et al. 2000b, 13; 
Schiller 1999, 28).  
 
In consideration of the mere confusion of differing, often contradicting definitions of 
democracy within the empirical study of democracy, the provision of a universal 
conception of democracy seems unrealistic. 22  However, three classifications of 
democracy definitions can be identified, including the constitutional, the substantive, as 
well as the procedural approach (Tilly 2007, 7-9). The first one focuses on the legal 
status of political systems and distinguishes on the basis of the constitutional setup, 
e.g. monarchies vs. oligarchies, etc. (Tilly 2007, 7). The second one, the substantive 
approach, deals with the output of political systems in terms of wealth, security, 
economic growth, etc. (Tilly 2007, 7; Abromeit 2004, 79) Finally, the procedural 
approach emphasizes governmental practices, such as elections and referendums, 
thus stressing the dynamic element of democracies (Tilly 2007, 8).  
 
Substantive democracy conceptions are rather problematic in terms of 
operationalization for democratic quality assessments, as they predominantly focus on 
policy performance and neglect the control dimension of democracy (Lauth 2004, 37-
8). The problem is that other, non-democratic regime types can equally deliver good 
economic performance results (Roller 2005, 268). Consequently, performance as an 
additional dimension is not apt within the frame of democratic quality evaluation (Lauth 
2004, 44). The quality of democracy must not be confounded with other political 
aspects, such as good governance, welfare system or system stability (Lauth 2004, 
29). Nonetheless, countries require minimum standards of state capacity in order to 
enable quality of democracy. 
 
In consideration of the deliberations above, political democracies will be defined in the 
style of Almond et al. (2004)23 and Lauth (2004)24:  
 
                                               
22
 
 
“Clearly, providing a definition of political democracy that everyone accepts is impossible.” 
(Bollen 1991, 5) 
23
 
 
“A democracy, briefly defined, is a political system in which citizens enjoy a number of basic 
civil and political rights, and in which their most important political leaders are elected in free 
and fair elections and accountable under a rule of law.” (Almond et al. 2004, 27) 
24
 
 
„Demokratie ist eine rechtsstaatliche Herrschaftsform, die eine Selbstbestimmung für alle 
Staatsbürgerinnen und Staatsbürger im Sinne der Volkssouveränität ermöglicht, indem sie 
die maßgebliche Beteiligung von jenen an der Besetzung der politischen 
Entscheidungspositionen (und/oder an der Entscheidung selbst) in freien, kompetitiven und 
fairen Verfahren (z.B. Wahlen) und die Chancen einer kontinuierlichen Einflussnahme auf 
den politischen Prozess sichert und generell eine Kontrolle der politische Herrschaft 
garantiert.“ (Lauth 2004, 100) 
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Democracies are political systems, in which all citizens are entitled to 
elect their political representatives in free, fair, meaningful, and recurring 
elections and in which basic civil and political rights are guaranteed on the 
basis of the rule of law as well as a system of control and accountability in 
order to enable the proper execution of these rights.  
 
Apparently, democracy is a multidimensional concept (Munck 2006, 138). As a result, 
the measurement of democratic quality is only valid, if all of the conceptual elements 
are adequately operationalized.25 The democracy definition, which forms the basis of 
this thesis, thus, incorporates liberal as well as procedural democratic elements, 
notably equality, liberty, and control (Lauth 2004, 31). However, the dualistic character 
of liberal democracies must be borne in mind, as the popular will is simultaneously 
affirmed and limited (Plattner 2004, 107).  
 
On the one hand, the liberal principle aims at making the people sovereign in terms of 
determining policy decisions. On the other hand, there is a need for protecting 
minorities to guarantee their ability of executing their rights and liberties. Put differently, 
liberal democracy enables equality, participation, competition, vertical accountability, 
and responsiveness, which fortifies the popular will. Simultaneously, freedom rights, 
the rule of law, as well as horizontal accountability work to limit the power of 
government and thus limit the effectiveness of the aforementioned channels of popular 
will (Plattner 2004, 107-8).  
2.2 The Need for Assessing the Quality of Democracy 
The analysis of democracy has always been a core business within the frame of 
comparative politics (Keman 2002b, 32). The goal of democracy measurement is the 
provision of inter-subjectively accepted criteria to evaluate the quality of democracy of 
political systems on a comparative basis (Pickel/Müller 2006, 135).26 More specifically, 
the goal of quantitative and quantifying democracy measurement is to work with narrow 
democracy concepts, while simultaneously depicting a reliable and valid picture of the 
democratic reality (Gaber 2000, 112).  
 
In this context, democracy measurement has to fulfill two different tasks, regime 
classification, on the one hand, and the assessment of democratic quality, on the other 
                                               
25
 
 6 Operationalization of the QD-Index, 78; 8.2 Further Research Proposals, 105 
26
 
 
“Die empirische Bestimmung von Demokratie ist das zentrale Ziel der Demokratiemessung.” 
(Lauth 2006, 92) 
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hand (Lauth 2006, 92). Thereby, dichotomous regime classifications were sufficient 
during the period of the Cold War. But since the end of the bipolar world order, the 
need increased for measuring democracy on a more differentiated level by providing 
quantitative indices and methods (Abromeit 2001, 1; Welzel 2000, 135; Gaber 2000, 
112). Besides, the question of how democratic democracies really are got ever more 
important (Schmidt 2000, 413-8; Pickel 2000, 242-3).  
 
Moreover, the substantial amount of hybrid regimes, ranging between authoritarian and 
democratic political systems, generates the need for indices that are able to accurately 
evaluate the continuum within different subtypes of democracies (Lauth et al. 2000b, 8-
9; Welzel 2000, 134). All these political developments lead to the idea of considering 
the quality of democracy as a matter of degree, which equally requires a gradual 
measurement of democracy in order to converge to a more realistic depiction of 
political systems.27 Put differently, dichotomous classifications are no longer sufficient 
to adequately depict the political reality and are thus replaced by polytomous 
conceptions and indices (Pickel 2000, 242; Bollen 1991, 9; Emminghaus/Nord 2000, 
164).28  
 
Apart from this, the need for assessing the quality of democracies rests upon a variety 
of additional reasons. For instance, the evaluation of democratic quality is vital to the 
field of “transformation research”, as it contributes to understand the dynamics and 
stability of processes of democratization (Lauth 2006, 89). The research effort, hereby, 
does not focus on institutional subtypes of democracy, such as parliamentary vs. 
presidential or proportional vs. majoritarian systems, but rather on functioning vs. 
deficient democracies (Lauth 2004, 10-1; Lauth 2006, 89). Nonetheless, it is also 
important for established democracies to critically assess their respective democratic 
quality (Lauth 2006, 89). Thus, quality research also helps to better understand the 
democratic improvement, stagnation, or even regression of established democracies 
(Lauth 2004, 11). 
 
The assessment of democratic quality also plays a key role for the testing and 
underpinning of theoretical concepts, such as modernization theory or the theory of 
“Democratic Peace” (Lauth 2006, 89).29 Consequently, the empirical investigation of 
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“The concept of political democracy is continuous.”, (Bollen 1991, 9) 
28
 
 See 1.2 Review of the State of Research, 3 
29
 
 According to the theory of „Democratic Peace“, democracies do not engage in military 
operations or wars against each other. Put differently, war could be eliminated, if all 
countries were to transform into democracies (Gärtner 2005, 32). Especially within this 
context, the need for differentiated, polytomous democracy assessment gets obvious.  
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democratic quality contributes to other fields of research, which explore the 
interrelations of democracy and economic performance, regime stability, etc. (Lauth 
2004, 11). 
  
Finally, the evaluation of democratic quality also features two important political 
implications. On the one hand, country rankings are often used as a conditionality 
criterion for official development assistance (ODA) by the international community 
(Lauth 2004, 12; Lauth 2006, 89). Democracy rankings, therefore, always imply a need 
for political justification, as well. On the other hand, assessing the quality of democracy 
on a global scale helps to avoid the illusionary fallacy that the idea of democracy has 
already conquered the world. In fact, the empirical study of democracy makes evident, 
that only a small fraction of the world population lives in high-quality democratic political 
systems (Schmidt 2000, 416). That is why the evaluation of democratic quality has to 
distinguish properly between the institutionalized political structures and the 
constitutional reality (Pickel 2006, 111; Emminghaus/Nord 2000, 182).  
 
Although the need for assessing the quality of democracy of political systems is 
undisputable, many questions and problems of this field still remain unsolved (Lauth et 
al. 2000b, 11-2): Should the idea of democracy be regarded as universal or rather 
culturally specific? 30  What are general elements and dimensions of every 
democracy?31 What are the best indicators for measuring democratic quality? Should 
democracy measurement pursue a subjective or rather an objective approach?32 
2.3 Problems of Conceptualization and Operationalization 
Despite the fact, that there is a true need for assessing the quality of democracy, there 
is a wide range of problems and difficulties involved with this sub discipline of the 
empirical study of democracy. The problems include minimalist vs. maximalist 
democracy conceptions, theoretical universalism vs. cultural relativism, validity, 
reliability, and objectivity vs. subjectivity. In addition, scale construction, threshold 
problems, the weighting of dimensions, data availability, as well as index combination 
represent important challenges of conceptualization and operationalization.  
In consideration of this fact, each of these issues will be dealt with in the subsequent 
sections.  
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 See 2.3.2 Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism, 18 
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 See 3 Principles and Dimensions of , 31 
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 See 2.3.4 Objectivity vs. Subjectivity, 20 
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2.3.1 Minimalist vs. Maximalist Democracy Concepts 
Before starting measuring the quality of democracy, there is a need for clarification of 
the concept “democracy” (Lauth 2004, 12). 33  Particularly, the differentiated 
classification between regime types as well as within established democracies requires 
an adequate definition and proper operationalization of democracy (Lauth 2004, 14).  
In scientific literature there is an enormous variety of often confounding indicators, 
dimensions and attributes to assess democratic quality (Lauth 2004, 13; Hadenius 
1992, 5). In this context, two different approaches can be distinguished; minimalist and 
maximalist democracy conceptions.  
 
Both conceptions feature strengths and weaknesses. For instance, minimalist 
conceptions try to depict the reality with only few dimensions and indicators, thus 
concentrating on basic universal requirements for democracy (Coppedge/Reinicke 
1991, 48; Lauth 2004, 25-6).34 As a result, global comparative analyses are feasible 
(Lauth 2004, 23). At the same time, minimalist concepts suffer from validity problems 
(Bogaards 2007, 1233; Abromeit 2001, 3).35 Many countries are automatically top-
ranked, because a differentiated classification of countries is often hardly possible 
(Coppedge/Reinicke 1991, 58). Besides, minimalist conceptions often only refer to the 
equality and liberty principles, thereby, neglecting the democratic principle of control 
(Lauth 2006, 91).36  
 
By contrast, maximalist concepts focus on a more comprehensive depiction of 
democratic reality by including auxiliary preconditions and conducive factors of 
democracy (Bollen 1991, 8; Lauth 2004, 29). As a result, the problem arises that the 
measurement of political democracy is often confounded with other concepts, such as 
economic growth, wealth, stability, or socio-economic development (Bollen 1991, 8). 
This, in turn, may lead to serious difficulties of operationalization (Lauth 2004, 21).  
 
All in all, the measurement of democratic quality faces a dilemma of conceptualization: 
Either the researcher follows a minimalist concept, thereby risking significant validity 
problems, or he chooses a maximalist concept with the problems of complex 
operationalization and data availability (Bogaards 2007, 1233). Bearing in mind this 
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„Bevor man mit dem Messen anfängt, muss man wissen, was genau man messen will.“ 
(Abromeit 2001, 3) 
34
 
 For instance, Dahl’s „polyarchy“-concept explicitly refers to the political dimension of 
democracy, trying to identify the most basic democracy requirements (Dahl 1971).  
35
 
 See 2.3.3 Validity and Reliability, 18 
36
 
 See 3 Principles and Dimensions of Democratic Quality, 31 
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dilemma, the model, developed within this diploma thesis, applies a rather narrow 
democracy conception in-between these both extremes. It focuses on the political 
dimension of democracy and incorporate all three basic principles of democracy, 
notably equality, liberty, and control (Lauth 2004, 31).37  
2.3.2 Universalism vs. Cultural Relativism 
Like other disciplines of social science, empirical democracy research operates within 
the stress ratio of universalism vs. cultural relativism (Lauth 2004, 13). One often cited 
point of criticism is that the measurement of democratic quality predominantly suffers 
from a eurocentristic perspective (Lauth 2004, 20). Critics put forward that the 
evaluation of democracy requires much more context-sensitive operationalizations 
(Lauth 2004, 20). Abromeit (2001), for example, criticizes the “institutional fallacy”, i.e. 
solely institutionally focused democracy conceptions, thereby using established 
democracies as a benchmark for all other democracies. She stresses the fact that this 
approach rather measures the convergence of a country to the system of the 
“hegemonial benchmark country” (Abromeit 2001, 2).38  
 
Though there may be considerable cultural bias in the course of the process of 
democracy conceptualization, a universal approach to measure democratic quality 
nonetheless features some legitimacy, especially, against the backdrop of the 
universality of the democratic idea. Besides, no real comparative democratic research 
would be feasible, if the universal assumption of democratic values was negated (Lauth 
2004, 23). As a result, there is a need for a universal definition, conceptualization, and 
operationalization of democracy, which allows for a differentiated evaluation of 
democratic quality. In this context, two goals must simultaneously be achieved; the 
differentiation of distinct regime types as well as the nuanced evaluation of established 
democracies (Lauth 2004, 23).39 
2.3.3 Validity and Reliability 
In general, democracy assessment suffers from significant flaws concerning its 
objectivity, validity and reliability (Lauth 2004, 305). Though they are all interrelated to 
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 See 2.1“Democracy” as the Central Term, 12;  
38
 
 Abromeit (2004) underscores that high inter-correlations of democracy indices do not 
necessarily approve their respective concept validity. According to her, the weakness of the 
instruments, measuring democratic quality, is often due to their exclusively institutional, 
onesided perspective. (Abromeit 2004, 75-6) 
39
 
 See 2.3.1 Minimalist vs. Maximalist Democracy Concepts, 17 
   The Idea of “Quality of Democracy” 
 19 
some degree, the last two of them will be dealt with separately within this subsection of 
the chapter.  
 
Reliability refers to the clarity and repeatability of democracy measurements. In this 
connection, there are several criteria for reliability, including the clarity of indicators, the 
clarity of scaling, and the objectivity of the researcher concerning potential ideological 
bias (Lauth 2004, 231). In addition, reliability also refers to the clarity of indexation in 
terms of data aggregation40 and thresholds41, the testing of reliability, as well as the 
transparency of data sources (Lauth 2004, 231). Especially the last point reveals the 
necessity of achieving a broad variety of sources, including journal articles, magazines, 
year books, official statistical data, scientific case studies, NGO data, etc. in order to 
decrease the potential bias of the actual sources (Lauth 2004, 306-7).  
 
Validity, by contrast, generally focuses on the congruence of what is attempted to be 
measured and what is actually been measured (Pickel/Müller 2006, 135). In this 
conjunction, there are three distinct types of validity, among them content validity, 
criteria validity, as well as construct validity (Lauth 2004, 231-2; Lauth/Winkler 2002, 
67). The first one, content validity, deals with the question whether the theory applied 
coincides with its operationalization (Lauth 2004, 231).42 Put differently, it questions 
whether all relevant aspects of a theoretical concept are depicted by its indicators. 
Derived from this, a proper definition of democracy is vital to the content validity, as 
well as for the validity of the indicators used (Lauth 2004, 233).  
 
Apart from this, criteria validity aims at exogenous validity testing under the assumption 
that the external variable measures the same like the internal one (Lauth 2004, 231). 
This approach, however, is difficult to be realized for democracy assessment, as it is 
nearly impossible to find two variables, especially exogenous ones, which measure 
exactly the same issue (Lauth 2004, 232). Finally, construct validity refers to the 
validation of internal coherence of a theoretical concept via other theoretical concepts 
(Lauth 2004, 232). Similar to the criteria validity, the guarantee of construct validity is 
hardly achievable for democracy research, as there is the potential danger of 
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 See 2.4 Assessing the Concept Quality of Democracy Indices, 26 
41
 
 See 2.3.6 Threshold Problem, 22 
42
 
 For instance, Bollen (1991) stresses that voter turnout might have little to do with political 
democracy due to external influencing factors, such as the obligation to vote, fraud, etc. 
(Bollen 1991, 4) According to Bollen (1991) indicators have to be as valid as possible and 
also applicable in empirical research. (Bollen 1991, 10-5) 
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confounding democracy conceptions with other theoretical constructs (Bollen 1991, 8; 
Lauth 2004, 232).43  
 
Due to the manifold challenges in guaranteeing the validity of democracy assessments, 
there is a need for validity tests. Thereby, recent research efforts reject endogenous 
cross validation, as there remains the problem of “tautological fallacy”, which means 
that neither of the democracy indices truly measures democracy, although their inter-
correlation may be high (Welzel 2000, 136; Abromeit 2004, 76). 44  Consequently, 
political scientists nowadays rather advocate exogenous validation of democracy 
measures, e.g. human development and democracy, in order to guarantee an external 
measurement yardstick (Welzel 2000, 136).45 Nonetheless, it is difficult to find objective 
benchmark criteria to assess the validity of specific democracy evaluations (Lauth 2006, 
90).  
2.3.4 Objectivity vs. Subjectivity 
Closely related to the question of measurement validity and reliability is the question of 
objectivity vs. subjectivity of democracy assessments within the broader frame of 
qualitative vs. quantitative research (Lauth 2004, 227). Among the variety of 
democracy indices, there is only one truly quantitative, objective index, notably 
Vanhanen’s ID (Lauth 2004, 245). Besides, there are exclusively qualitative, subjective 
democracy measures, as well, e.g. democratic audits (Beetham 1994a; Beetham 
1994b; Weir/Beetham 1999).46 In between those two extremes, the vast majority of 
indices follows a quantifying, quasi-objective approach, based on subjective expert 
judgments, which are then transformed into scale ratings (Pickel 2000, 243).  
 
Besides the methodological particularities of the indices, all democracy measurements 
should principally aim at high levels of objectivity. Three major types of objectivity can 
be distinguished, among them execution objectivity, evaluation objectivity, as well as 
interpretation objectivity (Lauth 2004, 227). Execution objectivity refers to the 
independency of measurement processes from the researcher, which means that 
indicators should not be ambiguous in terms of interpretation (Lauth 2004, 228). 
Evaluation objectivity, by comparison, aims at result independency from the 
researchers’ codification (Lauth 2004, 228). In this context, however, the problems of 
data allocation correlate with the degree of differentiation (Lauth 2004, 228).  
                                               
43
 
 See 2.3.1 Minimalist vs. Maximalist Democracy Concepts, 17 
44
 
 See 6.4.1 Comparison QDI Results vs. Constituent Indices, 89 
45
  See 6.4.2 Comparison of QDI Results vs. External Values, 90 
46
 
 See 1.2 Review of the State of Research, 3 
   The Idea of “Quality of Democracy” 
 21 
Put differently, evaluation objectivity decreases, the more fine-grained the modes of 
differentiation are (Lauth 2004, 228).47 Finally, interpretation objectivity refers to the 
handling and processing of the quantified material as well as to the threshold problem 
(Lauth 2004, 229).48 
 
The detailed discussion of different types of objectivity underlines the fact that 
democracy assessment aims at reducing measurement bias, because it substantially 
undermines the significance of empirical results and country comparisons 
(Bollen/Paxton 2000, 58). This undermining may be traced to eurocentrism49 , the 
impossibility of having first-hand and in-depth knowledge of all countries assessed,  
or the potential bias in secondary sources in general (Bollen 1991, 13-4). Especially 
Bollen (Bollen 1991; Bollen 1993; Bollen/Paxton 2000) has elaborated criticism on 
subjective democracy indicators and measures, as he found out that judge-specific 
errors play a substantial role in measurement bias and that these “method factors” are 
stable over the years (Bollen/Paxton 2000, 71).50  
 
Similar to the three subtypes of objectivity described above, Bollen (Bollen/Paxton 
2000) identifies a threefold judge-specific error. Firstly, bias may occur in gathering 
information due to filtering processes as well as the consideration of non-representative 
information. Secondly, the information processing itself may significantly distort 
empirical results, as the distinction between relevant and irrelevant information may be 
malfunctioning. Thirdly, the translation of the processed information into country ratings 
may be prone to systematic bias, because judges differ in terms of their measurement 
and aggregation methods (Bollen/Paxton 2000, 62-4). The overlaps with the 
aforementioned three types of objectivity are obvious. 
 
Of course, data selection always produces some bias due to cognitive, normative, and 
ideological selectivity and thus subjective evaluations (Beetham/Weir 2000, 78). 
Consequently, measurement processes always require a sound documentation of all 
sources utilized (Lauth 2004, 308). In order to eliminate the flaws of subjective 
democracy measurement, Bollen/Paxton (2000) suggest kind of a standard operation 
procedure: Firstly, there is need for a proper definition of democracy.51  Secondly, 
democracy dimensions with appropriate indicators must be identified. Thirdly, the way 
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“The judges are creating consistent, systematic error in the ratings of democracy.” 
(Bollen/Paxton 2000, 71) 
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 See 2.1 “Democracy” as the Central Term, 12 
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how the indicators are created as well as the particular relations between indicators 
and actual dimensions must be clarified. Finally, validity and reliability estimates have 
to be added (Bollen 1991, 15).  
 
Moreover, measurement bias can be diminished by improving democracy indices in 
order to delimit the impact of “method-factors” (Bollen/Paxton 2000, 78). One option is 
simply to be aware of the potential threat of the bias, and hence not to overestimate the 
empirical findings. Additionally, a panel of judges with diverse backgrounds may be 
installed in order to reduce the ideological, normative bias of the researchers. 
Ultimately, the use of objective measures may be extended, although then the question 
of adequately weighting the various indicators arises (Bollen/Paxton 2000, 78-9).52  
2.3.5 Scale Construction 
One of the goals of empirical democracy measurement is to generate accurate scales 
for the differentiated assessment of political systems (Croissant/Thiery 2000, 89).  
In this context, different types of scales are applied, including nominal, ordinal, interval, 
and ratio scales (Lauth/Winkler 2002, 66; Lauth 2004, 235). Nominal scales allow only 
one distinction, e.g. the classification of authoritarian vs. democratic regimes 
(Lauth/Winkler 2002, 66). Furthermore, ordinal scales, as contrasted with interval 
scales, enable to identify relations between objects without indicating the logical 
distance between them (Lauth/Winkler 2002, 66). Finally, ratio scales are additionally 
related to a neutral, zero point, e.g. the share of votes of a party in elections 
(Lauth/Winkler 2002, 66).  
 
Though there is a number of different scale levels, measuring democratic quality still 
faces an unsolved problem, i.e. the accurate classification of political systems 
(Croissant/Thiery 2000, 90; Lauth 2004, 305). Especially, the area between 
democracies and authoritarian regimes requires an instrument for the differentiated 
evaluation of democratic quality (Croissant/Thiery 2000, 95). However, empirical 
research has to bear in mind the problem of diminishing reliability, if the number of 
scale categories increases (Lauth 2004, 305).  
2.3.6 Threshold Problem 
Closely linked to the problem of scaling is the problem of identifying accurate 
thresholds for regime classification (Pickel/Müller 2006, 169). The question of 
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appropriate thresholds arises due to the dilemma between the need for gradations for a 
differentiated depiction of reality, on the one hand, and the idea of clear-cut regime 
classification, on the other hand (Lauth 2004, 110).  
 
In general, there are two strategies to solve the threshold problem. Firstly, thresholds 
may be totally omitted (Lauth 2004, 113-4). Thus, each country would be considered to 
be a democracy, while only differing in its degree. Secondly, thresholds may be 
retained, though not on the aggregate but rather on the sublevels of democracy indices 
(Lauth 2004, 114). This may circumvent the fallacy of compensating low results in one 
dimension with better results in other dimensions (Lauth 2004, 311). A political system 
would rank as a democracy only under the condition of passing all the relevant 
minimum sublevel thresholds.  
 
Either with or without thresholds, there is always a need for theoretical reflection (Lauth 
2004, 310). In general, the idea of assuming democracy as a continuum of differing 
gradations seems to be more suitable than simple categories, especially because the 
threshold problem aggravates if opting for low-differentiating regime categorizations 
(Lauth 2004, 11; Welzel 2000, 135; Pickel 2000, 242).53  
2.3.7 Weighting of Dimensions 
The indexation constitutes the inversion of the disaggregation of the democracy 
concept into dimensions and indicators (Lauth 2004, 309). Thereby, the problem of 
weighting the various indicators arises. In principal, the process can either be additive 
or multiplicative (Lauth 2004, 309). In the former case, countries can compensate bad 
ratings in one democracy dimension, if they rate better in the remaining ones. In the 
latter case, the multiplicative alternative, no compensation is feasible. If one category 
rates zero points, the whole result becomes zero (Lauth 2004, 309).54  
 
Concerning the process of indexation, there must be borne in mind, that also the pure 
selection of indicators itself represents an immanent kind of weighting (Lauth 2004, 
309). However, it is rather impossible to find an adequate way of accurately weighting 
democratic dimensions, as there is no sound theoretical justification for determining 
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particular percentages.55 Due to the fact, that weighting has the most important impact 
on final rating results, there is a need for sound theoretical reflection of the whole 
process (Lauth 2004, 310).56 This need intensifies in case of high numbers of indicators 
(Vanhanen 2000, 185). 
2.3.8 Data Availability 
A specific problem in comparative democracy research is the question of data 
availability and information filtering processes concerning the countries assessed, 
which is illustrated in figure 4. This problem holds especially true for political systems 
that can be classified as “non-democracies”. The problem of data availability 
aggravates, as the number of countries evaluated as well as the variety of indicators 
increase (Pickel 2000, 249; Vanhanen 2000, 185).  
 
 
Especially, in African countries data availability may represent a substantial obstacle in 
assessing their quality of democracy (Emminghaus/Nord 2000, 179). This underlines 
the data base dilemma for non-consolidated democracies: On the one hand, there is a 
need for differentiated assessment of the actual particularities of these countries.  
On the other hand, insufficient data availability may hamper accurate evaluation and 
comparability (Emminghaus/Nord 2000, 180). In fact, the reliability of democracy 
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element.” (Elklit 1994, 107) 
56
  See 6.2 Aggregation Methodology of the QD-Index, 82 
All events
Documented events
Accessible information
Published information
Internationally published information
Information published in Austria
 
Fig. 4: Data Availability Problem 
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measurement correlates with the level of development of the country evaluated 
(Emminghaus/Nord 2000, 181).  
 
Of course, there are strategies to deal with so called “missing values”. Firstly, if data is 
lacking for a specific indicator or dimension, the whole country could be eliminated from 
the assessment and the subsequent ranking (Coppedge/Reinicke 1991, 49). However, 
this strategy may lead to the elimination of a whole range of countries, if the evaluation 
conception is based on a complex variety of indicators. This in turn may lead to an 
additional bias due to the invalid rating improvements of the other countries 
(Coppedge/Reinicke 1991, 49). Secondly, missing values could simply be rated with 
zero points, an arithmetic mean of all other countries’ indicators, or the average score 
of that country in its other dimensions (Campbell/Sükösd 2002, 11). This second 
approach avoids the elimination of the countries with missing values. Problematic, 
however, is the theoretical justification of ascribing arbitrary ratings to missing values.  
2.3.9 Index Combination 
In consideration of the manifold challenges concerning the evaluation of democratic 
quality, which have been described above, most recent research efforts focus on the 
combination of current democracy indices (Lauth 2006; Campbell/Sükösd 2002). 57  
In this context, the goal is to generate more valid and more reliable overall 
measurement instruments that enable more accurate country assessments for a better 
understanding of the complex democracy dynamics (Pickel/Müller 2006, 168; Lauth 
2006, 103). Index combination may enable the avoidance of singular index problems, 
while simultaneously providing solutions for one-sided, minimalist democracy 
measurements (Pickel/Müller 2006, 170). Especially, the combination of quasi-
objective and quantitative indices could lead to a more reliable country evaluation 
(Keman 2002b, 47).58  
 
Nevertheless, there are challenges involved with index combination, as well.  
For instance, different democracy indices may be based on different theoretical 
conceptions of democracy. In addition, disaggregated data from expert judgments may 
not be available due to the lack of methodological transparency (Lauth 2004, 317).  
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2.4 Assessing the Concept Quality of Democracy Indices 
The bottom line of the previous section is that there are many conceptual as well as 
methodological problems concerning the measurement of democratic quality. Many of 
the indices simply do not meet minimum scientific criteria (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 7). 
Although the indices normally highly correlate in terms of regime classification, they 
suffer from adequate ascertainment of democratic quality (Lauth 2006, 92-3). 59  
The problem aggravates, as the degree of scale differentiation and its inherent 
variance increase (Lauth 2006, 93). Consequently, there is a need for a sound and 
systematic methodological discussion (Lauth 2006, 93).  
 
Due to the fact that assessing the quality of democracy is an extremely complex issue 
as well as due to the research gap of accurate operationalization of theoretical 
constructs, most recent scientific research tries to evaluate the actual concept quality of 
democracy indices on a comparative basis (Pickel 2000, 262; Munck/Verkuilen 2002; 
Müller/Pickel 2007). This field of research serves as a “meta-evaluation” of the 
evaluations generated by the democracy indices (Pickel/Müller 2006, 136). In this 
respect, two pioneering attempts have to be mentioned, notably those of 
Munck/Verkuilen (2002) and Müller/Pickel (2007).  
2.4.1 Approach by Munck/Verkuilen (2002) 
Munck/Verkuilen (2002) criticize that there is little emphasis on methodological 
questions in the field of empirical democracy research (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 7). They 
identify three major challenges in the frame of democracy evaluation, including 
conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 7). 
Conceptualization refers to the identification of adequate democracy attributes as well 
as their logic, vertical organization. The problem, of course, is the lacking of a definite 
guide to determine which attributes should be taken into account (Munck/Verkuilen 
2002, 7-8). Munck/Verkuilen (2002) criticize the application both of minimalist and 
maximalist definitions, thus, the overloading of concepts vs. the potential danger of 
ignoring fundamental democracy attributes (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 9).60  
 
The sound vertical organization of the relevant attributes should be carried out 
according to their actual degree of abstraction, from the concept to the attributes to the 
components of attributes (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 12). This process of disaggregating 
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the attributes is valuable in a dual manner, it helps avoiding the redundancy of 
democracy indicators and simultaneously provides the basis for the subsequent 
measurement step (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 13).  
 
The measurement stage starts at the lowest level of abstraction and obtains two 
important tasks, including the selection of indicators and the selection of the 
measurement level (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 15). Munck/Verkuilen (2002) advocate 
using multiple indicators with cross-cultural equivalence for one attribute. Put differently, 
they emphasize the need for universally apt indicators (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 15-6).  
In consideration of the fact, that evaluating democratic quality will always entail 
measurement error and data availability problems61 to some degree, the authors come 
out in favor of selecting indicators that are less subject to bias and which can be based 
on various sources (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 16).  
 
Concerning the second task, the selection of adequate measurement levels, 
researchers should bear in mind both the avoidance of too detailed and too superficial 
scaling with little potential for differentiation (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 17). 
Munck/Verkuilen (2002) underscore that the selection of accurate measurement levels 
represents one of the greatest deficits of current democracy indices (Munck/Verkuilen 
2002, 18). In addition, they favor coder panels in order to guarantee inter-subjective 
measurement reliability.62 However, the authors also emphasize that high reliability 
may not necessarily be ensured through high validity, as all coders may be equally 
subject to systematic bias (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 18).  
 
The last of the three challenges is the aggregation stage. Thereby, the process of 
disaggregation of the conceptualization stage gets reversed (Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 
22). Munck/Verkuilen (2002) stress the necessity of the theoretical justification of the 
aggregation level as well as the aggregation procedure (Campbell 1996, 23). 
Particularly, the authors highlight that the relations among the identified democracy 
attributes and the aggregation rule must coincide theoretically. They advise against too 
high levels of aggregation, for instance the production of a single overall score because 
of the immanent potential danger for loss of result validity and thus a loss of information 
(Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 22-5).63  
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2.4.2 Approach by Müller/Pickel (2007) 
Based on the deliberations of Munck/Verkuilen (2002), Müller/Pickel (2007) 
analogously emphasize the need for inter-subjectively comprehensible criteria for the 
assessment of democratic quality (Müller/Pickel 2007, 512). This need arises due to 
the waves of democratization and thus the question of how democratic democracies 
really are (Pickel 2000, 242-3; Müller/Pickel 2007, 511).64 In this context, the authors 
advocate the validation of measurement concepts, especially concerning the 
methodological conceptualization of indices, including the critical analysis of their 
components in terms of validity and reliability (Müller/Pickel 2007, 513).  
 
However, the authors criticize both endogenous and exogenous validity tests 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 514-5). The first one only tests the validity in terms of internal 
consistency. By contrast, the second alternative tries to establish an external point of 
reference, such as accompanying factors of democracy, to test the validity of the 
democracy concept (Müller/Pickel 2007, 515). The problem related with this approach 
concerns the lacking of the proof of the real interrelationship between democracy and 
these factors. As a consequence, exogenous quantitative validity tests remain to be of 
little value (Müller/Pickel 2007, 515).  
 
In consideration of the deficits of current concept validations, Müller/Pickel (2007) 
advocate a qualitative approach, because the question, of how democratic 
democracies really are, heavily depends on the quality of the actual measurement 
concept that aims at answering this question (Müller/Pickel 2007, 515-6). Their general 
assumption is that valid indicators and valid measurement results can only stem from 
an accurate methodological procedure (Müller/Pickel 2007, 516). The authors’ 
approach, therefore, represents a meta-approach to evaluate democracy indices. Their 
qualitative statements are codified 65  and thus quantified in order to enable the 
comparison of selected indices (Müller/Pickel 2007, 518).66 
 
Müller/Pickel (2007) operationalize the approach proposed by Munck/Verkuilen (2002). 
They also refer to the three major challenges concerning the measurement of 
democratic quality, notably conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation 
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(Müller/Pickel 2007, 517).67 However, the authors go further and identify a wide range 
of indicators for each challenge, which is basically illustrated in figure 5.  
 
The first challenge, the conceptualization, comprises two elements, the concept 
specification (1.1) and the concept logic (1.2) (Müller/Pickel 2007, 519). The concept 
specification refers to the need to incorporate all relevant and necessary attributes into 
a democracy conception provided by an index. Following Munck/Verkuilen (2002), 
Müller/Pickel (2007) distinguish two elements of concept specification, economicalness 
(1.1.1) as well as relevance (1.1.2), thus highlighting the dilemma of maximalist vs. 
minimalist democracy conceptions.68 Economicalness focuses on the application of a 
procedural democracy conception with a clear-cut political perspective, while rather 
neglecting socio-economic factors. Relevance, by contrast, refers to the question of 
whether all fundamental principles and dimensions of democracy have been 
considered in the process of conceptualization (Müller/Pickel 2007, 519).  
 
Apart from this, concept logic consists of the sub elements redundancy (1.2.1) and 
conflation (1.2.2). The first one deals with the question of explicit or implicit multiple 
measurements of democracy attributes, whereas the second one refers to the 
consistent allocation of attributes to democracy dimensions (Müller/Pickel 2007, 525).  
 
The subsequent challenge, i.e. measurement, consists of three sub elements, including 
the validity of indicators (2.1), the validity of scaling or coding (2.2), and its replicability 
(2.3). The validity of indicators itself emphasizes the question whether the indicators 
actually measure what they aim to measure, correct measuring (2.1.1), as well as the 
need for a wide scope of sources (2.1.2) from diverse backgrounds for these indicators. 
The validity of scaling as the second element within the frame of measurement refers 
to the criterion of a theoretical foundation (2.2.1) for the scale chosen (Müller/Pickel 
2007, 526-7).  
 
The third sub element, i.e. replicability, investigates whether the analyzed democracy 
index reveals the coding rules (2.3.1) and the sources applied (2.3.2), comments on 
inter-coder reliability tests (2.3.3), as well as disaggregated data (2.3.4). All of these 
factors aim at highlighting the need for transparency in order to avoid measurement 
errors when replicating democracy indices (Müller/Pickel 2007, 527).  
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Finally, Müller/Pickel (2007) operationalize the third challenge, i.e. aggregation. 
Thereby, they focus on validity of the aggregation level (3.1), the validity of the 
aggregation rule (3.2), as well as the replicability of aggregation (3.3). The indicators 
therefore are the adequacy of the aggregation level (3.1.1), the question of theoretical 
foundation (3.2.1), as well as the transparency and applicability of the aggregation rule 
(3.3.1), respectively. In this connection, the authors advocate the application of 
meaningful aggregation levels and the avoidance of overly aggregated, single scores 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 527-8).  
 
Conceptualization
1.1.1 Economicalness
1.1.2 Relevance
1.1 Concept Specification
1.2.1 Redundancy
1.2.2 Conflation
1.2 Concept Logic
Measurement
2.1.1 Correct Measuring
2.1.2 Scope of Sources
2.1 Validity of Indicators
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation2.2 Validity of Scaling
2.3.1 Coding Rules
2.3.2 Citation of Sources
2.3 Replicability
2.3.3 Inter-Coder Reliability Tests
2.3.4 Disaggregated Data
Aggregation
3.1.1 Adequacy of A.- Level3.1 Validity of A.- Level
3.2.1 Theoretical Foundation3.2 Validity of A.- Rule
3.3.1 Applicability of A.- Rule3.3 Replicability
 
Fig. 5: Concept Validation Approach by Müller/Pickel (2007)  
(Source: Own illustration following Müller/Pickel 2007, 520-3) 
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3 Principles and Dimensions of Democratic Quality 
Before evaluating political systems in terms of their democratic quality, there is a need 
for identifying integral principles and dimensions of the concept “democracy”. In this 
context, it is important to properly distinguish between necessary framework conditions, 
such as minimum levels of statehood and state-centered coercive power, on the one 
hand, and other conducive factors, such as a capitalist market system, on the other 
hand (Lauth 2006, 91; Lauth 2004, 53).  
 
Based on a liberal democracy conception, three constituent principles of democratic 
regimes can be distinguished, including liberty, equality, and control (Lauth 2004, 31). 
Apart from these elements, numerous possible dimensions of democracy can be 
identified. Among them are the rule of law, vertical and horizontal accountability, 
responsiveness, transparency, competition, participation, effectiveness of 
representation, the guarantee of civil and political rights, etc. (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 
21).  
 
Against the backdrop of the great variety of democratic dimensions, it is obvious, that 
democracy represents a multi-dimensional rather than a one-dimensional framework 
(Diamond/Morlino 2004, 22).69 In addition, trade-offs among the dimensions render 
impossible the attempt to maximize all of them simultaneously (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 
21). Bearing in mind these challenges, the claim of measuring the democratic quality of 
political systems must correspond to its multi-dimensional nature.  
3.1 Principles of Democratic Quality 
There are three fundamental principles of democracy, notably liberty, equality, and 
control. The discussion of these elements is important, because they represent a stress 
ratio (Lauth 2004, 99). For instance, classic liberalism sees liberty endangered when 
there is too much emphasis on equality (Lauth 2004, 97-8). Analogously, the idea of 
liberty contrasts with exaggerated levels of control (Lauth 2004, 98). And finally, strict 
equality hampers the effectiveness of specialized control, because auditing offices, for 
example, could not be entitled to control other government branches (Lauth 2004,  
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98-9). All in all, it is rather the balance of these three fundamental democratic 
elements, which ensures high quality of democracy (Lauth 2004, 99).  
3.1.1 Liberty 
One of the principal elements of democracy is liberty (Lauth 2004, 55). 70  It is 
constitutive for democracy, as it allows its citizens to pursue their private goals without 
external interference. In this connection, elections are the most important instrument of 
liberty in terms of the political sphere, especially according to a procedural conception 
of democracy (Lauth 2004, 55).71 However, liberty also requires some minimum socio-
economic standards in order to be properly executed (Beetham 2004, 65).  
3.1.2 Equality 
Analogously, equality serves as another fundamental element of democracy. Within 
scientific research there is substantial debate over the question which type of equality 
should be applied when assessing the quality of democracy. Equality may be 
understood either as a minimalist legal equality or as a maximalist, substantive equality 
in terms of social and political resource endowment (Lauth 2004, 32).  
 
Of course, a purely formal legal equality is not sufficient, as there must be a socio-
economic basis (Lauth 2004, 49). Nonetheless, the question of socio-economic 
preconditions for democracy is more important for transition and consolidation research 
than for the assessment of democratic quality (Lauth 2004, 47).72 The decisive factor 
from a procedural perspective is rather the citizens’ political equality in terms of gender, 
race, ethnicity, political orientation, religion, etc. (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 27; Lauth 
2004, 50) Notwithstanding, the necessity of socio-economic minimum standards also 
applies to the guarantee of political equality (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 27; Lauth 2004, 
50).  
 
Thus, the conception of equality of the QDI will rather follow the first alternative, notably 
legal and political equality of all citizens (Lauth 2004, 34). In this context, the research 
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will focus on input-egalitarianism rather than output-egalitarianism (Lauth 2004, 54). 
Especially, in the context of participation, equality in weight and opportunities is more 
important than equality in impact (Lauth 2004, 35).  
3.1.3 Control 
The third important principle of democracy is control. However, there are great 
differences between current democracy indices concerning its conceptualization (Lauth 
2000, 58). In general, the reign of the people is not unlimited in democratic political 
systems, as there are fundamental individual rights that delimit the sovereign rule 
(Lauth 2006, 91; Lauth 2004, 77). Questions related to the element of control concern 
the subject, the object, the mode, as well as the continuity of control actions (Lauth 
2004, 81). Thereby, the effectiveness of control increases with its frequency (Lauth 
2004, 87). Put differently, the greater the time spans between control activities, the 
lower is their impact (Lauth 2000, 59).73  
 
In general, control activities can be classified into two major categories: political control, 
on the one hand, and legal control, on the other hand (Lauth 2004, 83). Agents of 
political control are parliaments, legal public institutions, audit offices, parties, 
organizations, civil society, as well as the media, whereas legal control is limited to the 
judiciary (Lauth 2004, 83). Both of these subtypes refer to a horizontal and a vertical 
level (Lauth 2004, 79). 74  Clearly, both types presuppose a minimum amount of 
transparency in order to be effective (Lauth 2004, 87).  
3.2 Dimensions of Democratic Quality 
Due to the focus on political democracy as well as on an institutional, procedural rather 
than an output and performance-oriented approach, this chapter will concentrate on the 
following dimensions of democracy: rule of law, civil and political rights, 
responsiveness, vertical and horizontal accountability, participation, and competition.  
3.2.1 Rule of Law 
The most fundamental dimension of democracy is the rule of law (O’Donnell 2004b, 
32). Though the rule of law would be thinkable without democracy, due to the fact that 
other political regimes may also rest upon legal codifications, a democracy without the 
rule of law would be contradictory in terms (Lauth 2004, 166). In general, the rule of law 
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aims at guaranteeing that no one is above the law, especially including all political 
representatives (O’Donnell 1999, 33).  
 
Criteria for the rule of law comprise the generality of the law, the prohibition of personal 
or retroactive law, the equality of all citizens before the law, the binding of the state to 
the constitution and legislation, term limits for political representatives, the legality of 
public administration, and the transparency of political activities (Diamond/Morlino 
2004, 23; Lauth 2004, 147; Maltz 2007, 131). In addition, the rule of law deals with 
legal certainty, independent and professional courts, the separation of power,  
the guarantee that the codified law is fairly applied irrespective of social status, class, 
gender, race, or ethnicity, that the law is publicly known and possible to follow (Lauth 
2004, 147-8; O’Donnell 2004b, 33).  
 
As can be derived from the manifold tasks described above, the rule of law represents 
a precondition for democratic quality. 75  It is the basis for horizontal and vertical 
accountability. Simultaneously, the rule of law enables the exercise of civil liberties and 
political rights, participation, as well as competition (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 26; Lauth 
2004, 141).  
 
Of course, democracy and the rule of law presuppose a minimum level of statehood in 
order to be effective (Lauth 2004, 167). The rule of law especially depends on state 
capacity in terms of homogeneous expansion over state territory (O’Donnell 2004b, 
37). 76 In this context, the question arises, whether statehood is a defining factor or 
solely a precondition for democracy (Lauth 2004, 167). Within this thesis, state capacity 
will be regarded as a conducive factor, not as an integral democracy dimension. 77  
3.2.2 Rights 
Closely related to the rule of law is the question of rights, because there is a 
fundamental relation between rights and equality, as they are principally guaranteed to 
all citizens equally (Beetham 2004, 64). In the course of the diploma thesis, the 
research effort will focus on civil and political rights due to their correspondence with a 
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liberal and procedural conception of political democracy. Additionally, they represent 
the foundation for numerous other democracy dimensions, such as vertical 
accountability, participation, competition, or responsiveness (Beetham 2004, 65). 
Notwithstanding, civil and political rights require minimum socioeconomic standards in 
order to be properly executed (Beetham 2004, 64-5). However, it remains doubtful 
whether equality in civil and political rights also presupposes perfect equality in 
socioeconomic rights (Beetham 2004, 65).  
3.2.2.1 Civil Rights 
Civil rights or civil liberties comprise a multitude of different rights, including the 
freedom of conscience, thought, religion, feeling, expression, opinion, organization and 
association (Cunningham 2002, 28). In addition, they comprise the right for life and 
security of person, privacy, the liberty and freedom of movement and residence, the 
right of legal defense and due process, the freedom of information, as well as the right 
of protection against discrimination (Beetham 2004, 66; Diamond/Morlino 2004, 26). 
Closely related to these civil rights are also certain economic liberties, such as the 
freedom to choose a career as well as the guarantee of property rights (Lauth 2004, 
57; Diamond/Morlino 2004, 26).  
 
Concerning their nature all these civil rights represent negative liberties, as they 
guarantee some protection against astriction of personal individual freedom (Lauth 
2004, 57). As such, they are fundamental to every democracy conception, especially 
the liberal, procedural one.78 Apart from these negative liberties, there are also positive 
rights, which are more related to socio-economic issues, such as the absence of 
poverty or unemployment (Lauth 2004, 58). Due to the fact, that they are contested in 
terms of incorporating them into a democracy conception for evaluating democratic 
quality, they will be neglected within the research effort of this diploma thesis.79  
 
Nonetheless, there is an immanent paradox within liberal democracy conceptions 
(Cunningham 2002, 39). Civil rights represent the liberal principle of democratic quality. 
However, there are limitations to this liberty, especially if citizens pursue goals that 
challenge the very basis of the liberal rights themselves. In this respect, it is important 
to note that the execution and guarantee of liberal rights refers to the operation within 
an established liberal democracy, without fronting the very foundations of the system 
(Cunningham 2002, 39; Lauth 2004, 61).80  
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3.2.2.2 Political Rights 
On the basis of civil rights, political rights comprise the right to elect main political 
representatives, to stand for elective public office, to vote directly in referenda on 
substantial changes in the constitution, to campaign, to organize political parties, etc. 
(Beetham 2004, 69; Diamond/Morlino 2004, 26). It is obvious, that political rights 
depend on the guarantee of civil rights to a large degree (Lauth 2004, 57).  
 
For instance, organizing political parties presupposes the right to organization and 
association (Lauth 2004, 150). As a consequence, the separation of civil and political 
rights is difficult due to their interrelated nature. Analogously, political rights are equally 
important as prerequisites for other democracy dimensions, such as competition, 
participation, or vertical accountability (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 26).  
3.2.3 Responsiveness 
Another often cited dimension of democratic quality is responsiveness (Powell 2004).  
It refers to the extent to which citizens are satisfied with governmental and democratic 
performance (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 27). Put differently, responsiveness deals with 
the congruence of citizens’ preferences and governmental action and policy output. 
This dimension is vital to the realization of democratic quality, as it reflects the will of 
the sovereign. However, there are serious difficulties concerning the operationalization 
of responsiveness, both from a theoretical and a practical perspective (Powell 2000, 
14). 
3.2.3.1 Theoretical Critique of Responsiveness 
Firstly, from the theoretical perspective, modern societies feature diverse and multiple 
preference structures (Lauth 2004, 40). These preferences may be diffuse, 
contradictory, evenly divided over hot issues, and unstable over time (Roberts 2005, 
370). Due to this complexity, it may be impossible to derive a single consistent, 
aggregated citizens’ preference structure that could serve as a yardstick for policy 
decisions (Powell 2004, 93; Lauth 2000, 60; Lauth 2004, 90).81 Because of this fact, 
output-oriented democracy conceptions may be less useful for the assessment of 
democratic quality (Lauth 2004, 44).  
 
Besides, there is a problem of preference aggregation. For example, it may be the case 
that citizens, even well-educated ones, do not have preferences regarding every policy 
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issue (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 28). If only the existing preferences would be taken into 
account, the principle of equality would be violated (Lauth 2004, 90). Additionally,  
it would be highly problematic from a theoretical point of view, if citizens were to be 
forced to develop preferences, as this would run contrary to the principle of liberty 
(Lauth 2004, 90).  
 
Moreover, full responsiveness of political representatives may imply an immanent 
danger for minorities (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 29).82 The majority could simply outweigh 
the preferences of the minority and thus endanger the rule of law, as well as the 
foundations of democracy itself (Lauth 2004, 43). As a result, there must always be a 
normative qualification of preferences, as well, in order to protect the overall 
democratic consensus (Lauth 2004, 43).83  
3.2.3.2 Practical Critique of Responsiveness 
Apart from the theoretical difficulties, there are also numerous practical challenges of 
implementing and operationalizing responsiveness. Firstly, the medium chosen for 
detecting the citizens’ preferences influences the preference outcome to a substantial 
degree (Lauth 2004, 39). For instance, elections can only depict a limited picture of 
responsiveness and public preference articulation, as they occur only periodically 
(Lauth 2004, 92). In addition, citizens may be badly informed about governmental 
performance, which hampers responsiveness to be effective (Roberts 2005, 370; Lauth 
2000, 61). In addition, there are various exogenous factors that influence political 
output and regime performance (Lauth 2004, 91). Due to these facts, good 
governments may be voted out of office, whereas bad governments may be reelected 
(Lauth 2004, 92).  
 
Besides, elections as a valuable instrument of responsiveness face another challenge; 
citizens can only vote for whole policy packages, but no single policy issues (Lauth 
2000, 60). Accordingly, parties constitute preference accumulations, bundles of more 
or less coherent citizens’ preferences (Lauth 2004, 40, 90). Citizens may choose and 
vote for those parties that represent political positions which are least deviant from their 
own (Lauth 2004, 41). Consequently, responsiveness loses its significance as an 
indicator for democratic quality (Lauth 2004, 43).  
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Moreover, stringent responsiveness of political representatives to citizens may be 
problematic in case of the stress ratio between short-term and long-term preferences 
(Powell 2004, 96). Political leaders may avoid necessary long-term reforms that initially 
entail detrimental short-term impacts on citizens’ lives. Especially in developing 
countries, this type of short-term responsiveness leads to the postponement of painful, 
yet necessary reforms (Roberts 2005, 369).  
 
All in all, the question arises whether responsiveness can count as a valuable 
dimension of democracy (Lauth 2004, 43). Due to the weaknesses of the concept, 
especially in terms of operationalization and significance, other dimensions, such as 
vertical accountability, may be better suited instruments to assess democratic quality.  
3.2.4 Accountability 
In general, accountability deals with monitoring, control, checks, surveillance, restrain, 
and sanctioning (Schedler 1999, 14). Hence, it is more broad and inclusive than the 
concept of responsiveness. Accountability is inherent in the institutional structures of a 
political system, whereas responsiveness rather stems from the interaction within 
theses institutional structures (Ferejohn 1999, 131). Thus, the degree of 
responsiveness correlates with the extent to which an institutional structure permits 
accountability (Ferejohn 1999, 131).  
 
There are many different types of accountability, including legal, financial, political, 
bureaucratic, governmental, military, and judicial accountability (Weir/Beetham 1999, 9; 
Schedler 1999, 22). Nevertheless, each of these types always comprises two 
components, answerability, on the one hand, and enforcement, on the other hand 
(Schedler 1999, 14). Basically, answerability refers to the right of the public as well as 
other state institutions to be informed and to receive explanation regarding government 
action (Schedler 1999, 15). Answerability comprises the subcomponents information 
and justification (Schedler 1999, 17). In this context, answerability requires 
transparency. Put differently, democratic accountability has to be public in order to 
work effectively (Schedler 1999, 20).  
 
By contrast, enforcement focuses on rewarding good performance, while sanctioning 
bad one (Schedler 1999, 15). Especially, the threat of removal from office represents 
the most effective element of enforcement (Schedler 1999, 16). Of course, it is 
important that accountability involves sanction capacity. Otherwise, there would be no 
real accountability at all (Schedler 1999, 17). However, enforcement does not only 
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include sanctioning instruments; incentives for good political behavior are equally 
important.84  
3.2.4.1 Vertical Accountability 
On the basis of the introductory comments above, vertical accountability implies an 
upward stream from citizens to their elected political representatives (Diamond/Morlino 
2004, 25).85 Thereby, the citizens have two time perspectives: As illustrated in figure 6, 
voters hold their government accountable on a retrospective basis, thus, evaluating the 
past governmental performance. Simultaneously, they are prospectively mandating 
future governments (Powell 2000, 8).  
 
Of course, elections represent the major instrument of accountability, because in a 
democratic political system citizens are entitled to vote incumbent governments out of 
office (Fearon 1999, 56; Powell 2000, 47). Accountability, therefore, occurs not only in 
relation to the general public, but also in terms of concrete policy content (Powell 2000, 
3). Elections serve as the tool to enforce the accountability of policy makers, as the 
anticipation of potential loss of political power leads to compliant behavior (Powell 
2000, 10-1). Once again, the close relationship between accountability and 
responsiveness becomes obvious.86 
 
Nonetheless, accountability equally presupposes a set of minimum preconditions in 
order to work effectively, because it entails a relationship between unequals in terms of 
power, i.e. citizens vs. government (Schedler 1999, 23). Firstly, the citizens must be 
informed about policy issues to be able to evaluate political performance and 
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politicians’ behavior (Powell 2000, 51). In this context, freedoms of opinion and 
association as well as a free media form the basis for continuous monitoring and 
demanding justification (O’Donnell 1999, 29; Schmitter 2004, 48; Diamond/Morlino 
2004, 25). 87  Similarly, competition and participation serve as a foundation for 
meaningful vertical accountability (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 25).  
 
Secondly, citizens must be aware of which politicians are actually responsible for 
specific policy outcomes (Powell 2000, 51). Thirdly, accountability requires meaningful 
elections, because otherwise effective accountability is not feasible (Powell 2000, 51). 
Finally, vertical accountability depends on effective sanctioning mechanisms,  
i.e. politicians must lose their power subsequent to voter disapproval (Powell 2000, 12).  
3.2.4.2 Horizontal Accountability 
Whereas vertical accountability must exist in political systems in order to classify as 
“democratic”, horizontal accountability goes beyond this definitional minimum criterion 
and rather represents an element of democratic quality (O’Donnell 2004b, 37). 
Basically, it refers both to the legality of state action and the constitutionality of public 
laws (Lauth 2004, 89). The horizontal element of this accountability type stems from 
the fact that the interacting state agencies are principally equally endowed with 
power.88  
 
There are numerous agents engaging in horizontal accountability activities, e.g. the 
legislative opposition, investigative committees, regulatory and auditing agencies, state 
ombudsmen, central banks, the judiciary, human rights courts, as well as the 
constitution itself (Schmitter 2004, 53; Diamond/Morlino 2004, 26). The concept of 
horizontal accountability, thus, refers to the prevention of power abuse through the 
separation of power as well as a system of “checks and balances” (Lauth 2004, 79; 
Schedler 1999, 23). As such, horizontal accountability features significant intersections 
with the concept of the rule of law (Lauth 2004, 79).89  
 
Nonetheless, horizontal accountability violates the principle of equality to some 
extent.90 This is due to the fact that there are state agencies, which are entitled to 
control and sanction other state agencies. As a result, these agencies may not be 
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perfectly equal concerning their political and legal power, which forms the “paradox of 
horizontal accountability” (Schedler 1999, 24). In consideration of this problem, the 
question of second-order accountability of the controlling agencies arises (Schedler 
1999, 26). As illustrated in figure 7 there are institutional settings to avoid this second-
order accountability problem (Schedler 1999, 26).  
 
In general, the effectiveness of horizontal accountability is contingent upon the 
interrelated working of auditing institutions, which is backed by an independent 
judiciary. Put differently, it is the dense network of agencies rather than isolated 
institutions that guarantee the effective impact of horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 
1999, 39-41).  
 
Of course, there are obstacles concerning the full implementation of this type of 
accountability, especially if there are state institutions which are excluded from the 
auditing process or if corruption occurs (O’Donnell 1999, 41). Modalities of 
counteracting the potential dangers to horizontal accountability include the 
strengthening of opposition parties, the installation of professional accounting and 
auditing agencies as well as an independent judiciary (O’Donnell 1999, 44). 
Furthermore, political representatives acting as role models, the avoidance of extreme 
social inequalities, an independent media, and strong legislatures all conduce to the 
guarantee of effective horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1999, 45; Fish 2006, 12).  
3.2.4.3 Critique of Acc 
Similar to the critique of responsiveness as a dimension of democratic quality, 
accountability, especially the vertical type, features many weaknesses in terms of 
operationalization.91 At first, there is a certain “fallacy of idealism”, which means that 
there is no such thing as a “best” democracy (Schmitter 2004, 51). Especially, younger 
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democracies may not simply be benchmarked against highly developed and long-
established democracies (Schmitter 2004, 51).  
 
In addition, external factors may influence governmental performance. Consequently, 
bad governments may be rewarded, whereas good ones may be punished in the frame 
of accountability (Roberts 2005, 371). Besides, unpopular political decisions may be 
coupled with popular ones, thus, making accountability difficult to work effectively, 
especially via elections (Ferejohn 1999, 132). Elections also only occur infrequently, 
which impedes continuous vertical accountability (O’Donnell 1999, 30). And even if 
elections take place on a regular basis within small intervals, voter turnout may be 
difficult to interpret, although it is easily measurable (Schmitter 2004, 50). This is due to 
the fact that voters simultaneously select future government mandates and sanction or 
hold accountable past governmental performance (Fearon 1999, 57).92  
 
However, it may be the case that elections are first and foremost understood as a 
selection problem rather than a sanctioning mechanism for incumbent politicians 
(Fearon 1999, 82). In addition, the sanctioning mechanism of elections cannot work,  
if politicians have already reached their term limits (Fearon 1999, 61; Lauth 2004, 92). 
Put differently, term limits decrease the impact and the effect of electoral accountability. 
However, if elections really were the ultimate instrument of accountability, politicians 
would change their behavior significantly during their last term. Nonetheless, empirical 
reality seems to militate against the existence of substantial “last-period effects” 
(Fearon 1999, 63-4). As a result, accountability may play only a minimal role in the 
frame of elections.  
 
Besides, there are numerous other difficulties related to the concept of vertical 
accountability. For instance, politicians normally obtain a significant informational 
advantage over citizens, providing them with a discretionary leeway which allows them 
to circumvent the mechanism of vertical accountability (Ferejohn 1999, 132; Fearon 
1999, 55).93 Other reasons for the difficulty of assessing the degree of accountability 
include the fact that active citizens may choose alternative and unconventional modes 
of participation (Schmitter 2004, 55). Their initial active participation, however, may not 
necessarily coincide with subsequent policy conformity (Schmitter 2004, 55).  
In addition, citizens may hold politicians accountable for inconvenient, but necessary 
long-term reforms (Schmitter 2004, 56).  
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Finally, political representatives may truly believe that they were acting in the best 
interest of the citizens, although they are not (Schmitter 2004, 56). Analogously, 
citizens’ believes, attitudes, and preferences may not be stable over time, which 
equally undermines the definiteness of electoral accountability (Schmitter 2004, 56). 
3.2.5 Participation 
Another dimension, which is fundamental to the idea of democracy, especially for 
procedural conceptions, is participation (Deth 2006, 168). It emphasizes the need that 
all adults are equally entitled to take part in the decision-making process 
(Diamond/Morlino 2004, 23). 94  In this context, participation presupposes political 
equality in order to be really democratic (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 24).95 This implies that 
measuring participation always includes the latent measuring of political and thus civil 
rights, too (Lauth 2004, 68). 
 
Furthermore, participation rests upon four elements. Firstly, it emphasizes the role of 
the citizen as the primary agent. Secondly, it requires activity of the citizens in order to 
be effective. Thirdly, this activity rests on a voluntary basis. And finally, political 
participation is logically oriented towards governmental action (Deth 2006, 170-1).  
 
Therefore, the primary indicator for measuring participation are elections, through 
which the public selects political representatives and thus influences policy decisions 
(Parry/Moyser 1994, 48; Powell 2000, 3). Although elections do serve as the major 
indicator, recent scientific research additionally focuses on alternative modes of 
participation, as well (Deth 2006, 168). For instance, campaigning, contacting 
politicians, organizing protests and demonstrations, lobbying, or assembling, as 
instruments of a lively civil society, may serve as more significant and more valid 
indicators for participation, hence questioning the exclusive focus on election 
processes (Parry/Moyser 1994, 46; Diamond/Morlino 2004, 23).  
 
By tendency, a society demands for a higher number of participation alternatives, the 
more heterogeneous it is (Abromeit 2001, 21). Conversely, the more homogeneous a 
society is, the higher is the probability that elections and its inherent majority rule are 
perceived to be fair (Abromeit 2001, 20; Abromeit 2004, 85). Put more generally, the 
variety of participation alternatives may be viewed as a function of the actual context-
                                               
94
 
 
„Politische Partizipation kann lose als bürgerliche Beteiligung mit dem Ziel der 
Einflussnahme auf politische Entscheidungen definiert werden.“ (Deth 2006, 169) 
95
 
 See 3.1.2 Equality, 32 
Chapter 3 
 44 
specific circumstances (Abromeit 2004, 82). The quality of democracy in terms of 
participation could be measured according to supply and demand for diverse modes of 
participation (Abromeit 2004, 87). This approach, however, poses serious challenges 
concerning operationalization and comparability due to the focus on context-specificity 
(Abromeit 2004, 90-1).96 
 
However, taking into account alternative modes of participation is subject to some 
obstacles, as well. On the one hand, it may be difficult to properly distinguish between 
political and nonpolitical activities. This is especially due to the blurring boundaries 
between the public and the private sphere, or put differently, the politicization of the 
private sphere (Deth 2006, 180-1). In consideration of this phenomenon, problems of 
operationalization and valid measurement of these modes of participation may arise.  
 
On the other hand, alternative participatory forms are normally exercised only by a 
small minority of the population, especially in comparison with elections (Deth 2006, 
182-3; Parry/Moyser 1994, 50). This, in turn, may serve as a justification for relying on 
elections as the primary participatory indicator in the frame of evaluating the quality of 
democracy.97  
 
Either way, participation heavily depends on information, which, in turn, depends on 
transparency (Lauth 2004, 73). Citizens must have access to multiple and alternative 
sources of information. Otherwise, the conditions for effectively working participation 
could not be met. Of course, this independent information processing ability also 
depends on minimum levels of human development, because resource endowment 
influences the extent of participation to a non-negligible degree (Diamond/Morlino 
2004, 24; Deth 2006, 184).  
 
Besides, the scope of participation remains a controversial issue in the assessment of 
democratic quality. The question arises, if higher levels of participation coincide with 
higher levels of quality of democracy (Lauth 2004, 74; Abromeit 2004, 79). This 
question may be hard to answer due to the fact that it may be difficult to correctly 
interpret low levels of participation (Lauth 2004, 75). In acknowledging that protest and 
rejection may equally represent legitimate expressions of political participation, the 
attempt of equating high participatory levels with high levels of democratic quality 
delivers elusive results (Deth 2006, 172; Lauth 2004, 75).  
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Finally, participation requires two important aspects, notably representativeness as well 
as responsiveness (Parry/Moyser 1994, 57). Representativeness refers to the degree 
to which active participants simultaneously represent inactive citizens (Parry/Moyser 
1994, 57). Besides, responsiveness refers to the relationship between citizens and its 
political leaders, as without responsiveness, representation would be useless 
(Parry/Moyser 1994, 58).98 Similarly, participation requires strong legislatures in order 
to transform popular will in concrete policy outcomes (Fish 2006, 18).  
3.2.6 Competition 
Apart from participation, competition serves as the other major procedural democracy 
dimension. It refers to free, recurring, and fair elections with a real choice between 
differing political parties (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 24). Competition also emphasizes the 
need for meaningful elections (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 24). Otherwise, competition as 
well as participation would lose their effectiveness.  
 
Clearly, competition presupposes the existence and protected guarantee of political 
and civil rights (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 24). As a consequence, if competition is 
measured in the frame of evaluating the quality of democracy, political and civil rights 
are immanently measured, as well (Lauth 2004, 68).99 This aspect is important when 
taking into account the potential double measurement concerning the obvious as well 
as the latent weighting of the various dimensions in a liberal, procedural democracy 
conception.100  
 
Related to the question of basic civil and political rights, effectively working competition 
requires the fair access to the media for all political parties (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 
24). In this context, concentrated media ownership structures counteract this goal.  
In addition, there is a need for independent courts, which guarantee basic framework 
conditions for political competition, as well as the avoidance of extreme inequalities in 
economic and political resources (Diamond/Morlino 2004, 25). This condition is due to 
the fact that economic resources may correlate with political influence to a substantial 
degree.  
 
Analogical to other democracy dimensions, there are also some challenges involved 
related to the measurement of competition. For instance, competition and 
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competitiveness are often equated (Bogaards 2007, 1232). The latter one refers to the 
actual election outcomes, whereas competition rather emphasizes the pre-election 
phase. So, competitiveness could be low, although competition may have been intense 
(Bogaards 2007, 1232).101  
 
Another obstacle in evaluating competition is the relationship between competitiveness 
and democracy (Bogaards 2007, 1231). It may be possible that an overwhelming 
victory of a party truly reflects the citizens’ preferences, and thus not automatically 
represent distorted election results by the incumbent political elite. Put differently,  
if competitiveness, i.e. election results, are taken as the only reference for the 
competitive dimension of democracy, an overwhelming share of votes for one party 
may be perceived undemocratic (Bogaards 2007, 1232). This in turn, may simply be 
incorrect.102 Finally, countries featuring a two-party system would rate systematically 
worse under such a perception of competition (Bogaards 2007, 1231).103 
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4 Conceptualization of the QD-Index 
After having discussed fundamental principles and constituent dimensions of 
democratic quality, this chapter will deal with the theoretical conceptualization of the 
QDI. Bearing in mind the great variety of alternative democracy measurement 
concepts, there will be an attempt to develop an integrative framework, which 
realistically reflects the interrelations between the actual democracy dimensions.  
The QDI should ideally permit the differentiated assessment of quality of democracy, 
while guaranteeing the balance between conceptual relevance and economicalness.104  
 
The QDI aims at covering all three fundamental democracy principles; freedom, 
equality, and control. While the former two principles are mostly incorporated within 
current democracy evaluation conceptions, the control dimension remains 
disproportionately unconsidered. Nonetheless, control represents an integral part of 
functioning democracies, because it acts as a regulatory force for the otherwise 
unlimited sovereign rule of the people. That is why the QDI attempts to eliminate this 
deficiency and thus to contribute to a more valid evaluation of democratic quality, which 
is schematically illustrated in figure 8. 
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Concerning equality, the QDI focuses on political input rather than output equality, 
which corresponds with the general tenor of the thesis of measuring political 
democracy rather than more comprehensive, maximalist conceptions.105 Put differently, 
the QDI emphasizes political democracy from an institutional and procedural 
perspective, thus negating performance-oriented democracy conceptualizations. All in 
all, the QDI follows a multidimensional approach in order to correspond to the 
multidimensional nature of democracy. The complex interrelations between the 
dimensions, which are integrated in the QDI, are schematically illustrated figure 9 in 
order to facilitate the line of argument.  
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The most fundamental dimension, of course, is the rule of law. It serves as the basis for 
all the other democracy dimensions. The rule of law is the sine qua non for democracy, 
which means that political regimes cannot qualify as democratic, as long as they do not 
deliver minimum levels of rule of law. It serves as the foundation for horizontal and 
vertical accountability as well as the guarantee of civil liberties and political rights.  
Of course, participation and competition heavily depend on the functioning of the rule of 
law in order to work effectively. Due to this immanent importance, the dimension “rule 
of law” also represents the basis of the QDI, on which the other QDI dimensions build 
on. 
 
Based on this dimension, civil as well as political rights, serve as the second focal point 
of the QDI. As has already been outlined above, social rights are excluded from the 
model and thus as a factor of country evaluation, as they do not necessarily coincide 
with the concept of political democracy.107  
 
Rights represent the basis for the proper functioning of competition and participation, 
as well as vertical accountability and responsiveness. The theoretical focus of the civil 
liberties’ dimension within the QDI lies on negative liberties, which manifest freedom 
against the state, rather than positive civil rights, which deal with the right to 
employment and personal welfare. In this context, civil rights or liberties themselves 
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serve as the bases for political rights, because many political rights could not be 
practically executed unless there is a minimum guarantee of civil liberties.108 On the 
other hand, political rights equally form a precondition for democracy dimensions, such 
as participation, competition and thus also vertical accountability.  
 
Apart from the rule of law as well as civil and political rights, responsiveness represents 
another important element for democratic quality. However, responsiveness as a 
dimension is not incorporated into the QDI. Though the theoretical and practical 
problems concerning this dimension have been outlined above109, some of the most 
decisive reasons for omitting responsiveness in the model will be recapitulated. Firstly, 
the people’s preference structures are hard to aggregate, may also be unstable over 
time and contradictory in terms of short-term vs. long-term perspective. Secondly, 
exogenous factors may influence governmental performance and distort their effective 
results. These aspects undermine all democracy conceptions that follow an output-
oriented approach. Finally, perfect responsiveness endangers the freedom of 
minorities, thus questioning the whole idea of democracy and democratic quality.  
 
Based on the foundation of effective rule of law, political and civil rights, two other 
dimensions are incorporated into the QDI, notably participation and competition. 
Participation represents one of the most genuine elements of democracy, especially 
regarding procedural conceptions. Though there might be difficulties in correctly 
interpreting specific levels of participation, as they may not always serve as the correct 
indicator for a country’s democratic quality, participation as a dimension remains too 
important to be neglected in democracy evaluation concepts.  
 
The latter dimension, competition, also refers to a procedural conception of democracy. 
Similar to participation, it presupposes the guarantee of the rule of law, political and 
civil rights. As is indicated in figure 9, it also depends on participation, because without 
it, competition would lose its effectiveness and significance for democratic quality.  
Of course, competition depends on the avoidance of extreme inequalities in economic 
and political resources in order to reflect democratic quality potential. Conversely, low 
levels of competition may not necessarily signify the abuse of political power and 
resources and thus a low quality of democracy. Nonetheless, competition remains vital 
to the idea of democratic quality irrespective of the actual indicator measuring this 
dimension. Consequently, it is incorporated in the conceptual setup of the QDI.  
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Although responsiveness as a dimension has been omitted, the QDI focuses on 
accountability, notably vertical as well as horizontal accountability. The first one is 
incorporated into the model, because it comprises a bottom-up element of democracy, 
from citizens to their political representatives. Besides, effective vertical accountability 
presupposes fair and equal elections, as it entails a relationship between unequals in 
power. Consequently, vertical accountability implies the effective working of the rule of 
law, the free exercise of civil and political rights and, thus also, meaningful levels of 
participation and competition. Similar to the theoretical problems of responsiveness, 
there may be exogenous factors influencing governmental performance and distorting 
vertical accountability. However, it is incorporated into the QDI due to its procedural 
characteristics.  
 
The final dimension of democratic quality covered by the QDI is horizontal 
accountability. This is due to the fact that horizontal accountability relates to the control 
principle of democracy, as it represents the system of “checks and balances” within a 
democratic regime. It prevents the abuse of political power and resources and thus is 
vital to the very existence of democratic quality. In order to fulfill this task, horizontal 
accountability heavily depends on the effective working of the rule of law. As such,  
it does not necessarily interact with the other democracy dimensions incorporated in 
the QDI, which is graphically illustrated in figure 9. 
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5 Selected Democracy Indices 
After having discussed the major principles and elements of democracy as well as after 
having conceptualized the QDI from a theoretical perspective, this chapter will present 
three selected current democracy indices, notably Worldwide Governance Indicators 
provided by the World Bank, Freedom House and Vanhanen’s ID. These three indices 
have been chosen due to three important reasons: Firstly, they are published on an 
annual basis. Secondly, their data sets are easily accessible via the internet and finally, 
they are compatible with the theoretical construct of the QDI.110 
5.1 Worldwide Governance Indicators 
The first section of the chapter deals with the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 
which are released by the World Bank. After having discussed the background, the 
dimensions, as well as the methodology, the WGI will be analyzed regarding their 
conceptual quality. Finally, the transferability of the WGI to the QDI will be highlighted.  
5.1.1 Background and Development 
As the name implies, the WGI do not measure democracy per se, but rather 
governance on a global scale. Concretely, the WGI comprise analyses of 212 countries 
and territories (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 4). Thereby, the research utilizes a generally 
broad definition of governance, which reads as follows (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 7): 
 
“We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which 
authority in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which 
governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the 
government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the 
respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and 
social interactions among them.”  
 
The WGI are issued on a biannual basis since 1996 and annually for the period 
between 2002 and 2007 (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 1). In the course of the actualization of 
the WGI publications, the number of data sources increased significantly. The most 
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recent WGI edition, “Governance Matters VII”, comprises 35 sources from 32 different 
organizations (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 1). These organizations include firms, commercial 
risk rating agencies, multilateral aid agencies, and public as well as non-governmental 
organizations (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 4; Kaufmann et al. 2008, 3).111 As there have 
been data revisions in the course of the years, the most recent WGI edition replaces 
precedent publications (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 6).112 
5.1.2 Dimensions and Methodology 
As has already been mentioned, the WGI measure governance, rather than 
democracy, although there are some overlaps. In this context, the WGI consist of six 
aggregate governance measures, notably voice and accountability, political stability 
and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, as 
well as control of corruption (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 7-8).113 However, the WGI do not 
directly measure governance, but rather process perceptions of governance, thus 
processing subjective data (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 4; Kaufmann et al. 2004, 19).114 
 
The WGI employ a statistical methodology named unobserved components model 
(Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 4). It allows for the rescaling of individual data sources from 0 
to 1 and the aggregation of these sources into the six aggregated indicators by using 
weighted averages of the constituent data sources (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 4-6).  
The unobserved components model implicates the assumption that all individual 
sources measure governance only to some extent, because all measures suffer from a 
certain degree of bias and imprecision (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 11). The actual weight 
is assigned to a data source depending on its relative preciseness of measuring 
governance expressed by the correlation coefficient, as compared with the other data 
sources (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 11).115  
 
The main advantage of the WGI methodology consists of the fact that the aggregate 
indicators are more precise and provide more meaningful information about 
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 See Appendix C. Worldwide Governance Indicators - Data Sources 2007, 113 
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 It is for this reason why the most recent update of the WGI data sets (Kaufmann et al. 2008) 
will be utilized for the operationalization of the QDI, although 2006 remains the year under 
consideration. 
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 See Appendix B. Worldwide Governance Indicators - Definitions, 112 
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 The utilization of subjective, perception-based data is justified by the fact that most of the 
data can not be collected via public channels, such as data concerning corruption 
(Kaufmann et al. 2004, 19). Nonetheless, the authors admit that there are problems involved 
when dealing with subjective measures (Kaufmann et al. 2004, 21). 
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 Although this methodology may seem complex, the WGI authors underline that there is no 
substantial change in results, if simple averages of the data sources are processed 
(Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 11). 
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governance than individual data sources (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 11). Additionally, the 
unobserved components model produces margins of error, which underline the fact 
that country assessments always imply some degree of imprecision (Kaufmann et al. 
2007a, 4; Kaufmann et al. 2008, 5).116 This standard error declines steadily, as more 
and more data sources are incorporated in the governance measures since the first 
WGI publication in 1996 (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 4; Munck/Verkuilen 2002, 1).117  
5.1.3 Concept Validation 
This section of the chapter analyzes the concept quality of the WGI by utilizing the 
concept validation approach proposed by Müller/Pickel (2007), which has been 
presented in the second chapter. 118  Consequently, the Worldwide Governance 
indicators will be assessed regarding the three major challenges in index construction, 
i.e. conceptualization, measurement, as well as aggregation.119  A summary of the 
subsequent analytical deliberations is illustrated in figure 10. 
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 For instance, the WGI authors reject the idea of identifying the ten best and worst rating 
countries regarding governance issues, as this attempt simply remains of little relevance 
(Kaufmann et al. 2008, 5).  
117
 
 For a more detailed explanation of the WGI methodology please refer to Kaufmann et al. 
(2004, 7-11). 
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 See 2.4.2 Approach by Müller/Pickel (2007), 28 
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 As contrasted with the other two indices, that will be presented subsequently, there is not 
much reception yet of the WGI within the scientific literature of empirical democracy 
research. As a result, most of the following deliberations stem from the author of this thesis.  
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5.1.3.1 Conceptualization 
Regarding economicalness (1.1.1) the WGI rate ambiguously. Similar to the concept of 
democracy, governance is an extremely complex scientific issue. Consequently, 
utilizing six indicators to evaluate governance seems justifiable. On the other hand, the 
WGI integrates indicators that do not necessarily coincide with governance alone.  
For instance, “voice and accountability” is rather related to the concept of democracy, 
not governance. 120  Additionally, it is the only indicator which incorporates a clear 
bottom-up character as compared with the other five indicators. Finally, the concept of 
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Fig. 10: Concept Validation of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(Source: Own illustration following Müller/Pickel 2007, 520-3) 
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governance is very much related to an output-oriented approach, which definitively 
contrasts with the “voice and accountability” indicator.  
 
Due to the fact that this thesis focuses on the concept of democratic quality, it is not of 
peculiar interest whether the WGI fulfills the criterion of conceptual relevance (1.1.2) 
regarding the measurement of governance. However, the most important aspects 
seem to be covered via the indicators “political stability and absence of violence”, 
“government effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, as well as “control of corruption”.  
 
Although the WGI deal with relevant criteria, some of the indicators suffer from 
redundancy (1.2.1) to some degree. For example, “government effectiveness” indirectly 
correlates with “control of corruption”. Put differently, real government effectiveness 
seems unlikely achievable unless corruption remains at minimum levels. Secondly, 
there are theoretical overlaps between the two indicators “government effectiveness” 
and “regulatory quality”, as both of them focus on very similar issues. This in turn may 
lead to an inherent double measurement of specific governance attributes.  
 
Related with the problem of redundancy is the problem of conflation (1.2.2), which is 
predominantly due to the fact that the indicators partly feature low discriminatory power. 
The WGI authors admit that their concept suffers from low discriminant validity. 
However, they counter that in the frame of governance assessments the 
accomplishment of this type of validity does not render qualitative improvements,  
as they believe their indicators to be too interrelated to be theoretically separated from 
each other (Kaufmann et al. 2007b, 25).  
5.1.3.2 Measurement 
The variable of correct measuring (2.1.1) cannot be properly assessed, because the 
WGI do not genuinely conduct measurements, but aggregates already existing 
governance measures instead.121 The WGI authors admit that there may be some 
ideological biases within the data sources processed, but they deem this effect to have 
only limited impact on the overall results (Kaufmann et al. 2004, 22-3; Kaufmann et al. 
2008, 5). In addition, the WGI explicitly cites the margins of error resulting from the 
statistical methodology, which underlines the attempt to aggregate the individual data 
sources as precisely and transparently as possible (Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 2; 
Kaufmann et al. 2008, 2). 
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As has already been mentioned above, the latest edition of the WGI processed 35 data 
sources from 32 different organizations. Consequently, the index definitively fulfils the 
criterion scope of sources (2.1.2).122 Indeed, the broad scope of sources is one of the 
core strengths of the WGI, as it allows for the comparative assessment of a huge 
amount of countries that do not necessarily base on the same data sources (Kaufmann 
et al. 2007a, 17; Kaufmann et al. 2007b, 6). In addition, this broad scope of sources 
enables a more precise measurement than individual sources (Kaufmann et al. 2004, 
7; Kaufmann et al. 2007a, 14). 
 
Concerning the theoretical foundation (2.2.1) of scaling, the WGI publications provide 
only little information. 123  On the one hand, the scaling is preset by operational 
necessities, as the individual sources have to be rescaled for aggregation purposes. 
On the other hand, the WGI only allow for the comparison of countries in terms of their 
relative positions over time, not in terms of absolute changes, because world averages 
of governance are zero in each period (Kaufmann et al. 2004, 11; Kaufmann et al. 
2007a, 21).  
 
Due to the specificity of the WGI, notably the rescaling and processing of already 
existing governance and democracy data sources, there is no need for own coding 
rules (2.3.1). Apart from this, the WGI absolutely fulfill the criterion citation of sources 
(2.3.2), as there is a complete documentation of the actual sources processed for each 
of the six governance indicators. This transparency equally represents a substantial 
advantage of the WGI as compared with alternative governance and democracy 
measures. However, there is no indication about inter-coder reliability tests (2.3.3.) 
between the three editors of the WGI publications. Equivalent to the citation of sources, 
disaggregated data (2.3.4) is publicized in a transparent manner, especially since the 
WGI edition in 2006 (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 10).  
5.1.3.3 Aggregation 
Concerning the adequacy of the aggregation level (3.1.1) critics doubt the validity of 
combining so many different sources due to the potential loss of information and 
precision. However, the contrary is the case. The WGI aggregation methodology allows 
for a more precise and more valid depiction of governance on a global scale than any 
individual source, especially due to the mitigation of potential ideological biases.  
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Besides, the WGI also feature a theoretical foundation (3.2.1) for its aggregation rule. 
The utilization of the unobserved components model is justified by the fact that 
individual data sources measure the phenomenon “governance” only to some degree. 
The aggregation via this specific statistical instrument allows for a more valid 
measurement convergence to the real governance levels.  
 
Finally, the criterion of applicability of the aggregation rule (3.3.1) is almost fulfilled. 
Clearly, there is a need for elaborate statistical know-how in order to replicate the 
results delivered by the unobserved components model (Kaufmann et al. 2004, 7-11). 
In addition, it may be extremely time-consuming to process so many data sources by 
oneself. Finally, the problem of data availability remains despite the almost complete 
accessibility of the data sources, because some of them are publicly not available.124  
5.1.4 Transferability to the QD-Index 
After having validated the concept quality of the WGI, this section deals with the 
transferability of the actual indicators to the QDI. First of all, the QDI is based on a 
procedural and institutional conception of democracy, while output-oriented 
approaches have been omitted. As a result, there are several governance indicators 
that cannot be logically integrated into the QDI conception. Among these indicators are 
“political stability and absence of violence”, “government effectiveness”, “regulatory 
quality”, as well as “control of corruption”. Although all four of these indicators are 
important to democracies, other regime types can principally deliver equally high 
ratings concerning these dimensions with the exception that they do not base upon 
genuine democratic foundations. Especially, the indicator “political stability and 
absence of violence” might rank non-democratic countries unproportionally high as 
compared with other governance indicators.  
 
The first governance indicator, “voice and accountability”, generally fits the theoretical 
tenor of the QDI. The indicator, however, remains too broad, as it simultaneously 
covers three fundamental dimensions, notably participation, civil liberties, as well as 
political rights. Put differently, this indicator lacks the necessary discriminatory power in 
order to depict a differentiated picture of democratic quality. It is for this reason why 
“voice and accountability” cannot be integrated into the QDI.  
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 For instance, public disclosure remains insufficient concerning the Country Policy and 
Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings delivered by the World Bank, Asian Development 
Bank, and the African Development Bank (Kaufmann et al. 2007b, 27).  
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The only governance indicator that fits the theoretical conceptualization of the QDI is 
“rule of law”, which is illustrated in figure 11. By integrating this indicator, the QDI 
automatically benefits from one of the core strengths of the WGI, notably the broad 
scope of sources processed. As a result, the integration of this indicator enables 
depicting a more valid and more reliable picture of reality concerning the rule of law.  
In addition, the potential danger of ideological biases of the data sources can be 
mitigated via the aggregation procedure. To some extent, the WGI represents a meta-
index itself, which in turn justifies the general assumption underlying the QDI, notably 
the usefulness of combining indices in order to generate more reliable and more valid 
democracy evaluations.  
 
 
In addition, the integration of the WGI into the QDI allows for mitigating the problem of 
data availability, which automatically arises due to the combination of indices that may 
not always cover all of the same countries.125 Apart from this practical, concomitant 
fact, the WGI process governance data despite the fact that there is still no conclusive, 
commonly accepted definition of governance. However, the WGI authors point out that 
their research is nonetheless valuable (Kaufmann et al. 2007b, 24-6). Similarly, the 
attempt of setting up a meta-index of democratic quality, such as the QDI developed in 
this thesis, underlines the necessity of approaching the concept of democracy despite 
the persistent lack of an overall and commonly accepted definition of democracy.  
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Fig. 11: Integration of the WGI into the QD-Index 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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5.2 Freedom House 
Analogous to the deliberations of the WGI, this section will deal with another important, 
if not the best-known democracy measure of all, notably Freedom House (FH).126 After 
highlighting its background and development, its dimensions and its methodology are 
explained. The second part of this section comprises the concept validation of FH as 
well as its transferability to the QDI. 
5.2.1 Background and Development 
FH was co-founded in 1941 in New York City by Eleanor Roosevelt (FH 2008b).  
At first, it was aimed to raise awareness for the importance for US-American 
involvement in World War II in order to confront Nazism (FH 2008b). Similarly, FH 
opposed the negative developments in terms of freedom and human rights in the realm 
of Communism during the Cold War (FH 2008b). Since then, FH views itself as a 
prominent advocate for the spread of democratic values around the world, promoting 
freedom, human rights and civil liberties on a global scale by conducting 
comprehensive analyses and engaging in on-site country projects (FH 2008c; 104). 
FH’s mission statement reads as follows (FH 2008c): 
 “Freedom House is an independent nongovernmental organization that 
 supports the expansion of freedom in the world. Freedom is possible only in 
 democratic political systems in which the governments are accountable to their 
 own people; the rule of law prevails; and freedoms of expression, association, 
 and belief, as well as respect for the rights of minorities and women, are 
 guaranteed.  
 Freedom ultimately depends on the actions of committed and courageous men 
 and women. We support nonviolent civic initiatives in societies where freedom 
 is denied or under threat and we stand in opposition to ideas and forces that 
 challenge the right of all people to be free. Freedom House functions as a 
 catalyst for freedom, democracy and the rule of law through its analysis, 
 advocacy and action.” 
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 Although Freedom House does not explicitly measure democracy, but rather political rights 
and civil liberties, the index is nonetheless used to evaluate democratic quality. This is also 
due to the fact, that FH highly correlates with alternative measures of democracy (Lauth 
2004, 268).  
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In 1973 FH’s most important publication, “Freedom in the World”, was edited for the 
first time (FH 2008b). Since that year “Freedom in the World” has been updated 
annually, which enables longitudinal country comparisons over more than three 
decades (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 215). 127  This represents an enormous comparative 
advantage as contrasted with alternative democracy measures, which may explain the 
high popularity of FH within empirical democracy research. More recent publications 
with particular emphases are “Freedom of the Press”, “Nations in Transit”, “Survey of 
Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa”, “How Freedom is Won”, as well 
as “Radical Islam’s Rules” (FH 2008b).  
5.2.2 Dimensions and Methodology 
As has already been mentioned above, FH does not explicitly evaluate democratic 
quality per se, but rather political and individual freedom and thus important elements 
of democracy (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 209). Concretely, FH focuses on political rights and 
civil liberties (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 210). The index concentrates on the constitutional 
reality, rather than the pure institutional design (Schmidt 2000, 409; Pickel/Pickel 
2006b, 211). Put differently, Freedom House does not take into account the mere 
constitutional provision of political and civil rights, but rather the effective 
implementation and possibility of execution of these rights (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 210; 
Gaber 2000, 118; FH 2008a). Conceptually, FH is influenced by the procedural 
democracy approach of Dahl (1971), which inter alia manifests itself through the 
emphasis on democratic elections (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 211; Lauth 2004, 270).  
 
Most recent editions of “Freedom in the World” provide extensive analyses, reports and 
ratings for 193 countries as well as 15 related or disputed territories (FH 2008a).  
Until 1989 all country analyses were conducted by only one researcher, notably 
Raymond Gastil (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 211). Since the end of the Cold War, however, 
the countries are assessed by a team of scholars and regional experts (FH 2008a). 
The current report “Freedom in the World 2007” comprises a research team of 29 
analysts and 16 so-called senior-level academic advisors (FH 2008a). This outlines the 
methodological core of FH, because it represents a quasi-objective country rating, 
which is based on qualitative, subsequently quantified expert judgments (Pickel/Pickel 
2006b, 211).128  
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 The provision of longitudinal analyses by democracy indices facilitates the testing of their 
actual validity as compared with alternative democracy measures (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 215). 
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 See 2.3.4 Objectivity vs. Subjectivity, 20 
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The rating process itself proceeds as follows: Both dimensions, political rights and civil 
liberties, are concreted via a question catalogue, comprising 10 and 15 questions, 
respectively (FH 2008a). 129  The political rights dimension consists of three sub-
categories, notably “electoral process” (3 questions), “political pluralism and 
participation” (4), as well as “functioning of government” (3) (FH 2008a). The civil 
liberties dimension, by contrast, comprises four sub-categories, named “freedom of 
expression and belief” (4 questions), “associational and organizational rights” (3), “rule 
of law” (4), and “personal autonomy and individual rights” (4) (FH 2008a). In the course 
of the three-decades-long country assessment, there have been slight adaptations of 
the question catalogue, corresponding to the global political change (FH 2008a).130 
Each of the sub-category questions is assigned 0-4 raw points, with 4 indicating the 
maximum score (FH 2008a). Consequently, a country can rate 40 and 60 points at best 
concerning the two overall dimensions, political rights and civil liberties (FH 2008a).  
FH aggregates these two ratings into one overall score from 1 to 7 by simply adding up 
both political rights and civil liberties scores, indicating a country’s general classification 
as “free”, “partly free” or “not free” (FH 2008a). The actual classification intervals can 
be learned from table 1. 
 
                                               
129
 
 See Appendix E. Freedom House - Checklist Questions and Guidelines, 118 
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 Normally, the time of a country assessment covers a 12-month period. Only “Freedom in the 
World 2007”, which analyses the global freedom status for 2006, covers a 13-month period, 
ranging from December 1, 2005 until December 31, 2006 (FH 2008a). 
Political Rights Scores Civil Liberties Scores Rating 
36 – 40 53 – 60 1 
30 – 35 44 – 52 2 
24 – 29 35 – 43 3 
18 – 23 26 – 34 4 
12 – 17 17 – 25 5 
6 – 11 8 – 16 6 
0 – 5 0 – 7 7 
 
Country Status Combined Average of the PR and CL Rating 
Free 1.0 – 2.5 
Partly Free 3.0 – 5.0 
Not Free 5.5 – 7.0 
Tab. 1: Freedom House Key to Scores, Ratings and Status 
(Source: FH 2008a, slightly adapted) 
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5.2.3 Concept Validation 
This section of the chapter deals with a thorough concept validation of FH in order to 
identify its strengths and weaknesses as well as to evaluate its transferability to the 
QDI. Thereby, the analysis is based on the afore-mentioned concept validation 
approach by Müller/Pickel 2007. 131  A summary of the following analysis and its 
validation results is graphically illustrated in figure 12. 
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Fig. 12: Concept Validation of Freedom House 
(Source: Own illustration following Müller/Pickel 2007, 520-3) 
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5.2.3.1 Conceptualization 
Concerning its conceptual economicalness (1.1.1) FH does not rate well (Pickel/Müller 
2006, 158). On the one hand the index only consists of the two broad dimensions 
political rights and civil liberties, which would speak in favor of FH’s conceptual 
economicalness. On the other hand, however, these two dimensions are constructed 
via an extensive questionnaire, which incorporates many aspects, for instance 
conducive factors, that do not necessarily coincide with the concept of political 
democracy (Müller/Pickel 2007, 529; Lauth 2004, 273).132 
 
In terms of relevance (1.1.2), FH rates slightly better, because all three democracy 
principles, notably freedom, equality and control133, are covered by the conceptual 
setup (Müller/Pickel 2007, 529). For instance, rule of law and the separation of power 
are implicitly incorporated into the dimension of civil liberties (Lauth 2000, 57). 
However, there is only little emphasis on horizontal accountability (Lauth 2004, 273). 
Unsurprisingly, the questions’ relevance is higher in case of the political rights than for 
the civil liberties (Lauth 2004, 273).  
 
Regarding the concept logic (1.2) and its immanent redundancy (1.2.1) and conflation 
(1.2.2) FH features some serious flaws, as there are overlapping questions, which in 
turn lead to double measurements (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 219; Müller/Pickel 2007, 529). 
Especially, the discriminatory power between the sub-questions “pluralism”, “freedom 
of opinion” as well as “freedom of organization” remains weak (Pickel/Müller 2006, 159; 
Müller/Pickel 2007, 529; Lauth 2004, 274). 
5.2.3.2 Measurement 
As mentioned above, FH’s methodological core consists of an extensive set of 
questions for the various indicators, which lead to implicit double measurements and 
thus implicit weighting of the dimensions (Pickel/Müller 2006, 159; Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 
219). In addition, correct measuring (2.1.1) suffers from a culturally biased 
questionnaire with an inherent normative background (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 218). 
Obviously, FH focuses on the U.S. American type of liberal democracy, which 
systematically underrates democracies with differing normative emphasis due to 
lacking intercultural equivalence (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 221; Müller/Pickel 2007, 530).  
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Nevertheless, one of the core strengths of FH remains the fact that the ratings and 
country rankings are issued on an annual bias, which enables longitudinal studies 
(Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 210). This, of course, may be one reason for the above-average 
popularity of FH as compared with other current democracy indices. This comparative 
advantage, however, is reduced due to the fact that there have been slight 
methodological changes and adaptations of the questionnaire over the years, which 
reduce the validity of longitudinal studies to a substantial degree (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 
219).  
 
As contrasted with the variable of correct measuring, FH rates much better in terms of 
scope of sources (2.1.2), as it incorporates the findings and results from a diverse and 
broad pool of information, nationally as well as internationally (Müller/Pickel 2007, 530). 
In addition, not only “official” data is processed, but also information delivered by NGOs, 
which delimits the potential bias deriving from governmental institutions (Pickel/Müller 
2006, 160).  
 
FH uses ordinal scales to rate and rank countries according two their political rights 
and civil liberties (Müller/Pickel 2007, 530). Unfortunately, there is no theoretical 
foundation (2.2.1), which consequently diminishes the validity of scaling (2.2) 
(Pickel/Müller 2006, 160). More concretely, there is neither a theoretical justification for 
the overall 1-7 scale, which indicates a country’s general classification as “free”, “partly 
free” or “not free”, nor for the 0-4 scale for each of the sub-questions within the 
questionnaire.  
 
Similarly, there are numerous flaws concerning the replicability (2.3) of the FH scores. 
For instance, the coding rules (2.3.1) are not publicly available. In fact, each expert 
judgment may be based on an individual coding procedure, which in turn decreases the 
consistency of the entire research process to a non-negligible degree (Pickel/Müller 
2006, 161; Müller/Pickel 2007, 530). Similarly, the citation of sources (2.1.2) remains 
dissatisfactory (Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). Although utilized sources are generally 
publicized, there is no possibility to identify which specific sources have been gathered 
in order to set up the actual country ratings (Pickel/Müller 2006, 161; Lauth 2004, 271). 
In addition, there is no information provided concerning the experts who actually rate a 
country (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 221). All in all, the rating process features very low 
transparency and thus low auditability (Lauth 2004, 270). 
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The problem of insufficient replicability intensifies, as there is no information regarding 
inter-coder reliability tests (2.3.3), either (Pickel/Müller 2006, 161; Müller/Pickel 2007, 
531). There is simply a serious lack of inter-coder reliability, which in turn also affects 
the validity of the entire country rating process (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 219). Finally, FH 
does not fully publicize its disaggregated data (2.3.4) which form the country rankings 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). Before 2006 there have only been published the overall 
aggregate scores. Only recently, since the edition of “Freedom in the World 2006” the 
sub-scores for each battery of questions are additionally cited. The problem, however, 
remains, as the scores for the individual questions (0-4 points) still remain elusive.  
To sum it up, there are serious flaws and obstacles related to the methodological 
replicability of Freedom House.  
5.2.3.3 Aggregation 
In terms of the last challenge of index construction, notably aggregation, FH only 
scores slightly better. For instance, the adequacy of the aggregation level (3.1.1) is 
guaranteed, as the index comprises two scales with three typological classifications, 
“free”, “partly free” as well as “not free” (Pickel/Müller 2006, 161). However, problems 
for aggregation remain, because not all questions are definitely answerable and this 
fact may change from case to case (Lauth 2004, 271). Not least, the problem of limited 
reliability in the frame of the rating process hinders consistent aggregation procedures 
(Lauth 2004, 274).  
 
Similarly, the aggregation rule of FH lacks a sound theoretical foundation (3.2.1) 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). On the contrary, there are no theoretical deliberations 
concerning the method of scale combination, notably the simple addition of political 
rights and civil liberties (Pickel/Müller 2006, 162; Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 219). This fact is 
problematic, because from a theoretical point of view, political rights heavily depend on 
the guarantee of civil liberties, which makes the latter ones slightly more important.134 
Besides, there are implicit weightings of variables and dimensions due to the afore-
mentioned low discriminatory power of some of the questions (Lauth 2004, 271).  
In addition, the double thresholds concerning the typological classification both on the 
point level as well as on the scale level135 contribute to aggregation inconsistencies 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 531).  
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Finally, FH provides a mixed picture concerning the applicability of its aggregation rule 
(3.3.1). Although it is transparently publicized, it cannot be replicated in the frame of an 
autonomous research effort due to the non-accessibility of the underlying data 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 531; Pickel/Müller 2006, 162).  
5.2.4 Transferability to the QD-Index 
Analogous to the section covering the WGI, this section deals with the transferability of 
Freedom House to the QDI. Again, the advantages for the integration are discussed 
first, in the course of which there will be a differentiation between the conceptual as 
well as the operational implications.  
 
One of the critiques concerning FH is that it only measures freedom, not democracy or 
democratic quality. This fact, however, simultaneously represents one of the core 
strengths of a meta-index, such as the QDI, as it enables the integration of FH in an 
overall democracy measure.136 As illustrated in figure 13, both dimensions, political 
rights and civil liberties, can logically be transferred to the QDI.  
 
Another advantage of integrating FH into the QDI consists of the relatively broad scope 
of sources, which makes the QDI automatically more reliable. Besides, FH focuses on 
the constitutional reality, not the mere legal guarantee, which in turn enables the QDI to 
depict a more realistic picture of a country’s situation concerning political rights and civil 
liberties.  
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Fig. 13: Integration of Freedom House into the QD-Index 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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From an operational perspective, FH qualifies for the conceptual design of the QDI, 
because its analyses are published on an annual basis. In this respect, FH features 
highly actual data, which can be processed via the QDI. In addition, the index provides 
analytic coverage for an extensive number of country cases, which mitigates the 
general problem of missing country data, when combing multiple democracy indices.137 
Besides, FH’s most recent publications comprise published sub scores, which allows 
for their differentiated integration into the QDI. 
 
Additional advantages of transferring the FH index to the QDI stem from the mitigation 
of flaws in measurement and aggregation. 138  For instance, the problem of the 
theoretical foundation of scaling need not be taken into account, because the Freedom 
House scores must be rescaled anyway in order to fit into the overall QDI. Analogously, 
the problem of the double thresholds becomes obsolete, because there would have to 
be set new thresholds after all constituent democracy indices have been combined. 
Finally, the methodological problem of aggregating political rights and civil liberties via 
mere addition can be omitted due to the fact that other methodological ways of 
aggregation are chosen on the QDI level.139  
 
Nonetheless, some disadvantages regarding FH still remain. For example, the potential 
ideological bias concerning the ideal of a liberal, American conception of democracy 
may still impact the overall QDI results. Equally, the problem of low discriminatory 
power between the two dimensions as well as the consequent flaw of inherent double 
measurement remains. Finally, the problem of data validity may also pose a serious 
challenge to the QDI due to the lack of inter-coder reliability tests or the explicit citation 
of sources for specific country assessments.  
5.3 Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization 
Equivalent to the afore-mentioned indices, WGI and FH, this section analyzes 
Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization (ID) by looking closely at its background, 
development, dimensions, and methodology. Subsequently, the ID’s conceptual quality 
is critically reviewed of, before its transferability to the QDI is assessed in a final step.  
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5.3.1 Background and Development 
Tatu Vanhanen is emeritus professor at the University of Tampere as well as at the 
University of Helsinki (PRIO 2008). Over the last decades he has contributed 
enormously to the field of empirical democracy research by developing a rather simple 
index. It represents the only truly quantitative, objective democracy measure within 
scientific literature. The core strength of Vanhanen’s ID is its replicability, because the 
data required for the index construction is available from different sources, which in 
turn mitigates the fallacy of subjective judgments to a substantial degree (Vanhanen 
2000, 192). Thereby, Vanhanen focuses on longitudinal studies, analyzing democratic 
developments of countries dating back to the middle of the nineteenth century 
(Vanhanen 1997; Vanhanen 1990).140  
 
The Vanhanen index is grounded on an evolutionary theory of politics (Vanhanen 2003, 
25). In this context, Vanhanen refers to a universalistic approach of democracy, as he 
assumes that the human nature is alike across all human populations (Vanhanen 2003, 
49). The aim of the index is to analyze transformational processes within societies by 
utilizing a theoretical framework of societal power distribution (Vanhanen 2000, 186; 
Lauth 2004, 246).141 The evolutionary character manifests itself through the struggle for 
resources, whereas power serves as transmitting mechanism in the political struggle 
for these limited resources (Vanhanen 2003, 26-7). Put differently, there is a logic 
relation between power and political resources (Vanhanen 2003, 27).142  
5.3.2 Dimensions and Methodology 
Regarding the conceptualization of the index, Vanhanen very much refers to Dahl’s 
(1971) conceptions of public contestation and inclusiveness (Vanhanen 2000, 187). 
Vanhanen utilizes the dimensions “participation” and “competition”, each of which is 
measured by a single indicator, as is illustrated in table 2 (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 194). 
This economicalness, in turn, simultaneously represents the strength and weakness of 
Vanhanen’s ID (Lauth 2004, 245). 143  Vanhanen himself justifies this parsimonious 
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 http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/Vanhanens-index-of-democracy/,     [DoR: 
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“Consequently, I use ‘democracy’ to refer to a political system in which ideologically and 
socially different groups are legally entitled to compete for political power, and in which 
institutional power holders are elected by the people and are responsible to the people.”, 
(Vanhanen 2000, 185) 
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“The crucial point in my theoretical argumentation is that the distribution of power resources 
determines the distribution of political power to a significant extent and that the evolutionary 
interpretation of politics explains why it must be so.”, (Vanhanen 2003, 28) 
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conceptualization with the problem of data availability for an extensive number of 
countries in case of too complex democracy conceptualizations (Vanhanen 2000, 
185).144  
 
As can be derived from table 2, minimum thresholds must be attained in order to 
qualify as democratic (Vanhanen 2000, 193; Lauth 2004, 245).145 In this context, it is 
important to note that the participation indicator refers to the entire, not just the 
enfranchised population. Again, Vanhanen justifies this operationalization with 
reference to the data availability problem concerning reliable voter registration data 
(Vanhanen 2000, 189). Additionally, both dimensions are multiplied, which underlines 
the equal weighting as well as the necessity of both dimensions to be high in order to 
qualify as democratic. Put differently, compensating low competition results with high 
participation values, and vice versa, is not feasible (Vanhanen 2003, 64).  
 
With reference to his evolutionary theory of politics, Vanhanen justifies the 
operationalization of the competition dimension by reasoning that the share of the 
smaller parties reflects best the real distribution of power (Vanhanen 2000, 186). 
Analogously, the more people are involved in the struggle for political power, the better. 
According to Vanhanen this serves as a justification for the operationalization of the 
participation dimension by drawing on elections as the primary indicator (Vanhanen 
2000, 187).  
 
Vanhanen’s ID can be processed either on parliamentary or presidential elections or on 
a combination of both of them (Vanhanen 2003, 58). In this context, Vanhanen defines 
three different institutional power arrangements, notably parliamentary dominance, 
executive dominance, as well as concurrent powers (Vanhanen 2000, 190). 
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 Vanhanen applies differing threshold values in the course of his publications. The ones cited 
in table 2 represent the threshold values of his most recent comprehensive study (Vanhanen 
2003).  
Dimension Indicator Dem.-Threshold 
Participation Voter Turnout in % 20% 
Competition 100% minus largest 
party share in % 
30% 
Index of Democratization 
(ID) 
(Part * Comp) * 100 6.0 index points 
Tab. 2: Methodology of Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization 
(Source: Own illustration following Vanhanen 2003, 65) 
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Concerning the latter power arrangement, there is a weighting of both election types 
according to their relative importance, 50-50, 25-75, or 75-25 percent (Vanhanen 2003, 
59).  
 
Although the two indicators are comparably easy to apply, there still remain some 
practical difficulties. For instance, parties may be part of an alliance. Consequently, 
alliance parties are not dealt with separately (Vanhanen 2003, 57). Moreover, the 
candidate, who won in presidential elections, is considered the largest party regarding 
the competition indicator (Vanhanen 2003, 57). Generally, only last round elections are 
taken into account (Vanhanen 2000, 189). And finally, if the selection of political 
representatives is not based on popular elections, then both dimensions score zero 
percent (Vanhanen 2003, 58).  
 
Nonetheless, there are some inherent biases concerning the indicators. For example, 
the competition indicator systematically rates majoritarian electoral systems worse. 
Vanhanen counters that he sets 70 percent as the upper limit for the competition 
indicator in order to mitigate this bias (Vanhanen 2000, 191). Similarly, the participation 
dimension adversely affects the ratings of developing countries, as the entire 
population figures are taken into account. Vanhanen, however, estimates that this 
methodological difficulty distorts the validity of results only by about 10 to 15 percent 
(Vanhanen 2000, 191). 
5.3.3 Concept Validation 
Analogical to the evaluation of Freedom House, this part of the chapter deals with the 
concept validation of Vanhanen’s ID. Vanhanen himself argues that his concept is 
parsimonious, well-documented, non-subjective, transparent and flexible (Vanhanen 
2003, 77-8). As summarized in figure 14, the following deliberations will constitute a 
more fine-grained analysis of the concept. 
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5.3.3.1 Conceptualization 
Concerning economicalness (1.1.1) Vanhanen’s ID is probably the most parsimonious 
among all democracy indices, as it focuses exclusively on the two dimensions 
participation and competition (Müller/Pickel 2007, 529). This fact represents its core 
strength as compared with more complex conceptualizations.146 Vanhanen disapproves 
many of the conventional indices due to their complexity and the consequential 
problem of data availability (Vanhanen 2003, 52).  
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Fig. 14: Concept Validation of Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization 
(Source: Own illustration following Müller/Pickel 2007, 520-3) 
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However, in terms of relevance (1.1.2) the ID also suffers from this apparent strength, 
because it omits other fundamental democracy dimensions, such as basic human 
rights, political rights, or the control dimension (Müller/Pickel 2007, 529; Lauth 2006, 
94; Lauth 2004, 248; Lauth 2000, 57). Although Vanhanen counters that participation 
and competition presuppose the existence of these rights to some extent in order to 
work effectively, the ID’s concept still remains a too minimalist approach concerning the 
differentiated evaluation of democratic quality (Vanhanen 2003, 38).147 This problem 
aggravates due to the fact that both dimensions are measured through one indicator 
each. In fact, critics fault that democracy is simply too complex to be adequately 
assessed by only two dimensions (Traine 2000, 208). 
 
Related with the evident economicalness Vanhanen’s ID features low redundancy 
(1.2.1), which represents another strength of the index (Pickel/Müller 2006, 159; 
Müller/Pickel 2007, 529). Nonetheless, the ID does not score that strong concerning 
the variable of conflation (1.2.2), because the dimensions are theoretically overlapping 
to some degree (Müller/Pickel 2007, 529).  
 
Apart from the critique related to the conceptualization of the ID, the basic theoretical 
deliberations of his model get criticized, as well. The assumption that the struggle for 
political power as a means to generate and acquire political resources, which 
determines the behavior of all human beings, simply represents a meta-physical 
statement (Traine 2000, 212). 148  This assumption, however, is not falsifiable with 
means of scientific research. In this sense, Vanhanen’s quantitative approach with its 
inherent focus on “hard data” rather represents a convention, which is somehow 
misleading and obscuring its normative, subjective basis (Traine 2000, 209).  
5.3.3.2 Measurement 
One of the core strengths of the Vanhanen’s ID is the fact that the indicators are 
exactly determinable, because voter turnout numbers and relative party shares in terms 
of either election results or seat distribution in parliaments are relatively unambiguous 
(Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 196). However, both indicators also tend to be too imprecise 
concerning correct measuring (2.1.1) (Traine 2000, 208).  
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For instance, voter turnout may be subjected to a variety of influencing factors, which 
may reveal little information with regard to democratic quality (Lauth 2004, 247). Voter 
turnout may be high due to compulsory suffrage or election fraud. On the other hand, it 
may be low due to specific weather conditions on election day (Schmidt 2000, 401). In 
addition, voter turnout as an indicator for participation may be of little value in case of 
authoritarian regimes without elections compared to totalitarian regimes with pseudo 
elections (Lauth 2004, 248). Hence, Vanhanen’s ID validates the mere execution of 
elections rather than their respective quality (Lauth 2004, 248). Besides, voter turnout 
may be subjected to short-term changes without any underlying change in the overall 
political system and thus with no change in a country’s quality of democracy. Although 
Vanhanen acknowledges the last fact, he still believes that the strengths of the 
indicators outweigh their shortcomings (Vanhanen 2003, 38). 
 
Besides, the measurement of voter turnout alone does not take into account direct 
democratic instruments, such as referenda, which underrates countries like Switzerland 
or the USA (Schmidt 2000, 400-1). That is why Vanhanen incorporated referenda into 
the participation dimension in the frame of his most recent democratization evaluation 
(Vanhanen 2003). Finally, the participation indicator within Vanhanen’s ID is also 
distorted by the fact that the actual number of votes is related to a country’s entire 
population for reasons of data availability. As a result, participation levels correlate with 
the country’s age structure, which systematically underrates developing countries and 
overstates participation levels in industrialized countries (Lauth 2004, 247; Pickel/Pickel 
2006b, 197; Schmidt 2000, 401; Pickel/Müller 2006, 160).149 
 
The second indicator, competition, equally suffers from non-negligible flaws. The 
competition dimension scores high in case of a highly fragmented party system. 
Conversely, the indicator rates countries lower which feature a two-party system 
(Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 197; Schmidt 2000, 402; Lauth 2004, 247; Müller/Pickel 2007, 
530). Due to this substantial bias, which may reveal little information about a country’s 
actual quality of democracy, Vanhanen introduces a cutoff point of 70 percent for the 
competition indicator. Although this helps to mitigate the bias, it is nonetheless an 
arbitrary threshold, which cannot be justified theoretically.150  
 
As contrasted with the question of correct measuring, Vanhanen’s ID rates much better 
concerning the scope of sources (2.1.2). Due to the fact that Vanhanen uses 
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quantitative objective data, voter turnouts and seat distributions are relatively easy to 
find out. Besides, the percentages can be cross-checked by utilizing various sources. 
One problem, however, remains, notably the fact that both indicators depend on the 
provision of “official” data, which are often publicized by governmental institutions 
(O’Donnell 1999, 160; Müller/Pickel 2007, 530). As a result, ID scores may be biased 
consequential to distorted governmental publications.  
 
Regarding the validity of scaling (2.2) and its theoretical foundation (2.2.1), Vanhanen 
utilizes interval scales, which represents a high-level scale from a statistical 
perspective, because value differences between countries are hence identifiable.151 
However, Vanhanen does not provide any theoretical justification for its usage 
(Pickel/Müller 2006, 160; Müller/Pickel 2007, 530).  
 
One of the greatest strengths of Vanhanen’s ID surely is its replicability (2.3) 
(Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 197). Firstly, there is no need for coding rules (2.3.1), as the two 
indicators are externally codified (Pickel/Müller 2006, 161; Müller/Pickel 2007, 530). 
Secondly, the citation of sources (2.3.2) is very transparent (Pickel/Müller 2006, 161; 
Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). Thirdly and similarly to the coding rules, there is no need for 
inter-coder reliability tests (2.3.3) due to the external codification of the indicators 
(Pickel/Müller 2006, 161; Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). Finally, the construction of the 
indicators does not imply the processing of disaggregated data (2.3.4), because the 
participation and competition percentages already represent aggregated data 
(Pickel/Müller 2006, 161; Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). 
5.3.3.3 Aggregation 
In terms of the last challenge, aggregation, Vanhanen’s ID provides a mixed picture. 
Concerning the adequacy of the aggregation level (3.1.1) the index combines the two 
dimensions into one overall score, notably the Index of Democratization (ID). Thereby, 
cross-sectional and longitudinal comparability is facilitated (Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). 
However, this approach also entails a substantial loss of information. For instance, two 
countries could rate equal, although they might feature complementary ratings in terms 
of participation and competition (Pickel/Müller 2006, 161).  
 
Related with the aggregation level is the problem of arbitrary threshold determination of 
the indicators (Campbell/Schaller 2002, 199; Gaber 2000, 119; Pickel/Müller 2006, 
169). Due to this methodological structure Vanhanen’s concept does not seem to be 
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apt for evaluating democracy in a differentiated way (Lauth 2004, 249).  
More concretely, the critical question is why the differentiation between two similarly 
rated countries from different regime classifications should be more important than a 
substantial rating gap between two countries within the same regime classification 
(Lauth 2004, 249). Vanhanen acknowledges this fact, but he counters that there is 
simply no theoretically justifiable way of consistently determining democracy 
thresholds, which holds true for all other democracy indices, as well (Vanhanen 2003, 
66).152  
 
Another strength of the ID is its validity of aggregation rule (3.2) and its theoretical 
foundation (3.2.1) (Pickel/Müller 2006, 162). Vanhanen combines the two dimensions 
via multiplication, because he argues that both of them are equally important.  
Put differently, there should be no possibility for compensating low ratings of one 
dimension with high ratings of the other dimension (Müller/Pickel 2007, 531). Hence, 
the theoretical deliberations are consistently transformed into the construction of the 
aggregated overall score (Pickel/Pickel 2006b, 195). Finally, the applicability of the 
aggregation rule (3.3.1) is guaranteed, because it is transparent and explicitly cited in 
the various publications by Vanhanen, which constitutes another advantage of the ID 
(Müller/Pickel 2007, 531; Pickel/Müller 2006, 161).  
5.3.4 Transferability to the QD-Index 
Vanhanen’s ID covers two fundamental democracy dimensions, participation and 
competition. These two dimensions perfectly coincide with the theoretical 
conceptualization of the QDI, which is graphically illustrated in figure 15.  
The integration of the index also underscores the procedural character of the QDI. 
From a more practical point of view, the ID features the advantage of relatively easy 
replicability, which is especially due to its quantitative, objective methodological 
approach. Consequently, the index may be replicated for any year under consideration 
with relative ease.153 In addition, the necessary data for constructing the index is easily 
accessible and can be cross-checked without any serious difficulties.  
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Apart from this, the incorporation of Vanhanen’s ID into the QDI delivers additional 
advantages. For instance, it allows for the mitigation of the obvious theoretical 
parsimoniousness of Vanhanen’s concept. Especially, by separately assessing political 
rights and civil liberties, much of the scientific critique becomes unfounded (Vanhanen 
2003, 60). Additionally, operational flaws concerning the participation indicator (e.g. 
compulsory suffrage) can be mitigated when explicitly taking into account fundamental 
rights, as well.  
 
Vanhanen himself admits that the ID is more apt for measuring substantial differences 
between political systems, than for more sophisticated assessments among 
democracies or non-democracies (Vanhanen 2003, 64). Consequently, the integration 
of Vanhanen’s ID into a conceptually broader meta-index, such as the QDI, allows for a 
more detailed evaluation of democratic quality.  
 
Finally, Vanhanen’s ID offers the opportunity to conduct longitudinal studies with the 
QDI. This is due to the fact that the Vanhanen datasets reach back to the middle of the 
nineteenth century. 
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Fig. 15: Integration of Vanhanen’ ID into the QD-Index 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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6 Operationalization of the QD-Index 
The previous chapters dealt with the principles and dimensions of democratic quality, 
the theoretical deduction of the QDI concept, as well as the analytic evaluation of the 
concept quality of three current democracy indices and their transferability to the QDI. 
Subsequently, this chapter focuses on the practical operationalization of the QDI. In a 
first step, the concrete operationalization of the three constituent indices is commented 
on, especially concerning their commonalities and adaptations compared to the initial 
concepts. Secondly, the QDI’s aggregation methodology is explained. Thirdly, the 
country rating and ranking, deriving from the QDI, is presented, before, in a final step, 
the QDI results are compared to the three constituent indices as well as selected 
external values by statistical means.  
6.1 Transfer of the Constituent Indices  
Although the QDI constitutes a meta-index that combines three current democracy 
indices, they are not integrated into the model without slight adaptations. The need for 
these operational changes stems from the fact that the indices either do not exclusively 
measure democracy or are not directly available for 2006. 
6.1.1 Operationalization of Worldwide Governance Indicators 
The WGI scores represent a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one, which produces statistical estimates, basically ranging between -2.5 
and +2.5 (Kaufmann et al. 2008, 16).154 Due to the fact that the QDI only processes 
167 countries instead of the 212 countries assessed by the WGI, the 2006 estimates 
must be rescaled. The rescaling will be conducted via a Z-transformation in order to 
reobtain a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one and 
thus to render valuable results for the index combination.155 Put differently, the country 
estimates (x-values) are rescaled into z-values, which correspond to specific relative 
percentage values, in turn representing the results for the “rule of law”-dimension.156 
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Although the WGI authors highly recommend also taking into account the standard 
errors for country evaluation, the standard deviations will be omitted within the QDI 
construction, as they cannot be incorporated methodologically (Kaufmann et al. 2007b, 
12).  
6.1.2 Operationalization of Freedom House 
Firstly, it is important to draw on the correct data when working with FH publications, 
because the editions of “Freedom in the World” always refer to the previous year.  
For instance, the FH data which is processed within this thesis for the year 2006 stems 
from the publication “Freedom in the World 2007” (Puddington 2007).157  
 
In terms of the methodological operationalization, there are only minor changes 
compared to the traditional FH ratings.158 Firstly, the overall scale (1-7) is omitted. 
Instead, the sub scores are utilized for data processing. This is due to the fact that the 
sub scores allow for a more detailed differentiation than the simplistic overall scales. 
Regarding the dimension of political rights, there will be no change. All three sub 
scores are integrated into the QDI. Concerning the civil liberties, however, the 
subcategory “rule of law” is excluded, because it represents a separate democracy 
dimension, which will be covered by another index, notably the WGI.159 As a result, the 
civil liberties dimension will comprise only 44 instead of the full 60 sub score points.  
 
Analogous to the WGI, both of the FH dimensions are rescaled via a Z-transformation 
in order to guarantee comparability with the other indices. 160  Besides, the regime 
classifications (“free”, “partly free”, “not free”), which are deployed by FH, are also 
omitted due to the fact that the QDI does not entail any threshold determination.  
6.1.3 Operationalization of Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization 
The most recent edition of Vanhanen’s comprehensive cross-sectional country study 
was issued in 2003 and covers 170 countries during the time period 1999-2001 
(Vanhanen 2003). Due to this fact, there is a need for replicating Vanhanen’s ID for the 
year under consideration, notably 2006. In the course of this replication, some 
adaptations have to be made as compared with the original version of the ID.  
Of course, the principal goal is to follow the initial methodology as precisely as 
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possible. However, some corrections in the course of the ID’s operationalization enable 
the immediate mitigation of some afore-mentioned methodological deficits. 161 
Subsequently, all of the commonalities and differences between the replicated and 
original ID will be discussed in order to meet the criteria of transparency and 
replicability.  
 
The general conceptual attempt of the QDI is to integrate as many countries as 
possible into the analysis in order to generate a truly global cross-sectional study. 
Regarding this aspect, the Vanhanen index serves as a bottleneck, because it “only” 
takes into account 170 countries, whereas the WGI and Freedom House analyze more 
than 200 states and territories.162  
 
As has already been mentioned, 2006 serves as the year under consideration for the 
operational setup of the QDI within this thesis. Analogous to Vanhanen’s methodology, 
previous years are also taken into account, if no elections were held in 2006 in a 
specific country. Similarly, only last rounds of elections are dealt with for analytic 
purposes, especially in the case of presidential elections (Vanhanen 2003, 57).  
Of course, election year, election type, the largest party, the victorious executive, as 
well as all data sources utilized are cited as transparently as possible.163 
 
In the course of the ID’s replication for 2006, Vanhanen’s (2003) country classifications 
in terms of the three institutional power arrangements, notably executive dominance, 
parliamentary dominance, or concurrent powers, will be adopted. Only some countries 
are classified differently, as their have been obvious political changes since 1999-
2001.164  
 
Similarly, the weightings of institutions provided by Vanhanen (2003) have been 
adopted in case of concurrent powers. Apart from this, some countries have been 
assigned the same participation and competition values, notably zero percent, as 
Vanhanen did in his latest country study. These countries typically represent “classical 
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authoritarian” or monarchal regimes, where no executive change has occurred over a 
long period.165 
 
Regarding the both dimensions, participation and competition, there have also been 
some important adaptations. For instance, the participation indicator is calculated on 
the basis of a country’s enfranchised, not its total population. Cleary, this represents a 
major methodological change as contrasted with the original concept provided by 
Vanhanen (2003). Unlike Vanhanen (2003) reasons, data concerning registered voters 
is mostly available without problems (Vanhanen 2003, 56).166  
 
Obviously, Vanhanen utilizes total population figures, as they may be more easily 
available for his extensive longitudinal studies, which also comprise elections of the 
nineteenth century. For analyses of democratic quality in the present, however, it 
seems more valuable to process data on registered voters instead. Simultaneously, 
this approach allows for the elimination of one of the major deficits and critiques 
concerning Vanhanen’s participation indicator, because variation in countries’ 
population age structures is no longer taken into account. 167  Consequently, the 
immanent bias favoring industrial countries can be neutralized.  
 
In this context, the cut-off point of 70 percent will equally be omitted, as Vanhanen 
(2003) introduces this upper limit with reference to the total population figures he 
applies. There is no theoretical justification for retaining this limit in the frame of the 
operationalization of Vanhanen’s ID for the QDI. Finally, Vanhanen also took 
referendums into account within his most recent study by increasing the participation 
value by five percent per referendum (Vanhanen 2003, 61-3). Although referendums 
represent an important mode of participation, which may contribute to a more valid 
assessment of a country’s democratic quality, they will be omitted within the frame of 
the QDI. This is due to the fact that the ascription of a certain percentage per 
referendum remains purely arbitrary and lacks any theoretical justification. 
 
Regarding the competition indicator, there will be no substantial changes. The cut-off 
point of 70 percent will be retained in order to limit the bias towards proportional 
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 The list of these countries comprises: Angola, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), 
Cambodia, China, Eritrea, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, 
Vietnam. See Appendix G. Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization – Replication for 2006, 126 
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 See for example: www.electionguide.org, africanelections.tripod.com, www.parties-and-
elections.de, www.idea.int/vt 
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 See 5.3.3 Concept Validation, 71 
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electoral systems and to adhere to Vanhanen’s original concept (Vanhanen 2003, 59). 
Nevertheless, this limit percentage remains arbitrary and an admitted point of criticism. 
In terms of parliamentary competition, Vanhanen (2003) takes into account either the 
party shares, deriving from election results, or the effective distribution of seats 
(Vanhanen 2003, 56). In order to generate reliable results, both types for determining 
parliamentary competition will be processed to an arithmetic mean in the frame of QDI 
operationalization, provided that relevant data is available. In the case of concurrent 
powers, the competition value analogously represents a combination of executive and 
parliamentary competition (Vanhanen 2003, 58-9).  
 
Finally, the actual percentages of both of Vanhanen’s democracy dimensions are Z-
transformed in order to be compatible with the transformed values of the other three 
dimensions. Analogous to the previous Z-transformations, the base scale for the 
transformation is FH civil liberties.168  
6.2 Aggregation Methodology of the QD-Index 
After having replicated or adapted the three constituent indices, WGI, FH and 
Vanhanen’s ID for 2006, their respective dimensions are now aggregated to the overall 
QDI.169 As can be derived from figure 16, the combination of these three indices allows 
for the coverage of five fundamental dimensions of democratic quality. However, two 
additional important dimensions, notably horizontal and vertical accountability, cannot 
be adequately covered by the WGI, FH or the Vanhanen’s ID. As a result, there 
remains a substantial gap between the theoretical conceptualization and the practical 
operationalization of the QDI.170 Nonetheless, the aggregation of the five dimensions 
covered by current democracy indices can generate added value, as it represents a 
proximate realization of the ideal theoretical concept.  
                                               
168
 See 6.2.1 Z-Transformation, 83 
 See Appendix G. Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization – Replication for 2006, 126 
169
 
 See Appendix A. Constitution of the QD-Index 2006, 108 
170
 
 See 8.2 Further Research Proposals, 105 
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6.2.1 Z-Transformation 
 
Due to the fact that the three constituent indices feature different scales, they have to 
be transformed in order to be accurately combined. To this end, a statistical means, 
namely the z-transformation, is applied. The z-transformation transforms a random 
distribution into a distribution with a mean value of zero and a standard deviation of one 
(Bortz 1999, 756). Consequently, prior different scales can now be compared and 
combined without methodological fallacies. 
 
With regard to the QDI, the initial values, also called x-values, (FH political rights 
ranging from 0 to points, FH civil liberties ranging from 0 to 44 points, Vanhanen 
Participation ranging from 0 to 100%, Vanhanen Competition ranging from 0 to 70%, 
and WGI rule of law ranging from -2.57 to +2.01) are transformed into z-values 
(ranging from about -2.5 to +2.5). For each of the five dimensions, the mean value and 
the standard deviation are computed, as illustrated in table 3. After the  
z-transformation, the distributions of the respective z-values feature a mean value of 
zero and a standard deviation of one.171  
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 See Appendix D. Worldwide Governance Indicators – Operationalization for 2006, 114 
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
 See Appendix G. Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization – Replication for 2006, 126 
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Fig. 16: Operationalization of the QD-Index 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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In order to make the distinct dimensions comparable and combinable, four of them are 
now re-transformed to the scale of a fifth dimension with its mean value and standard 
deviation, e.g. FH civil liberties, which is illustrated in table 4. As a result, all of the five 
dimensions ultimately feature the same FH scale with the same FH mean value and 
the same FH standard deviation and can, thus, be correctly compared and 
combined.172  
6.2.2 Aggregation Formula 
 
After having computed all re-transformed values, the QDI can be calculated by 
aggregation of its constitutive index dimensions. In general, two principal modes for 
aggregating the five dimensions are available, notably addition and multiplication.  
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 The mean value and the standard deviation of the FH scale, which is used for all of the re-
transformation calculations, are µ=28.16 and σ=11.74, respectively. 
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
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The multiplicative aggregation prevents for the compensation of low dimensional 
ratings with higher ones, as would be the case in additive aggregation methodologies. 
Similar to Vanhanen’s deliberations, countries need to score relatively high in all of the 
five democracy dimensions in order to be assigned high levels of democratic quality 
(Vanhanen 2003, 64). By contrast, if a country rates zero percent in one dimension, 
also the overall QDI value will be zero. 
 
Despite the positive aspects of a multiplicative methodology, the QDI is calculated on 
an additive basis, which means that a country’s overall QDI ranking represents an 
arithmetic mean of its dimensional scores, which is illustrated in table 5.  
 
The additive methodology provides some advantages: Contrary to the multiplicative 
methodology, the country ranking does not change, irrespective of the dimension which 
serves as the base scale. In addition, the number of negative re-transformed values 
does not matter. Finally, the additive methodology provides for clear country rankings 
as contrasted with the clustering of zero-rating countries, when applying the 
multiplicative methodology. Admittedly, inferior dimensional ratings can, however,  
be compensated with better results in other country dimensions.  
 
As can be derived from the aggregation formula, all of the five dimensions are weighted 
equally. Put differently, the actual democracy dimensions are not weighted according to 
their relative importance. In turn, this implies that the three processed indices are 
unequally incorporated into the overall QDI results. For instance, the rule of law 
represents the basis upon which all other dimensions of democratic quality rest. 
However, rule of law is equally weighted within the QDI methodology. The reason why 
dimensional weights have been omitted is the fact that there is simply no theoretical 
justification for other concrete weighting percentages per dimension, either. However, 
the operationalization is in accordance with the prior conceptualization of the QDI, 
 
5
__________
2006
CVxPVxPRFHxCLFHxRoLWGIx xxxxxQDI ++++=  
Key: 
QDI........ Quality of Democracy – Index 
RoL........ Rule of Law 
CL.......... Civil Liberties 
 
PR ......... Political Rights 
C............ Competition 
P ............ Participation 
Tab. 5: Aggregation Formula of the QD-Index 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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because all dimensions are valued equally irrespective of the initial index they are 
stemming from. Nonetheless, this problem still remains a justified point of criticism 
concerning the operationalization of the QDI.173 
6.3 QDI - Country Ranking 2006 
As has been described above, Vanhanen’s most recent country study serves as the 
bottleneck in terms of the scope of countries assessed by the QDI (Vanhanen 2003). 
The evaluation of the world’s smallest countries is omitted due to the fact, that they are 
heavily contingent upon external influences, which would distort their relative 
democratic quality ratings (Vanhanen 2003, 31). The ranking of the 167 countries, 
which have been assessed within the frame of the present study for 2006, is shown in 
table 6. The top ten ranked countries are Iceland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Belgium, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Austria, and New Zealand.174 Eight out of 
these ten countries are European states. Among the first 25 states, there are only 
seven non-European countries. 
 
The interpretation of this fact can be threefold: Firstly, European countries may really 
feature higher levels of democratic quality than other countries. Secondly, the results 
may underscore the potential ideological bias towards European democracy 
perceptions. Finally, the QDI itself may produce somewhat distorted results due to its 
methodological construction. For the purpose of discussion of the results, some of the 
country positions will be analyzed in more detail. 
 
Austria obtains rank 9th, which is mostly due to the very high ratings regarding rule of 
law, civil liberties, and political rights. Participation and competition scores are slightly 
lower due to the parliamentary elections in 2006. Another interesting case is Chile, 
which ranks higher than prominent democracies, such as Israel or the Czech Republic. 
The high ratings of Chile are predominately based on high scores in terms of rule of 
law, civil liberties, political rights, and participation. 
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 See 7 Concept Validation of the QD-Index, 92 
174
 
 Some of the countries have different rankings despite equal QDI scores. This is due to 
rounding effects of the overall QDI ratings. As a result, the ranking of nearly equally rating 
countries is of minor relevance. 
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Rank Country QDI Rank Country QDI Rank Country QDI
1 Iceland 44.5 57 Mexico 32.6 112 Ethiopia 24.9
2 Denmark 44.4 58 Romania 32.5 113 Niger 24.9
3 Luxembourg 44.0 59 Peru 32.4 114 Central African Rep. 24.2
4 Belgium 43.9 60 Namibia 32.1 115 Mozambique 24.0
5 Netherlands 43.7 61 Dominican Republic 32.1 116 Burkina Faso 23.8
6 Norway 43.6 62 Botswana 31.9 117 Haiti 23.3
7 Sweden 43.5 63 Indonesia 31.5 118 Gambia, The 23.1
8 Australia 43.1 64 Papa New Guinea 31.5 119 Syria 23.0
9 Austria 42.9 65 Bolivia 31.3 120 Morocco 22.6
10 New Zealand 42.2 66 Ukraine 31.2 121 Tunisia 22.5
11 Germany 42.2 67 Serbia 31.2 122 Iraq 22.4
12 Finland 42.2 68 Nicaragua 31.0 123 Afghanistan 22.3
13 Malta 41.7 69 Guyana 30.7 124 Maldives 22.2
14 Cyprus 41.7 70 El Salvador 30.6 125 Russia 22.1
15 Canada 41.5 71 Senegal 30.6 126 Thailand 22.1
16 Switzerland 40.9 72 Solomon Islands 30.4 127 Tajikistan 21.9
17 United Kingdom 40.1 73 Sri Lanka 30.4 128 Algeria 21.6
18 Ireland 39.9 74 Lesotho 30.3 129 Kyrgyzstan 21.6
19 Spain 39.8 75 Bosnia-Herzegovina 30.2 130 Rwanda 21.6
20 Chile 39.8 76 Ecuador 30.1 131 Yemen 21.1
21 Estonia 39.2 77 Turkey 29.9 132 Cameroon 20.9
22 Bahamas 39.1 78 Jamaica 29.8 133 Azerbaijan 20.6
23 Uruguay 38.6 79 Benin 29.7 134 Egypt 20.0
24 Czech Republic 38.4 80 Paraguay 29.7 135 DR Congo (Zaire) 20.0
25 United States 38.0 81 Macedonia 29.1 136 Congo (Brazzaville) 20.0
26 Israel 38.0 82 Zambia 29.0 137 Togo 19.9
27 Portugal 37.6 83 Malawi 28.8 138 Kazakhstan 19.8
28 Latvia 37.6 84 Liberia 28.6 139 Vietnam 19.7
29 Italy 37.6 85 Montenegro 28.3 140 Guinea 19.7
30 Hungary 37.5 86 Albania 28.1 141 Djibouti 19.2
31 Japan 37.4 87 Bangladesh 28.0 142 Cambodia 18.5
32 France 37.0 88 Fiji 27.9 143 Belarus 18.4
33 Costa Rica 37.0 89 Madagascar 27.8 144 Iran 18.4
34 Slovenia 37.0 90 Guinea-Bissau 27.5 145 Chad 18.0
35 Greece 36.9 91 Mauritania 27.2 146 Laos 17.8
36 Mauritius 36.6 92 Mali 27.2 147 Equatorial Guinea 16.7
37 Taiwan 36.5 93 Malaysia 27.1 148 Cuba 16.6
38 South Korea 36.1 94 Georgia 26.9 149 Zimbabwe 16.3
39 Lithuania 35.9 95 Kenya 26.8 150 Cote D'Ivoire 16.2
40 Argentina 35.7 96 Sierra Leone 26.5 151 Bahrain 15.7
41 Barbados 35.6 97 Honduras 26.5 152 Uzbekistan 15.5
42 Panama 35.1 98 Nepal 26.5 153 Bhutan 14.7
43 Slovakia 35.0 99 Colombia 25.8 154 Qatar 14.2
44 Ghana 34.9 100 Burundi 25.7 155 Oman 13.8
45 Brazil 34.8 101 Uganda 25.6 156 Brunei 13.4
46 Bulgaria 34.7 102 Moldova 25.5 157 United Arab Emirat. 13.2
47 India 34.6 103 Kuwait 25.3 158 Pakistan 12.3
48 Poland 34.5 104 Armenia 25.3 159 Angola 10.1
49 Cape Verde 34.3 105 Guatemala 25.2 160 Saudi Arabia 10.1
50 Mongolia 34.3 106 Tanzania 25.1 161 China 10.1
51 Belize 34.1 107 Nigeria 25.0 162 Libya 8.1
52 South Africa 33.6 108 Lebanon 25.0 163 Eritrea 8.1
53 Singapore 33.5 109 Venezuela 25.0 164 Burma (Myanmar) 6.3
54 Philippines 33.4 110 Comoros 25.0 165 North Korea 5.6
55 Croatia 32.9 111 Jordan 24.9 166 Turkmenistan 5.1
56 Trinidad and Tobago 32.8 167 Somalia 3.0
 
Tab. 6: QDI Country Ranking 2006  
(Source: Own illustration) 
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By contrast, Switzerland only ranks as the 16th country within the QDI ranking. Despite 
extremely high ratings concerning rule of law, political rights, civil liberties and 
competition; participation levels are relatively low. This circumstance is mostly due to 
the participation indicator, notably electoral voter turnout, and the omission of direct 
modes of participation, such as referendums. This flaw has already been taken into 
account within the frame of Vanhanen’s most recent country study (Vanhanen 2003, 
59).  
 
Similarly, the relatively low ranking of the United States of America is due to low ratings 
regarding participation and competition. Despite the high ratings in terms of rule of law, 
civil liberties and political rights175, the two-party system induces low competition levels 
and thus relatively low overall QDI results. Analogously, the relative low ranking of 
France seems to be due to the exceptional presidential elections in 2002176, inducing 
low competition scores and thus also a relatively low overall QDI score.  
 
Rather sobering is the QDI ranking of Russia. It is predominantly based on the low 
ratings in terms of rule of law, civil liberties, and especially political rights. The countries 
with least democratic quality, according to the QDI ranking 2006, are Eritrea, Myanmar, 
North Korea, Turkmenistan, and Somalia, all of which feature comparably low ratings 
with regard to the five democracy dimensions under consideration. Due to the additive 
aggregation methodology, even these countries with least democratic quality can still 
be differentiated and ranked. In other words, a clustering of countries with zero points, 
which would be the case if the multiplicative methodology was applied, can be avoided. 
6.4 Correlations of QDI Results  
After having dealt with the concrete QDI country ranking 2006, this section of the 
chapter will analyze interrelations of the QDI with other values. On the one hand, 
correlations between the overall QDI scores and its constituent indices are conducted. 
On the other hand, the QDI results are compared with external values, as well. 
  
 
 
                                               
175
 
 Admittedly, the Freedom House ratings may be biased towards the democracy conception of 
the USA. As a result, the USA score high in terms of political rights and civil liberties.  
176
 
 In 2002 incumbent president Jacques Chirac won a landslide victory against far right Jean-
Marie Le Pen, which was commonly considered an anti-Le pen rather than a pro-Chirac vote 
of the French population. 
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6.4.1 Comparison QDI Results vs. Constituent Indices 
 
First of all, the question arises, which of the constituent democracy dimensions impacts 
the QDI results most. To answer this question, a Pearson correlation analysis between 
the QD-Index and its based-upon index dimensions is conducted, which is summarized 
in table 7.  
 
Remarkably, civil liberties (.936) and political rights (.934) both highly correlate with the 
QDI ratings. Astonishingly, both FH dimensions correlate nearly identically with the 
QDI. With regard to the WGI, a significantly high correlation coefficient with the QDI 
can also be attested, however to a lesser extent (.706). Finally, the Vanhanen 
dimensions feature quite different correlation coefficients (.592/.809). This may be due 
to the fact that voter turnout constitutes a more volatile indicator than competition 
figures, as participation results only represent an electoral snapshot. However, it is 
important to note that the correlation coefficient of the competition dimension is also 
influenced by the upper limit of 70 percent.177 
 
Besides the correlations among the QDI and its defining dimensions, the correlation 
coefficients among the dimensions themselves are important from an analytical 
perspective, as well. Again, the WGI nearly identically correlate with the FH dimensions 
(.666/.630), whereas the correlation coefficients are comparably low with the Vanhanen 
dimensions (.155/.354). As has already been outlined above, this relation may be 
contingent upon the relative stability of the countries’ rule of law status as compared 
with the relative volatility of their participation outcomes. Additionally, the rule of law 
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 See 6.1.3 Operationalization of Vanhanen, 79 
N = 167 QDI WGI_RoL FH_CL FH_PR V_P V_C 
QDI  .706** .936** .934** .592** .809** 
WGI_RoL   .666** .630** .155* .354**  
FH_CL    .960**  .389** .706**  
FH_PR     .388**  .736** 
V_P      .419**  
Tab. 7: Correlation Coefficients between QDI and Constituent Dimensions 2006 
(Source: Own calculation)  
(**/* correlation is significant as the 0.01/0.05 level; 2-tailed; 167 countries) 
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may be conceptually closer to political rights and civil liberties than to competition and 
participation. 
 
Apart from this, political rights and civil liberties highly correlate (.960), which 
underlines that FH rates countries relatively equally in terms of political rights and civil 
liberties. This fact stresses the homogenous impact of FH country scores on the overall 
QDI results. By contrast, the ID dimensions correlate to a much lesser extent (.419). 
Consequently, the impact of Vanhanen’s ID on the final QDI ratings is comparably 
smaller (.592/.809). 
 
6.4.2 Comparison of QDI Results vs. External Values 
 
Apart from an internal correlation, the QDI results can equally be correlated with 
external values, such as economic indicators.178  In this respect, there will be two 
exemplary correlation calculations of the QDI, notably with gross domestic product 
figures based on purchasing-power-parity per capita (GDP_PPP) and with life 
expectancy data. The outcome of the first correlation of the QDI scores with the 
GDP_PPP for 2006 is illustrated in table 8.179 
 
 
Apparently, there is a positive and significant connection between the GDP_PPP and 
the QDI for the year 2006 (.446) for the 163 countries under consideration. 180 
Nonetheless, the correlation coefficient is relatively low. This fact may underscore the 
above mentioned statement that economic performance does not necessarily depend 
                                               
178
 As has been outlined numerous times throughout this diploma thesis, the conceptual core of 
the QDI focuses on political democracy, thus explicitly omitting maximalist democracy 
definitions, which include output-oriented policies, economic welfare, etc. Nonetheless, an 
external correlation with economic data may be of interest from an explorative perspective. 
 See 1.3 Thesis’ Focus of Research, 5 
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 GDP purchasing-power-parity per capita data is retrieved from IMF 2008, [DoR: 15.11.2008] 
 For the purpose of comparability, this data has equally been Z-transformed. 
 See Appendix H. Correlation Data for GDP PPP 2006, 138 
180
 
 IMF 2008 does not provide GDP_PPP data for 2006 with regard to Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, 
and Somalia. 
N = 163 QDI WGI_RoL FH_CL FH_PR V_P V_C 
GDP_PPP .446** .797** .409** .383** -.019 .183* 
Tab. 8: Correlation Coefficients between QDI and GDP PPP per capita 2006 
(Source: Own calculation, GDP data by IMF 2008) 
(**/* correlation is significant as the 0.01/0.05 level; 2-tailed; 163 countries) 
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on a specific type of political system, especially democratic regimes.181 Analogously, 
civil liberties as well as political rights of a country do not highly correlate with its GDP 
(.409/.383). Besides, there is nearly no interrelation between the GDP and democratic 
dimensions, such as participation (-.019) or competition (.183). However, there seems 
to be a rather highly correlating relation among GDP_PPP and the dimension of rule of 
law (.797). This fact may be due to the circumstance that countries with relatively high 
levels regarding legal certainty provide a proper basis for economic development.  
This legal certainty, however, may be provided by non-democratic regimes, as well, 
which would explain the lower correlation coefficient between GDP_PPP and the 
overall QDI results (.446). 
 
Another interesting comparison is the correlation of the overall QDI results of countries 
with their populations’ respective average life expectancies, as illustrated in table 9.182 
Not surprisingly, the various correlation coefficients do not differ substantially from the 
coefficients derived from the GDP correlation. Though there is a positive relationship 
between the quality of democracy of a country and the life expectancy of its population, 
the relationship remains fairly weak (.468) for the 164 countries under consideration.183 
Similarly, there is only weak interrelation of the life expectancy indicator, on the one 
hand, and the civil liberties and political rights indicators, on the other hand (.438/.405).  
 
Once again, there is practically no interrelation of the participation and the competition 
dimensions with the life expectancy figures for the year 2006 (.073/.229). The only 
dimension, which correlates relatively stronger with the QDI as compared to the other 
indicators, is the rule of law (.661). Analogous to the deliberations above with regard to 
the economic performance of a country, legal certainty may provide an improved basis 
for economic development, which in turn manifests itself in terms of higher life 
expectancy of a country’s population.  
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 See 1.3 Thesis’ Focus of Research, 5 
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 Life Expectancy data is retrieved from WDI 2008, [DoR: 15.11.2008] 
 For the purpose of comparability, this data has equally been Z-transformed. 
 See Appendix I. Correlation Data for Life Expectancy 2006, 142 
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 WDI 2008 do not provide data on life expectancy for Afghanistan, Iraq, and Taiwan. 
N = 164 QDI WGI_RoL FH_CL FH_PR V_P V_C 
Life Exp .468** .661** .438** .405** .073 .229** 
Tab. 9: Correlation Coefficients between QDI and Life Expectancy 2006 
(Source: Own calculation, Life Expectancy data by WDI 2008) 
(**/* correlation is significant as the 0.01/0.05 level; 2-tailed; 164 countries) 
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7 Concept Validation of the QD-Index 
Subsequent to the quantitative, statistical evaluation of the QDI in terms of correlation 
with its constituent indices, this chapter follows a more qualitative approach.  
The concept validation approach by Müller/Pickel (2007)184 will be applied for critically 
evaluating the concept quality of the QDI. The respective results are illustrated in figure 
17. Of course, not all of the validation attributes can be automatically transferred to the 
QDI assessment due to the fact that the approach by Müller/Pickel (2007) primarily 
focuses on genuine democracy indices, not meta-indices. Nevertheless, this approach 
serves as a valuable means to systematically analyze the QDI’s strengths and 
weaknesses.  
 
Obviously, the QDI differs in terms of his conceptualization as compared with its 
operationalization, because only five out of seven democracy dimensions could be 
operationalized. Of course, this fact represents a serious deficit. However, the QDI 
constitutes an experimental meta-concept, based on an ideal theoretical 
conceptualization. Concerning its operationalization, the QDI still remains a work in 
progress. As a result, the QDI will be validated according to its seven dimensions in 
terms of its conceptualization and according to its five dimensions in terms of its 
operationalization, notably measurement and aggregation. 
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 See 2.4.2 Approach by Müller/Pickel (2007), 28 
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7.1 Conceptualization 
One of the strengths of the QDI represents its concept specification (1.1). The QDI 
predominantly focuses on political democracy. Socioeconomic factors as well as 
conducive elements, such as regime stability or government effectiveness in terms of 
policy-output are omitted, which underlines the concept’s economicalness (1.1.1). 
Related with this question is the aspect of conceptual relevance (1.1.2). By integrating 
democracy dimensions, such as rule of law, civil liberties, political rights, participation, 
competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, the concept covers all relevant 
Conceptualization
1.1.1 Economicalness
1.1.2 Relevance
1.1 Concept Specification
1.2.1 Redundancy
1.2.2 Conflation
1.2 Concept Logic
Measurement
2.1.1 Correct Measuring
2.1.2 Scope of Sources
2.1 Validity of Indicators
2.2.1 Theoretical Foundation2.2 Validity of Scaling
2.3.1 Coding Rules
2.3.2 Citation of Sources
2.3 Replicability
2.3.3 Inter-Coder Reliability Tests
2.3.4 Disaggregated Data
Aggregation
3.1.1 Adequacy of A.- Level3.1 Validity of A.- Level
3.2.1 Theoretical Foundation3.2 Validity of A.- Rule
3.3.1 Applicability of A.- Rule3.3 Replicability
 
Fig. 17: Concept Validation of the QD-Index 
(Source: Own illustration following Müller/Pickel 2007, 520-3) 
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aspects of political democracy. Equally, the three core principals of democracy, notably 
liberty, equality and control, are covered by the concept.185  
 
The seven (five) democracy dimensions incorporated into the QDI are strongly 
interrelated. The rule of law constitutes the most fundamental element of democratic 
quality. Based on this, civil liberties serve as the foundation for political rights, which in 
turn represent the basis for participation and competition. Finally, vertical accountability 
draws on all of the afore-mentioned democracy dimensions in order to work effectively. 
Only, horizontal accountability does not necessarily interrelate with the other elements 
of democratic quality, as it solely presupposes an effective rule of law.  
 
As can be derived from this short recapitulation of the index construction, the QDI 
scores well with regard to its conceptual redundancy (1.2.1), because all of the afore-
mentioned dimensions are indispensable for the accurate evaluation of democratic 
quality. Of course, it may be argued that horizontal accountability represents a specific 
element of the rule of law, that participation overlaps with vertical accountability, or that 
competition and participation already implicate political and civil rights to some degree.  
 
Nonetheless, the dimensions are measured separately. Admittedly, horizontal 
accountability heavily depends on the functioning of the rule of law. However, 
horizontal accountability draws on the specific relations among state institutions, 
therefore highlighting a specific element of democratic quality. Thus, the integration of 
this element into the broader category of rule of law would lead to a substantial loss of 
information and differentiation. 
 
Equally, vertical accountability may well go far beyond simple modes of participation in 
terms of elections, which makes the separate assessment of the dimension more 
reasonable. Finally, it is one of the explicit strengths of the QDI that it enables the 
separate assessment of rights, competition, as well as participation, thereby eliminating 
specific weaknesses of the individual democracy indices. Any abandonment of a 
differentiated assessment would automatically entail substantial losses of information.  
 
As compared with redundancy the aspect of conflation (1.2.2) is much easier to deal 
with. Due to the fact that the QDI exclusively processes pre-established index 
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 Admittedly, the control dimension could only be operationalized to a minor degree due to the 
lack of adequate democracy indices assessing horizontal and vertical accountability.  
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dimensions and omits the evaluation of more fine-grained democracy attributes, there 
assessment of conceptual conflation remains irrelevant.  
7.2 Measurement 
Because the QDI constitutes a meta-index, which is based on three constituent 
democracy indices, all their advantages and deficits in terms of correct measuring 
(2.1.1) equally apply to the QDI.186 The great benefit of the QDI, however, represents 
the possibility of mitigating individual deficiencies via combination of the indices. For 
instance, FH does not explicitly measure democracy. It is rather the integration of FH 
that enables the correct depiction of democratic quality.  
 
Equally, the integration of Vanhanen’s ID allows for mitigating one of its conceptual 
deficits, notably the pretended implicit measurement of political and civil rights. Indeed, 
it is one of the core strengths of the QDI that it allows for the combination of 
conceptually complementary democracy indices despite their methodologically different 
approaches. Similar to the concept methodological principle of the WGI, the 
combination of the indices provides the opportunity for more precise and more accurate 
assessments of democratic quality than individual democracy indices could do.  
 
Apart from this, the QDI features a broad scope of sources (2.1.2), which represents an 
additional advantage as compared with the constituent indices. As has been outlined in 
the previous chapters, FH draws on numerous public as well as non-governmental 
sources.187 Besides, the WGI process 35 different sources provided by 32 different 
organizations. 188  Finally, Vanhanen’s ID has been replicated for 2006, based on 
several sources, as well.189 However, in the frame of the ID the scope of sources does 
not play such an important role due to the reliance on objective data.  
 
The theoretical foundation (2.2.1) of the validity of scaling is two-fold. On the one hand, 
the QDI aims at setting up an instrument to assess and rank countries via a democratic 
continuum. As a result, there is a need for a differentiated scale. On the other hand, the 
QDI represents a combination index. Consequently, the constituent indices have to be 
homogenously transformed by rescaling in order to be compatible for further analyses. 
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Moreover, the replicability (2.3) represents a major strength of the QDI. Indeed, it has 
been the initial motivation to construct a meta-index, which can be replicated on an 
annual or biannual basis in order to generate cross-sectional as well as longitudinal 
comparative rankings of democratic quality. The processing of the constituent indices 
in the course of the QDI construction is aimed to be simple and replicable. As a result, 
there has been emphasized the importance of methodological transparency throughout 
the thesis.190  
 
The validation criterion coding rules (2.3.1) does not apply to the concept assessment 
of the QDI, as there are no separate coding rules utilized. In fact, this criterion only 
applies to the concept validation of the individual democracy indices. By contrast, the 
citation of sources (2.3.2) plays an important role for the transparency and the 
replicability of the QDI, as well. Of course, the QDI depends of the citation of the 
sources of the constituent indices. Put differently, the QDI cannot cite sources which 
have not been cited by the individual sources themselves. This holds especially true of 
the WGI as well as FH. For as Vanhanen’s ID has been replicated for 2006 
autonomously, all the processed sources have been indicated as transparently as 
possible.191  
 
As contrasted with the necessity of comprehensible citation of data sources, there is no 
need for inter-coder reliability tests (2.3.3) in the frame of the QDI. This is due to the 
fact that the index construction remains an objective procedure, which does not involve 
any genuine subjective measure. This, in turn, also represents an important advantage 
of the QDI as a meta-concept as compared with alternative individual democracy 
indices. Admittedly, the problem of lacking inter-coder reliability tests at the constituent 
indices’ level still remains.  
 
Finally, the QDI also provides information about disaggregated data (2.3.4) by explicitly 
citing the values for each processed democracy dimension. The provision of further 
disaggregated data remains the task of the individual indices and does not constitute a 
genuine validation criterion of the QDI.  
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7.3 Aggregation 
It may be a valuable point of criticism that the QDI suffers from little adequacy of its 
aggregation level (3.1.1), as it may be impracticable to generate one singe overall 
scale for such a complex phenomenon like the quality of democracy.192 Although this 
criticism is justifiable to some degree, the aggregation to one singe score enables the 
simple cross-sectional comparison of countries, which represents a valuable asset for 
the evaluation of democratic quality. Nonetheless, the QDI’s sub scores, notably the 
five individual dimension values, are published, which in turn allows for the comparison 
of countries according to separate dimensions, as well.  
 
Apart from this, critics may doubt the general validity of a meta-index, as the 
combination of already existing indices entails a non-negligible loss of information, 
hence making country comparisons in terms of democratic quality pointless. Indeed, 
the contrary is the case. A meta-index, such as the QDI, allows for the combination of 
indices and thus for the combination of the indices’ strengths while diminishing their 
respective deficits.193  
 
Related with this aspect, all thresholds provided by the constituent indices will be 
omitted. On the one hand, the various thresholds cannot be combined in a reasonable 
and consistent manner. On the other hand, the QDI’s theoretical concept explicitly 
refuses any threshold determination, because democratic quality is perceived to 
represent a continuum rather than “democratic”, “authoritarian”, or “totalitarian” clusters. 
In addition, there is simply no theoretical justification for any concrete threshold 
determination.194  
 
The theoretical justification (3.2.1) of the aggregation rule represents another strength 
of the QDI. Contrary to Vanhanen’s deliberations, the QDI’s aggregation methodology 
is based on an additive combination of democracy dimensions. Admittedly,  
this approach does not ensure that countries only receive high overall quality ratings,  
if all of their separate dimensions are rated equally high. However, it allows for 
achieving the primary goal of the present diploma thesis, notably the differentiated 
assessment of countries according to their quality of democracy. Put differently, the 
application of an additive aggregation methodology enables the differentiated 
democracy evaluation of least democratic countries, as well.  
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Admittedly, this additive procedure does not necessarily explain why the five 
dimensions should be weighted equally. In fact, it remains doubtful why the rule of law 
should receive the same weight like competition or participation. Obviously, the relative 
importance of the actual dimensions differs. Nonetheless, the simple additive 
methodology has been applied for the operationalization of the QDI due to the fact that 
there is no theoretical justification for determining concrete weights to each dimension. 
Put differently, although there is no theoretical justification for equal weights, there is no 
theoretical justification for differing weights, either. As a result, equal weights have 
been maintained in order to avoid incomprehensible methodological arbitrariness.195  
 
Finally, the last validation criterion, notably the applicability of the aggregation rule 
(3.3.1), is fulfilled by the QDI’s methodology. The aggregation formula has been cited 
explicitly.196 The applicability of the individual aggregation rules depend on the index 
construction of the actual constituent democracy indices. These, however, are not 
directly subject to the evaluation criterion regarding the QDI. 
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8 Conclusion 
The core of the present diploma thesis was to establish a meta-concept, notably the 
QD-Index, which combines current democracy indices in order to depict a more valid 
and more reliable picture of democratic quality on a global scale. In this context, the 
meta-index should enable the combination of the indices’ relative strengths, while 
reducing their respective weaknesses. The study proceeded as follows: 
 
Firstly, a proper working definition of democracy was derived to serve as the theoretical 
basis of the subsequent QDI conceptualization. The model focuses on a universalistic 
conception of political democracy, thus neglecting democracy approaches that 
emphasize socio-economic preconditions, conducive factors, or output-oriented policy 
results. The goal was to distill a rather narrow democracy concept that nonetheless 
enables the differentiated assessment of countries against the backdrop of a 
democracy continuum without thresholds, hence omitting simplistic dichotomous 
regime classifications.  
 
In the next stage, the need for the assessment of democratic quality and thus the 
legitimacy of the present study was stressed. Among other factors, this need arises 
due to the ever increasing number of democratic political systems, which is resulting 
from the end of the bipolar world order, the theoretical developments within empirical 
democracy research, as well as the increasing importance of ODA conditionality 
clauses.  
 
Of course, the problems concerning theoretical conceptualization and practical 
operationalization within democratic quality research were discussed in detail.  
This discussion comprised minimalist vs. maximalist democracy concepts, theoretical 
universalism vs. cultural relativism, validity and reliability issues, methodological 
objectivity vs. subjectivity, or the scale construction within the measurement as well as 
the aggregation stage.  
 
Moreover, there are additional problems, such as the difficulty of determining justifiable 
thresholds, the weighting of dimensions within the aggregation stage, the often 
unsatisfactory availability of relevant data, and the challenge of index combination in 
general. In this context, there have also been discussed two important approaches 
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within the scientific literature, which aim at validating current democracy indices against 
the backdrop of these numerous conceptual and practical problems. 
 
Subsequently, three elementary principles of democracy and democratic quality were 
discussed, notably liberty, equality, and control. Based on this, numerous democracy 
dimensions were identified, such as the rule of law, civil and political rights, 
responsiveness, vertical and horizontal accountability, participation, as well as 
competition. Except for responsiveness, all of these dimensions then were incorporated 
into the QDI concept.  
 
After the concept had been set up, three current democracy indices, notably the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, Freedom House, as well as Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democratization, were presented in terms of their respective theoretical background, 
development, their dimensions, as well as their methodology. Additionally, a thorough 
concept validation and a test for their transferability to the QDI were conducted.  
 
The last section of the study dealt with the concrete operationalization of the QDI and 
thus with the methodological adaptations of its constituent democracy indices for the 
purpose of their combination. Subsequently, the additive aggregation methodology was 
made explicit, the QDI country ranking for 2006 was generated and a statistical 
comparison of the QDI and its constituent indices as well as selected external values 
was conducted via a Pearson correlation analysis. Finally, the QDI itself was submitted 
to a detailed validation of its conceptual quality.  
8.1 Recapitulation of the Research Question 
After having revised the structure of the diploma thesis, the focus of the conclusion 
shifts towards a more detailed discussion of the study’s outcomes. For this purpose, 
the central research question is recapitulated: 
 
To what extent can an experimental meta-concept, such as the QDI, generate 
added value in terms of concept quality by combining already existing 
democracy indices for the purpose of assessing democratic quality on a global 
scale?  
 
The general answer is that the QDI can deliver added value, because it combines three 
complementary democracy indices, each of which focuses on different democracy 
dimensions. The QDI enables a more valid and more reliable assessment of 
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democratic quality on a global scale, because it mitigates the constituent indices’ 
relative weaknesses, while combining their respective strengths. In order to evaluate 
the thesis’ outcomes more thoroughly, each of the sub questions, posed in the 
introductory chapter, is dealt with separately.197  
 
• What are potential and useful dimensions and indicators for the QDI?  
 
As has been outlined in chapter three, seven major democracy dimensions have been 
incorporated within the QDI conceptualization process. The scope of dimensions 
comprises the rule of law, civil liberties, political rights, participation, competition, 
vertical as well as horizontal accountability. The respective indicators for the 
dimensions differed according to the methodological design of the constituent indices. 
However, the problem of incomplete operationalization of the theoretical construct 
remains, because horizontal and vertical accountability could not be integrated into the 
operationalized version of the QDI.  
 
Nonetheless, the QDI proves to be of theoretical and practical value. Concretely,  
the incomplete operationalization underlines the fact that the QDI represents an 
experimental meta-concept, an approach that is open to further theoretical and 
practical improvements. Hence, the QDI still represents a work in progress, which 
allows for the substitution and then integration of additional indices, as long as they 
meet the methodological criteria.198 
 
• Which democracy indices can (cannot) be used for the conceptualization of the 
QDI? 
 
In general, the indices, which are integrated into the QDI framework, need to be 
annually updated or allow for their annual replication in order to correspond to the 
overall goal of setting up a meta-concept for longitudinal studies of democratic quality 
on a global scale. Additionally, they need to depict at least one of the dimensions the 
QDI concept is composed of. Ideally, the processed indices are conceptually 
complementary, as this fact would further increase the utility of the QDI as a meta-
index.199  
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In the course of the present study, three democracy indices have been identified that 
meet all of the criteria mentioned above, notably the World Bank’s Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, Freedom House, and Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization.  
Of course, these indices had to be transformed in order to be integrated into the 
operationalized version of the QDI concept. All of the indices had to be statistically 
rescaled via a Z-transformation.200 In addition, the rule of law had to be excluded from 
FH’s civil liberties dimension and finally, Vanhanen’s ID had to be replicated for 2006 
due to the lacking of more recent publications. By contrast, some annually updated 
indices had to be excluded from the analysis, among them for instance the UN Human 
Development Index (HDI) and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). 
Additionally, concepts that rather remain on a theoretical basis, such as Dahl (1971) or 
Hadenius (1992) could not be incorporated, either.  
 
• According to the QDI, what does an exemplary country ranking for a specific 
year (e.g. 2006) look like? 
 
The QDI country ranking 2006 stresses the fact that European countries meet best the 
distinct criteria of democratic quality. Concretely, there are eight and 18 European 
countries under the top ten and top 25 ranked countries, respectively. Austria ranks as 
the 9th country, the USA rank 25th, France is the 32nd country and Russia only obtains 
rank 125th. Of course, the relative ranks should not be overestimated, especially in 
case of countries with very similar QDI scores. Additionally, the QDI country ranking 
represents only a snapshot of democratic quality for 2006, which is also substantially 
influenced by electoral outcomes of different years. The QDI ranking rather qualifies for 
revealing trends of global democratic quality developments from a relative perspective. 
Besides, the dimensional scores must also be taken into account in order to analyze 
the underlying reasons for specific country rankings.201  
 
• What are differences and commonalities of the results generated by the QDI in 
comparison to its constituent democracy indices as well as external reference 
values? 
 
The QDI results feature high correlations with the FH scores, which stems from the 
high inter-correlations among the two FH dimensions, civil liberties and political rights. 
By contrast, the WGI correlates least with the overall QDI ratings. This may be due to 
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the fact that only one indicator, notably rule of law, has been incorporated into the QDI 
model. Finally, the correlation coefficient of Vanhanen’s ID replication ranges in 
between. This comparatively lower impact on QDI results is due to the lower inter-
correlations of Vanhanen’s dimensions, competition and participation.202 With regard to 
the correlations of the QDI with external values, only mediocre interrelationships can be 
observed. In other words, there does not seem to be a strong relation between a 
country’s democratic quality, on the one hand, and its economic performance and 
welfare in terms of GDP per capita and its poluplation’s life expectancy, on the other 
hand.203 
 
• What are strengths and weaknesses of the QDI? 
 
The most important strength of the operationalized QDI is the fact that it enables the 
combination of complementary indices, such as Vanhanen’s ID and Freedom House.  
In this respect, a conceptual flaw of FH can be eliminated, notably that it does measure 
freedom, rather than democracy. Conversely, the ID’s weakness of presupposing civil 
and political rights as well as the higher result volatility deriving from the electoral 
indicators can equally be mitigated by the QDI. Finally, WGI’s rule of law itself 
represents a meta-dimension based on various data sources, which in turn also 
increases the reliability and validity of the QDI.  
 
This combination of theoretically complementary democracy indices enables a more 
precise evaluation of democratic quality. This measurement improvement is vital to 
distinct fields, such as the testing of theories within political science or the justification 
of ODA conditionality clauses.204 This effect is amplified by the possibility of timely 
actualization of the QDI as well as the possibility for longitudinal assessments of 
democratic quality.205  
 
Another strength of the QDI is that the index enables polytomous country evaluations 
by circumventing the fallacy of arbitrary thresholds or bold regime classifications, unlike 
FH’s classification of “free”, “partly free”, and “not free”. 206  In addition, the QDI’s 
construct methodology is made as transparent as possible. Put differently, the index 
can easily be replicated, because it draws on already existing and easily accessible 
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data sources. As a result, the QDI can be updated annually, which once more qualifies 
it for longitudinal research. Of course, the replication of Vanhanen’s ID is slightly more 
labor-intensive. Due to the objectivity of the indicators, however, the replication can be 
conducted with relative ease, as well.  
 
Besides the strengths, there are also weaknesses to be considered regarding the setup 
of the QDI. Probably, the results would be even more reliable, if more indices could be 
applied for the measurement of the relevant indicators. Of course, the WGI represent 
an exception, as they already constitute a mixture of 35 different data sources.  
 
Moreover, the integration of Vanhanen’s ID also poses some difficulties despite its 
major advantage of conceptual and methodological parsimoniousness, because 
electoral results heavily impact overall QDI results.207 Elections are the only mode of 
participation taken into account. Other forms, such as referendums, demonstrations, 
etc. are neglected, which distorts the results to some degree.208 Especially concerning 
second round presidential elections, the competition value may rarely be significantly 
higher than 50 percent.  
 
• Is it meaningful and feasible to combine conceptually and methodologically 
different democracy indices in the first place? 
 
As has been shown by the WGI, it does make sense to combine democracy indices, 
which are conceptually heterogeneous and which apply different methodologies.209 
More generally, there is no founded objection to combining various democracy 
measures. The contrary is the case. On the assumption that each of the indices 
measures democracy to some extent, their combination into a meta-index should 
theoretically enable a more reliable approximation to the phenomenon “democracy”.  
 
• What about the QDI’s own concept quality in terms of its theoretical 
conceptualization and practical operationalization? 
 
The QDI’s reflexive element of the last chapter, notably its own concept validation,  
is one of the strengths of the present study. In short, the index features both conceptual 
economicalness and relevance in terms of its scope of dimensions. Additional 
advantages of the QDI are the scope and the transparent citation of the sources 
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processed, the theoretical foundation of the scale construction, as well as the provision 
of the disaggregated data. Finally, the theoretical foundation and the applicability of the 
aggregation rule are ensured.  
8.2 Further Research Proposals 
As has already been outlined above, the QDI represents an experimental meta-index, 
which does claim neither theoretical nor practical sanctity. Obviously, there is no full 
operationalization of the conceptual design of the QDI, because not all QDI dimensions 
could be operationalized by current democracy indices. This fact is graphically 
illustrated in figure 18. Due to the fact that vertical and horizontal accountability 
represent two important democracy dimensions, which equally underscore the 
relevance of the control principle within democracy conceptions, the QDI still can be 
improved.  
 
 
Besides, there may be integrated additional democracy indices, measuring already 
operationalized dimensions by providing additional indicators. Hence, the validity and 
reliability of the country assessments could be further improved, especially concerning 
participation and competition. As a result, the potential bias of the 70 percent cut-off 
limit regarding Vanhanen’s competition indicator could be mitigated. 210  Equally, 
additional modes of participation, such as referendums or demonstrations, could be 
integrated. 
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Fig. 18: Non-operationalized QDI Dimensions 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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Apart from this, the QDI has been designed as a continuum measure for democratic 
quality, explicitly omitting democracy thresholds. Further research could also identify 
reasonable thresholds for this meta-index. However, the problem of theoretical 
justifiability of concrete thresholds remains.  
 
In addition, the QDI could serve as a means for longitudinal studies regarding the 
development of democratic quality. Due to the fact that the WGI do not allow for the 
identification of global trends211, it enables the identification and analysis of relative 
changes in country positions. In this context, the methodology may be improved in 
order to differentiate among countries that score zero QDI points.212  
 
The bottom line is that the QDI represents a valuable conceptual proposal for 
measuring the quality of democracy on a global scale. Despite the numerous 
advantages, stemming from combining the constituent indices’ strengths, while 
mitigating their inherent deficits, many starting points for further improvements remain. 
Nonetheless, index combination constitutes a fruitful new field within empirical 
democracy research and thus is very likely to become the new focus of future scientific 
effort in comparative politics.  
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A. Constitution of the QD-Index 2006 
 
 
Key : 
x_WGI_RoL........re-transformed WGI rule of law dimension213 
x_FH_CL............re-transformed Freedom House civil liberties dimension214 
x_FH_PR............re-transformed Freedom House political rights dimension214 
x_V_P ................re-transformed Vanhanen’s participation dimension215 
x_V_C ................re-transformed Vanhanen’s competition dimension215 
QDI.....................QD-Index for 2006216 
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Country Code x_WGI_RoL x_FH_CL x_FH_PR x_V_P x_V_C QDI
Afghanistan AFG 5.78 15.00 22.16 38.28 30.52 22.35
Albania ALB 21.28 28.00 30.40 22.04 39.00 28.14
Algeria DZA 22.43 20.00 16.67 23.42 25.70 21.64
Angola AGO 14.91 17.00 13.93 -1.15 5.90 10.12
Argentina ARG 23.63 38.00 36.80 35.39 44.52 35.67
Armenia ARM 23.49 22.00 18.50 26.68 35.73 25.28
Australia AUS 50.68 43.00 42.29 43.42 36.30 43.14
Austria AUT 51.47 43.00 43.21 35.85 41.07 42.92
Azerbaijan AZE 19.61 18.00 15.76 22.96 26.64 20.59
Bahamas BHS 42.78 43.00 41.38 41.36 26.78 39.06
Bahrain BHR 36.66 16.00 21.25 -1.15 5.90 15.73
Bangladesh BGD 20.29 25.00 26.74 34.19 33.64 27.97
Barbados BRB 41.69 43.00 43.21 25.66 24.53 35.62
Belarus BLR 15.62 8.00 10.27 42.66 15.28 18.37
Belgium BEL 46.53 43.00 43.21 42.04 44.52 43.86
Belize BLZ 30.02 39.00 39.55 36.31 25.48 34.07
Benin BEN 23.09 37.00 36.80 28.40 23.21 29.70
Bhutan BTN 36.77 17.00 14.84 -1.15 5.90 14.67
Bolivia BOL 19.37 35.00 32.23 38.68 31.42 31.34
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 23.66 29.00 29.48 24.54 44.52 30.24
Botswana BWA 37.14 34.00 34.97 34.77 18.48 31.87
Brazil BRA 24.60 37.00 34.97 37.57 39.89 34.81
Brunei BRN 33.16 17.00 12.10 -1.15 5.90 13.40
Bulgaria BGR 27.59 38.00 39.55 25.13 43.11 34.67
Burkina Faso BFA 23.97 30.00 22.16 26.03 16.74 23.78
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 13.33 6.00 7.52 -1.15 5.90 6.32
Burundi BDI 17.75 19.00 26.74 35.25 29.96 25.74
Cambodia KHM 16.51 22.00 16.67 18.46 18.77 18.48
Cameroon CMR 17.83 14.00 16.67 36.33 19.56 20.88
Canada CAN 51.11 44.00 43.21 29.46 39.96 41.55
Cape Verde CPV 36.94 39.00 40.46 24.39 30.94 34.34
Central African Republic CAF 11.99 23.00 22.16 31.84 32.22 24.24
Chad TCD 13.81 15.00 12.10 23.88 25.39 18.04
Chile CHL 43.36 43.00 42.29 38.65 31.56 39.77
China CHN 24.18 13.00 8.44 -1.15 5.90 10.07
Colombia COL 22.91 29.00 30.40 20.08 26.67 25.81
Comoros COM 19.35 22.00 28.57 25.84 29.06 24.96
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 15.35 22.00 16.67 34.06 11.74 19.96
Costa Rica CRI 35.76 40.00 41.38 29.59 38.49 37.04
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 12.29 13.00 11.18 16.48 28.30 16.25
Croatia HRV 29.28 39.00 38.63 25.41 32.22 32.91
Cuba CUB 20.58 5.00 7.52 44.10 5.90 16.62
Cyprus CYP 40.70 42.00 41.38 40.81 43.61 41.70
Czech Republic CZE 38.37 43.00 41.38 29.21 40.14 38.42
Denmark DNK 52.36 43.00 43.21 38.70 44.52 44.36
Djibouti DJI 22.42 18.00 17.59 21.67 16.18 19.17
Dominican Republic DOM 23.75 37.00 36.80 33.18 29.56 32.06
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 9.72 12.00 19.42 29.68 29.04 19.97
Ecuador ECU 17.86 36.00 32.23 34.68 29.80 30.11
Egypt EGY 28.14 15.00 13.01 26.43 17.31 19.98
El Salvador SLV 22.99 34.00 36.80 30.03 29.22 30.61
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 15.42 8.00 7.52 45.04 7.50 16.70
Eritrea ERI 18.34 8.00 9.35 -1.15 5.90 8.09
Estonia EST 40.73 42.00 42.29 26.30 44.52 39.17
Ethiopia ETH 23.28 16.00 19.42 37.78 28.09 24.91
Fiji FJI 29.01 24.00 13.01 40.33 33.10 27.89
Finland FIN 52.24 44.00 43.21 32.02 39.59 42.21
France FRA 45.53 42.00 41.38 31.85 24.49 37.05
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Country Code x_WGI_RoL x_FH_CL x_FH_PR x_V_P x_V_C QDI
Gambia, The GMB 26.63 24.00 22.16 25.95 16.63 23.08
Georgia GEO 23.30 30.00 29.48 34.65 17.06 26.90
Germany DEU 50.43 42.00 42.29 35.45 41.03 42.24
Ghana GHA 28.94 35.00 40.46 39.08 31.25 34.95
Greece GRC 37.80 38.00 40.46 34.89 33.38 36.91
Guatemala GTM 17.40 28.00 28.57 20.90 31.21 25.22
Guinea GIN 13.32 19.00 14.84 35.23 16.02 19.68
Guinea-Bissau GNB 14.86 25.00 26.74 35.33 35.75 27.54
Guyana GUY 22.33 34.00 34.97 31.28 30.73 30.66
Haiti HTI 12.02 20.00 24.91 26.78 32.82 23.31
Honduras HND 19.02 30.00 29.48 20.53 33.60 26.53
Hungary HUN 38.68 42.00 40.46 30.81 35.58 37.50
Iceland ISL 53.18 44.00 43.21 40.19 42.15 44.54
India IND 31.72 33.00 37.72 26.07 44.52 34.61
Indonesia IDN 20.88 28.00 34.06 36.40 38.16 31.50
Iran IRN 20.45 10.00 15.76 21.68 23.93 18.36
Iraq IRQ 8.22 11.00 19.42 36.48 36.87 22.40
Ireland IRL 49.36 43.00 42.29 28.54 36.16 39.87
Israel ISR 39.05 37.00 40.46 28.80 44.52 37.97
Italy ITA 34.04 42.00 41.38 38.26 32.09 37.55
Jamaica JAM 22.91 35.00 34.97 25.62 30.52 29.81
Japan JPN 46.38 36.00 40.46 30.67 33.52 37.41
Jordan JOR 35.23 22.00 19.42 18.13 29.92 24.94
Kazakhstan KAZ 19.21 18.00 15.76 35.04 10.78 19.76
Kenya KEN 19.00 31.00 29.48 25.81 28.56 26.77
Kuwait KWT 38.03 20.00 23.99 20.51 24.11 25.33
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 15.55 25.00 21.25 34.19 12.12 21.62
Laos LAO 18.93 10.00 7.52 45.89 6.86 17.84
Latvia LVA 35.68 41.00 39.55 27.17 44.52 37.58
Lebanon LBN 23.14 29.00 22.16 20.77 30.04 25.02
Lesotho LSO 26.93 32.00 34.06 30.27 28.23 30.30
Liberia LBR 18.55 26.00 28.57 31.56 38.32 28.60
Libya LBY 21.35 7.00 7.52 -1.15 5.90 8.13
Lithuania LTU 34.90 40.00 39.55 20.49 44.52 35.89
Luxembourg LUX 50.89 44.00 43.21 42.07 40.08 44.05
Macedonia MKD 24.02 28.00 28.57 25.05 39.70 29.07
Madagascar MDG 25.33 27.00 27.65 28.03 30.84 27.77
Malawi MWI 24.66 26.00 27.65 24.45 41.26 28.81
Malaysia MYS 36.18 23.00 23.99 33.68 18.80 27.13
Maldives MDV 31.88 16.00 16.67 35.36 11.26 22.23
Mali MLI 25.34 34.00 34.06 16.91 25.54 27.17
Malta MLT 46.91 43.00 42.29 44.55 31.93 41.74
Mauritania MRT 22.88 23.00 22.16 29.77 38.13 27.19
Mauritius MUS 38.34 39.00 40.46 37.26 27.97 36.61
Mexico MEX 23.63 35.00 36.80 26.47 41.27 32.63
Moldova MDA 22.27 25.00 28.57 31.87 19.86 25.51
Mongolia MNG 26.23 37.00 36.80 37.41 34.18 34.32
Montenegro MNP 23.41 33.00 28.57 27.01 29.62 28.32
Morocco MAR 28.37 22.00 22.16 11.01 29.24 22.56
Mozambique MOZ 22.35 26.00 29.48 15.98 26.10 23.98
Namibia NAM 31.62 36.00 34.97 38.77 18.96 32.06
Nepal NPL 22.58 22.00 22.16 29.86 35.88 26.50
Netherlands NLD 50.05 44.00 43.21 36.72 44.52 43.70
New Zealand NZL 51.64 42.00 42.29 37.03 38.24 42.24
Nicaragua NIC 20.40 32.00 32.23 30.35 40.11 31.02
Niger NER 20.37 26.00 33.14 20.05 24.92 24.90
Nigeria NGA 16.00 25.00 25.82 31.41 26.90 25.03
North Korea PRK 15.63 1.00 6.61 -1.15 5.90 5.60
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(Source: Own Illustration) 
Country Code x_WGI_RoL x_FH_CL x_FH_PR x_V_P x_V_C QDI
Norway NOR 53.21 44.00 43.21 35.35 42.10 43.57
Oman OMN 38.31 14.00 12.10 -1.15 5.90 13.83
Pakistan PAK 19.98 20.00 16.67 -1.15 5.90 12.28
Panama PAN 28.17 38.00 39.55 35.10 34.89 35.14
Papa New Guinea PNG 19.36 29.00 30.40 34.20 44.52 31.50
Paraguay PRY 18.32 30.00 30.40 29.11 40.58 29.68
Peru PER 20.99 33.00 35.89 40.19 32.03 32.42
Philippines PHL 24.24 33.00 32.23 38.49 39.01 33.39
Poland POL 32.78 40.00 41.38 20.43 37.79 34.48
Portugal PRT 40.77 42.00 43.21 28.68 33.53 37.64
Qatar QAT 40.20 14.00 12.10 -1.15 5.90 14.21
Romania ROM 27.43 37.00 35.89 25.55 36.61 32.50
Russia RUS 18.64 19.00 16.67 27.15 29.19 22.13
Rwanda RWA 22.21 17.00 15.76 44.36 8.63 21.59
Saudi Arabia SAU 32.12 6.00 7.52 -1.15 5.90 10.08
Senegal SEN 25.74 34.00 36.80 27.51 28.80 30.57
Serbia YUG 23.00 38.00 33.14 24.09 37.80 31.21
Sierra Leone SLE 16.42 29.00 27.65 37.66 21.89 26.53
Singapore SGP 50.30 24.00 22.16 43.16 27.89 33.50
Slovakia SVK 34.60 42.00 40.46 21.98 35.93 34.99
Slovenia SVN 39.03 39.00 41.38 28.49 37.02 36.98
Solomon Islands SLB 20.27 34.00 27.65 25.72 44.52 30.43
Somalia SOM -0.07 3.00 7.52 -1.15 5.90 3.04
South Africa ZAF 32.64 39.00 38.63 35.02 22.60 33.58
South Korea KOR 37.82 38.00 39.55 29.68 35.29 36.07
Spain ESP 42.36 43.00 42.29 35.25 36.19 39.82
Sri Lanka LKA 30.81 26.00 26.74 34.13 34.47 30.43
Sweden SWE 51.54 44.00 43.21 37.50 41.14 43.48
Switzerland CHE 52.48 44.00 43.21 20.27 44.52 40.90
Syria SYR 22.11 7.00 7.52 34.03 44.52 23.04
Taiwan TWN 37.85 40.00 37.72 30.31 36.55 36.48
Tajikistan TJK 17.53 16.00 14.84 42.27 18.91 21.91
Tanzania TZA 23.77 26.00 26.74 31.47 17.53 25.10
Thailand THA 29.77 26.00 10.27 24.41 20.01 22.09
Togo TGO 18.07 18.00 13.93 29.72 19.96 19.93
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 26.64 39.00 34.97 31.64 31.75 32.80
Tunisia TUN 33.73 14.00 12.10 40.78 11.83 22.49
Turkey TUR 29.71 29.00 32.23 26.92 31.78 29.93
Turkmenistan TKM 13.15 1.00 6.61 -1.15 5.90 5.10
Uganda UGA 24.00 24.00 20.33 31.46 28.38 25.63
Ukraine UKR 20.85 34.00 32.23 33.02 36.03 31.23
United Arab Emirates ARE 37.74 13.00 10.27 -1.15 5.90 13.15
United Kingdom GBR 50.24 43.00 43.21 27.74 36.13 40.06
United States USA 48.18 41.00 41.38 26.24 33.10 37.98
Uruguay URY 34.64 43.00 42.29 40.46 32.41 38.56
Uzbekistan UZB 13.73 3.00 6.61 43.67 10.37 15.48
Venezuela VEN 14.01 26.00 24.91 33.76 26.39 25.01
Vietnam VNM 23.88 15.00 8.44 45.46 5.90 19.74
Yemen YEM 18.25 15.00 19.42 32.11 20.87 21.13
Zambia ZMB 21.98 26.00 29.48 32.17 35.61 29.05
Zimbabwe ZWE 11.65 8.00 10.27 23.28 28.44 16.33
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B. Worldwide Governance Indicators - Definitions 
Voice and Accountability 
(VA) 
Measuring perceptions of the extent to which a 
country’s citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free 
media.  
Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence  
(PV) 
Measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including 
politically-motivated violence and terrorism.  
Government Effectiveness 
(GE) 
Measuring perceptions of the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies.  
Regulatory Quality  
(RQ) 
Measuring perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.  
Rule of Law  
(RL) 
Measuring perceptions of the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules 
of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence.  
Control of Corruption  
(CC) 
Measuring perceptions of the extent to which public 
power is exercised for private gain, including both 
petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
“capture” of the state by elites and private interests.  
(Source: Kaufmann et al. 2008, 7-8) 
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C. Worldwide Governance Indicators - Data Sources 2007 
2 
 
(Source: Kaufmann et al. 2008, 29) 
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D. Worldwide Governance Indicators – Operationalization for 2006 
 
 
Key : 
N. .......................number of data sources processed  
WGI=x................WGI estimates for “rule of law”  
z .........................z-transformed “WGI=x”-values217 
x_WGI_RoL........re-transformed z-values218 
µ_con .................control mean value219 
σ_con.................control standard deviation219 
 
Explanation: 
 
The mean value and the standard deviation (µ=28.16; σ=11.74) of the FH scale is used 
for the re-transformation calculations.220 
 
                                               
217
 See Tab. 3: Formulas for Z-Transformation, 84 
218
 See Tab. 4: Re-Transformation of z-values, 84 
219
 The z-transformation transforms a random distribution into a distribution with a mean value of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (Bortz 1999, 756). 
220
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
   Appendix 
 115 
 
Country Code N. WGI=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_WGI_RoL
Afghanistan AFG 10 -2.07 3.70 -1.91 3.64 5.78
Albania ALB 14 -0.73 0.35 -0.59 0.34 21.28
Algeria DZA 16 -0.64 0.24 -0.49 0.24 22.43
Angola AGO 16 -1.28 1.30 -1.13 1.28 14.91
Argentina ARG 18 -0.53 0.15 -0.39 0.15 23.63
Armenia ARM 19 -0.54 0.16 -0.40 0.16 23.49
Australia AUS 13 1.79 3.74 1.92 3.68 50.68
Austria AUT 13 1.86 4.01 1.99 3.95 51.47
Azerbaijan AZE 19 -0.88 0.54 -0.73 0.53 19.61
Bahamas BHS 4 1.11 1.58 1.25 1.55 42.78
Bahrain BHR 12 0.59 0.53 0.72 0.52 36.66
Bangladesh BGD 17 -0.82 0.46 -0.67 0.45 20.29
Barbados BRB 5 1.02 1.35 1.15 1.33 41.69
Belarus BLR 13 -1.22 1.16 -1.07 1.14 15.62
Belgium BEL 13 1.43 2.49 1.57 2.45 46.53
Belize BLZ 8 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.03 30.02
Benin BEN 15 -0.58 0.19 -0.43 0.19 23.09
Bhutan BTN 7 0.60 0.55 0.73 0.54 36.77
Bolivia BOL 18 -0.90 0.57 -0.75 0.56 19.37
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 14 -0.53 0.15 -0.38 0.15 23.66
Botswana BWA 15 0.63 0.60 0.77 0.59 37.14
Brazil BRA 20 -0.45 0.09 -0.30 0.09 24.60
Brunei BRN 3 0.29 0.18 0.43 0.18 33.16
Bulgaria BGR 18 -0.19 0.00 -0.05 0.00 27.59
Burkina Faso BFA 16 -0.50 0.13 -0.36 0.13 23.97
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 11 -1.42 1.62 -1.26 1.60 13.33
Burundi BDI 13 -1.04 0.80 -0.89 0.79 17.75
Cambodia KHM 15 -1.14 1.00 -0.99 0.99 16.51
Cameroon CMR 15 -1.03 0.79 -0.88 0.77 17.83
Canada CAN 15 1.83 3.89 1.96 3.83 51.11
Cape Verde CPV 8 0.61 0.57 0.75 0.56 36.94
Central African Republic CAF 8 -1.53 1.93 -1.38 1.90 11.99
Chad TCD 13 -1.38 1.52 -1.22 1.50 13.81
Chile CHL 18 1.16 1.70 1.30 1.68 43.36
China CHN 17 -0.48 0.12 -0.34 0.12 24.18
Colombia COL 20 -0.59 0.20 -0.45 0.20 22.91
Comoros COM 5 -0.90 0.57 -0.75 0.56 19.35
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 11 -1.24 1.21 -1.09 1.19 15.35
Costa Rica CRI 16 0.51 0.43 0.65 0.42 35.76
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 12 -1.51 1.86 -1.35 1.83 12.29
Croatia HRV 16 -0.05 0.01 0.10 0.01 29.28
Cuba CUB 12 -0.79 0.42 -0.65 0.42 20.58
Cyprus CYP 10 0.93 1.16 1.07 1.14 40.70
Czech Republic CZE 17 0.73 0.77 0.87 0.76 38.37
Denmark DNK 13 1.94 4.32 2.06 4.25 52.36
Djibouti DJI 7 -0.64 0.24 -0.49 0.24 22.42
Dominican Republic DOM 17 -0.52 0.14 -0.38 0.14 23.75
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 12 -1.73 2.51 -1.57 2.47 9.72
Ecuador ECU 17 -1.03 0.78 -0.88 0.77 17.86
Egypt EGY 18 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.14
El Salvador SLV 14 -0.59 0.20 -0.44 0.19 22.99
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 9 -1.24 1.20 -1.09 1.18 15.42
Eritrea ERI 9 -0.99 0.71 -0.84 0.70 18.34
Estonia EST 16 0.94 1.17 1.07 1.15 40.73
Ethiopia ETH 16 -0.56 0.18 -0.42 0.17 23.28
Fiji FJI 5 -0.07 0.01 0.07 0.01 29.01
Finland FIN 13 1.93 4.28 2.05 4.21 52.24
France FRA 14 1.35 2.23 1.48 2.19 45.53
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Country Code N. WGI=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_WGI_RoL
Gambia, The GMB 10 -0.27 0.02 -0.13 0.02 26.63
Georgia GEO 17 -0.56 0.17 -0.41 0.17 23.30
Germany DEU 14 1.77 3.66 1.90 3.60 50.43
Ghana GHA 17 -0.08 0.00 0.07 0.00 28.94
Greece GRC 14 0.68 0.68 0.82 0.67 37.80
Guatemala GTM 19 -1.07 0.85 -0.92 0.84 17.40
Guinea GIN 12 -1.42 1.63 -1.27 1.60 13.32
Guinea-Bissau GNB 8 -1.29 1.31 -1.13 1.29 14.86
Guyana GUY 12 -0.64 0.25 -0.50 0.25 22.33
Haiti HTI 11 -1.53 1.92 -1.38 1.89 12.02
Honduras HND 17 -0.93 0.62 -0.78 0.61 19.02
Hungary HUN 18 0.76 0.82 0.90 0.80 38.68
Iceland ISL 9 2.01 4.62 2.13 4.54 53.18
India IND 18 0.16 0.09 0.30 0.09 31.72
Indonesia IDN 20 -0.77 0.39 -0.62 0.38 20.88
Iran IRN 16 -0.81 0.44 -0.66 0.43 20.45
Iraq IRQ 8 -1.86 2.93 -1.70 2.89 8.22
Ireland IRL 13 1.68 3.32 1.81 3.26 49.36
Israel ISR 14 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.86 39.05
Italy ITA 14 0.36 0.25 0.50 0.25 34.04
Jamaica JAM 14 -0.59 0.20 -0.45 0.20 22.91
Japan JPN 14 1.42 2.45 1.55 2.41 46.38
Jordan JOR 17 0.46 0.37 0.60 0.36 35.23
Kazakhstan KAZ 19 -0.91 0.59 -0.76 0.58 19.21
Kenya KEN 19 -0.93 0.62 -0.78 0.61 19.00
Kuwait KWT 12 0.70 0.72 0.84 0.71 38.03
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 18 -1.23 1.17 -1.07 1.15 15.55
Laos LAO 14 -0.94 0.63 -0.79 0.62 18.93
Latvia LVA 15 0.50 0.42 0.64 0.41 35.68
Lebanon LBN 15 -0.57 0.19 -0.43 0.18 23.14
Lesotho LSO 11 -0.25 0.01 -0.10 0.01 26.93
Liberia LBR 7 -0.97 0.68 -0.82 0.67 18.55
Libya LBY 11 -0.73 0.34 -0.58 0.34 21.35
Lithuania LTU 15 0.44 0.33 0.57 0.33 34.90
Luxembourg LUX 9 1.81 3.81 1.94 3.75 50.89
Macedonia MKD 14 -0.50 0.13 -0.35 0.12 24.02
Madagascar MDG 16 -0.39 0.06 -0.24 0.06 25.33
Malawi MWI 17 -0.44 0.09 -0.30 0.09 24.66
Malaysia MYS 18 0.55 0.47 0.68 0.47 36.18
Maldives MDV 5 0.18 0.10 0.32 0.10 31.88
Mali MLI 15 -0.39 0.06 -0.24 0.06 25.34
Malta MLT 8 1.47 2.59 1.60 2.55 46.91
Mauritania MRT 13 -0.60 0.21 -0.45 0.20 22.88
Mauritius MUS 13 0.73 0.76 0.87 0.75 38.34
Mexico MEX 20 -0.53 0.15 -0.39 0.15 23.63
Moldova MDA 16 -0.65 0.26 -0.50 0.25 22.27
Mongolia MNG 12 -0.31 0.03 -0.16 0.03 26.23
Montenegro MNP 9 -0.55 0.17 -0.40 0.16 23.41
Morocco MAR 17 -0.13 0.00 0.02 0.00 28.37
Mozambique MOZ 19 -0.64 0.25 -0.50 0.25 22.35
Namibia NAM 12 0.15 0.09 0.29 0.09 31.62
Nepal NPL 15 -0.62 0.23 -0.48 0.23 22.58
Netherlands NLD 13 1.74 3.53 1.86 3.48 50.05
New Zealand NZL 13 1.87 4.07 2.00 4.00 51.64
Nicaragua NIC 17 -0.81 0.44 -0.66 0.44 20.40
Niger NER 13 -0.81 0.45 -0.66 0.44 20.37
Nigeria NGA 19 -1.19 1.09 -1.04 1.07 16.00
North Korea PRK 8 -1.22 1.16 -1.07 1.14 15.63
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(Source: Own Illustration) 
 
Country Code N. WGI=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_WGI_RoL
Norway NOR 14 2.01 4.63 2.13 4.56 53.21
Oman OMN 9 0.73 0.76 0.86 0.75 38.31
Pakistan PAK 19 -0.85 0.49 -0.70 0.49 19.98
Panama PAN 16 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.17
Papa New Guinea PNG 12 -0.90 0.57 -0.75 0.56 19.36
Paraguay PRY 16 -0.99 0.71 -0.84 0.70 18.32
Peru PER 19 -0.76 0.38 -0.61 0.37 20.99
Philippines PHL 19 -0.48 0.11 -0.33 0.11 24.24
Poland POL 18 0.25 0.16 0.39 0.16 32.78
Portugal PRT 14 0.94 1.17 1.07 1.16 40.77
Qatar QAT 10 0.89 1.07 1.03 1.05 40.20
Romania ROM 19 -0.21 0.00 -0.06 0.00 27.43
Russia RUS 20 -0.96 0.67 -0.81 0.66 18.64
Rwanda RWA 11 -0.65 0.26 -0.51 0.26 22.21
Saudi Arabia SAU 13 0.20 0.12 0.34 0.11 32.12
Senegal SEN 17 -0.35 0.04 -0.21 0.04 25.74
Serbia YUG 14 -0.59 0.20 -0.44 0.19 23.00
Sierra Leone SLE 13 -1.15 1.02 -1.00 1.00 16.42
Singapore SGP 15 1.76 3.61 1.89 3.56 50.30
Slovakia SVK 16 0.41 0.31 0.55 0.30 34.60
Slovenia SVN 15 0.79 0.87 0.93 0.86 39.03
Solomon Islands SLB 4 -0.82 0.46 -0.67 0.45 20.27
Somalia SOM 4 -2.57 5.88 -2.41 5.79 -0.07
South Africa ZAF 19 0.24 0.15 0.38 0.15 32.64
South Korea KOR 16 0.69 0.69 0.82 0.68 37.82
Spain ESP 14 1.08 1.49 1.21 1.46 42.36
Sri Lanka LKA 17 0.08 0.05 0.23 0.05 30.81
Sweden SWE 14 1.87 4.03 1.99 3.97 51.54
Switzerland CHE 13 1.95 4.36 2.07 4.30 52.48
Syria SYR 14 -0.66 0.27 -0.52 0.27 22.11
Taiwan TWN 15 0.69 0.69 0.83 0.68 37.85
Tajikistan TJK 17 -1.06 0.83 -0.91 0.82 17.53
Tanzania TZA 17 -0.52 0.14 -0.37 0.14 23.77
Thailand THA 18 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.02 29.77
Togo TGO 13 -1.01 0.75 -0.86 0.74 18.07
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 11 -0.27 0.02 -0.13 0.02 26.64
Tunisia TUN 15 0.34 0.23 0.47 0.23 33.73
Turkey TUR 19 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.02 29.71
Turkmenistan TKM 10 -1.43 1.66 -1.28 1.64 13.15
Uganda UGA 19 -0.50 0.13 -0.35 0.13 24.00
Ukraine UKR 18 -0.77 0.39 -0.62 0.39 20.85
United Arab Emirates ARE 12 0.68 0.68 0.82 0.67 37.74
United Kingdom GBR 14 1.75 3.59 1.88 3.54 50.24
United States USA 14 1.58 2.96 1.71 2.91 48.18
Uruguay URY 14 0.41 0.31 0.55 0.30 34.64
Uzbekistan UZB 16 -1.38 1.54 -1.23 1.51 13.73
Venezuela VEN 19 -1.36 1.48 -1.21 1.45 14.01
Vietnam VNM 19 -0.51 0.14 -0.37 0.13 23.88
Yemen YEM 16 -0.99 0.72 -0.84 0.71 18.25
Zambia ZMB 17 -0.67 0.28 -0.53 0.28 21.98
Zimbabwe ZWE 19 -1.56 2.01 -1.41 1.98 11.65
-0.14 169.63 0.00 167.00
Z-Transformation variables: µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con
1.01 1.00
σ σ_con
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E. Freedom House - Checklist Questions and Guidelines 
 
Each numbered checklist question is assigned a score of 0-4 (except for discretionary 
question A, for which 1-4 points may be added, and discretionary question B, for which 
1-4 points may be subtracted), according to the survey methodology. The bulleted sub-
questions are intended to provide guidance to the writers regarding what issues are 
meant to be considered in scoring each checklist question; the authors do not 
necessarily have to consider every sub-question when scoring their countries.221 
Political Rights Checklist 
A. Electoral Process 
1. Is the head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and 
fair elections?  
2. Are the national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? 
3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair? 
B. Political Pluralism and Participation 
1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other 
competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system open to the rise and 
fall of these competing parties or groupings? 
2. Is there a significant opposition vote and a realistic possibility for the opposition to 
increase its support or gain power through elections? 
3. Are the people’s political choices free from domination by the military, foreign 
powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other 
powerful group? 
4. Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups have full political rights and 
electoral opportunities? 
                                               
221
 
 For a complete catalogue of all sub-questions please refer to the Freedom House website: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=333&year=2007,  
 [DoR: 23.05.2008] 
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C. Functioning of Government 
1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives 
determine the policies of the government? 
2. Is the government free from pervasive corruption? 
3. Is the government accountable to the electorate between elections, and does it 
operate with openness and transparency? 
Additional Discretionary Political Rights Questions 
A. For traditional monarchies that have no parties or electoral process, does the 
system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage public 
discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler? 
B. Is the government or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition 
of a country or territory so as to destroy a culture or tip the political balance in favor of 
another group? 
Civil Liberties Checklist 
D. Freedom of Expression and Belief 
1. Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression? (Note: 
In cases where the media are state-controlled but offer pluralistic points of view, the 
survey gives the system credit.) 
2. Are religious institutions and communities free to practice their faith and express 
themselves in public and private? 
3. Is there academic freedom and is the educational system free of extensive political 
indoctrination? 
4. Is there open and free private discussion? 
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E. Associational and Organizational Rights 
1. Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? 
2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations? (Note: This includes civic 
organizations, interest groups, foundations, etc.) 
3. Are there free trade unions and peasant organizations or equivalents, and is there 
effective collective bargaining? Are there free professional and other private 
organizations? 
F. Rule of Law 
1. Is there an independent judiciary? 
2. Does the rule of law prevail in civil and criminal matters? Are police under direct 
civilian control? 
3. Is there protection from political terror, unjustified imprisonment, exile, or torture, 
whether by groups that support or oppose the system? Is there freedom from war and 
insurgencies? 
4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of 
the population? 
G. Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights 
1. Does the state control travel or choice of residence, employment, or institution of 
higher education? 
2. Do citizens have the right to own property and establish private businesses? Is 
private business activity unduly influenced by government officials, the security forces, 
political parties/organizations, or organized crime? 
3. Are there personal social freedoms, including gender equality, choice of marriage 
partners, and size of family? 
4. Is there equality of opportunity and the absence of economic exploitation?  
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F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006 
 
 
Key : 
PR......................political rights  
CL ......................civil liberties 
Status.................“F”-free, “PF”-partly free, “NF”-not free  
A ........................electoral process (max. 12 points) 
B ........................political pluralism and participation (max. 16 points) 
C ........................functioning of government (max. 12 points) 
D ........................freedom of expression and belief (max. 16 points) 
E ........................associational and organizational rights (max. 12 points) 
F.........................rule of law (excluded from calculation) (max. 16 points) 
G........................personal autonomy and individual rights (max. 16 points) 
PR (A+B+C)=x ...Freedom House political rights dimension, initial values 
z .........................z-transformed “PR (A+B+C)=x”-values222 
x_FH_PR ...........re-transformed z-values223 
CL (D+E+G)=x ...Freedom House civil liberties dimension, initial values 
z .........................z-transformed “CL (D+E+G)=x”-values222 
x_FH_CL............re-transformed z-values223 
µ_con .................control mean value224 
σ_con.................control standard deviation224 
 
Eplanation: 
 
The mean value and the standard deviation (µ=28.16; σ=11.74) of the FH scale is used 
for the re-transformation calculations.225 
 
 
                                               
222
 See Tab. 3: Formulas for Z-Transformation, 84 
223
 See Tab. 4: Re-Transformation of z-values, 84 
224
 The z-transformation transforms a random distribution into a distribution with a mean value of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (Bortz 1999, 756). 
225
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
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Country Code PR CL Status A B C D E F G PR (A+B+C)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_PR CL (D+E+G)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_CL
Afghanistan AFG 5 5 PF 6 7 4 5 5 3 5 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 15 173 -1.12 1.26 15.0
Albania ALB 3 3 PF 8 11 7 11 8 10 9 26 6 0.19 0.04 30.40 28 0 -0.01 0.00 28.0
Algeria DZA 6 5 NF 4 4 3 7 6 5 7 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 20 67 -0.70 0.48 20.0
Angola AGO 6 5 NF 2 5 1 8 6 4 3 8 242 -1.21 1.47 13.93 17 125 -0.95 0.90 17.0
Argentina ARG 2 2 F 11 15 7 14 11 10 13 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 38 97 0.84 0.70 38.0
Armenia ARM 5 4 PF 4 5 4 8 5 6 9 13 111 -0.82 0.68 18.50 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Australia AUS 1 1 F 12 15 12 16 12 14 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Austria AUT 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 15 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Azerbaijan AZE 6 5 NF 3 4 3 7 3 4 8 10 184 -1.06 1.12 15.76 18 103 -0.87 0.75 18.0
Bahamas BHS 1 1 F 12 16 10 16 12 15 15 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Bahrain BHR 5 5 PF 3 9 4 8 3 4 5 16 57 -0.59 0.35 21.25 16 148 -1.04 1.07 16.0
Bangladesh BGD 4 4 PF 8 10 4 8 8 6 9 22 2 -0.12 0.01 26.74 25 10 -0.27 0.07 25.0
Barbados BRB 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 16 15 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Belarus BLR 7 6 NF 0 3 1 3 0 2 5 4 382 -1.52 2.32 10.27 8 406 -1.72 2.95 8.0
Belgium BEL 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 15 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Belize BLZ 1 2 F 12 14 10 15 11 12 13 36 155 0.97 0.94 39.55 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
Benin BEN 2 2 F 10 15 8 15 12 12 10 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 37 78 0.75 0.57 37.0
Bhutan BTN 6 5 NF 3 1 5 7 2 4 8 9 212 -1.13 1.29 14.84 17 125 -0.95 0.90 17.0
Bolivia BOL 3 3 PF 11 13 4 15 11 8 9 28 20 0.35 0.12 32.23 35 47 0.58 0.34 35.0
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 3 3 PF 8 11 6 11 8 10 10 25 2 0.11 0.01 29.48 29 1 0.07 0.01 29.0
Botswana BWA 2 2 F 11 11 9 14 10 13 10 31 55 0.58 0.34 34.97 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
Brazil BRA 2 2 F 11 14 6 15 10 8 12 31 55 0.58 0.34 34.97 37 78 0.75 0.57 37.0
Brunei BRN 6 5 NF 0 3 3 6 3 6 8 6 308 -1.37 1.87 12.10 17 125 -0.95 0.90 17.0
Bulgaria BGR 1 2 F 12 15 9 14 11 12 13 36 155 0.97 0.94 39.55 38 97 0.84 0.70 38.0
Burkina Faso BFA 5 3 PF 5 8 4 14 9 6 7 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 30 3 0.16 0.02 30.0
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 7 7 NF 0 1 0 2 0 0 4 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 6 491 -1.89 3.57 6.0
Burundi BDI 3 5 PF 9 9 4 8 5 4 6 22 2 -0.12 0.01 26.74 19 84 -0.78 0.61 19.0
Cambodia KHM 6 5 NF 3 5 3 9 6 2 7 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Cameroon CMR 6 6 NF 3 5 3 7 3 2 4 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 14 201 -1.21 1.46 14.0
Canada CAN 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
Cape Verde CPV 1 1 F 12 15 10 15 11 14 13 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
Central African Republic CAF 5 4 PF 7 7 3 10 9 3 4 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 23 27 -0.44 0.19 23.0
Chad TCD 6 5 NF 3 1 2 7 5 1 3 6 308 -1.37 1.87 12.10 15 173 -1.12 1.26 15.0
Chile CHL 1 1 F 12 15 12 16 12 15 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
China CHN 7 6 NF 0 1 1 4 2 2 7 2 465 -1.68 2.82 8.44 13 230 -1.29 1.67 13.0
Colombia COL 3 3 PF 10 9 7 12 7 7 10 26 6 0.19 0.04 30.40 29 1 0.07 0.01 29.0
Comoros COM 3 4 PF 9 11 4 10 6 8 6 24 0 0.03 0.00 28.57 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 6 5 NF 3 5 3 9 7 2 6 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Costa Rica CRI 1 1 F 12 15 11 16 11 13 13 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 40 140 1.01 1.02 40.0
Cote d’Ivoire CIV 6 6 NF 1 2 2 5 4 3 4 5 344 -1.45 2.09 11.18 13 230 -1.29 1.67 13.0
Croatia HRV 2 2 F 12 14 9 14 12 11 13 35 131 0.89 0.80 38.63 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
Cuba CUB 7 7 NF 0 0 1 2 1 1 2 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 5 536 -1.97 3.90 5.0
Cyprus CYP 1 1 F 11 16 11 15 12 15 15 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Czech Republic CZE 1 1 F 12 15 11 16 12 14 15 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Denmark DNK 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 15 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Djibouti DJI 5 5 PF 4 5 3 7 5 5 6 12 134 -0.90 0.81 17.59 18 103 -0.87 0.75 18.0
Dominican Republic DOM 2 2 F 11 13 9 15 11 10 11 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 37 78 0.75 0.57 37.0
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Country Code PR CL Status A B C D E F G PR (A+B+C)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_PR CL (D+E+G)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_CL
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 5 6 NF 6 6 2 6 5 0 1 14 91 -0.75 0.56 19.42 12 261 -1.38 1.90 12.0
Ecuador ECU 3 3 PF 9 15 4 15 11 5 10 28 20 0.35 0.12 32.23 36 61 0.67 0.45 36.0
Egypt EGY 7 6 NF 1 4 2 6 2 5 7 7 274 -1.29 1.67 13.01 15 173 -1.12 1.26 15.0
El Salvador SLV 2 3 F 12 13 8 15 9 7 10 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 7 6 NF 0 1 0 5 0 1 3 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 8 406 -1.72 2.95 8.0
Eritrea ERI 7 6 NF 0 1 2 2 0 2 6 3 423 -1.60 2.57 9.35 8 406 -1.72 2.95 8.0
Estonia EST 1 1 F 12 15 12 16 12 14 14 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Ethiopia ETH 5 5 PF 5 5 4 7 3 4 6 14 91 -0.75 0.56 19.42 16 148 -1.04 1.07 16.0
Fiji FJI 6 4 PF 0 5 2 10 4 7 10 7 274 -1.29 1.67 13.01 24 17 -0.35 0.13 24.0
Finland FIN 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 16 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
France FRA 1 1 F 12 15 11 15 12 14 15 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Gambia GMB 4 4 PF 6 7 4 10 6 7 8 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 24 17 -0.35 0.13 24.0
Georgia GEO 3 3 PF 9 9 7 12 8 7 10 25 2 0.11 0.01 29.48 30 3 0.16 0.02 30.0
Germany DEU 1 1 F 12 15 12 15 12 15 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Ghana GHA 1 2 F 12 15 10 14 11 12 10 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 35 47 0.58 0.34 35.0
Greece GRC 1 2 F 12 15 10 15 10 14 13 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 38 97 0.84 0.70 38.0
Guatemala GTM 3 4 PF 9 10 5 12 8 5 8 24 0 0.03 0.00 28.57 28 0 -0.01 0.00 28.0
Guinea GIN 6 5 NF 2 5 2 8 5 4 6 9 212 -1.13 1.29 14.84 19 84 -0.78 0.61 19.0
Guinea-Bissau GNB 4 4 PF 9 9 4 11 8 8 6 22 2 -0.12 0.01 26.74 25 10 -0.27 0.07 25.0
Guyana GUY 2 3 PF 11 13 7 15 10 8 9 31 55 0.58 0.34 34.97 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
Haiti HTI 4 5 PF 7 10 3 10 5 2 5 20 13 -0.28 0.08 24.91 20 67 -0.70 0.48 20.0
Honduras HND 3 3 PF 9 10 6 13 8 7 9 25 2 0.11 0.01 29.48 30 3 0.16 0.02 30.0
Hungary HUN 1 1 F 12 15 10 16 12 13 14 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Iceland ISL 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 16 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
India IND 2 3 F 11 14 9 13 10 9 10 34 109 0.81 0.66 37.72 33 23 0.41 0.17 33.0
Indonesia IDN 2 3 F 11 13 6 10 9 7 9 30 42 0.50 0.25 34.06 28 0 -0.01 0.00 28.0
Iran IRN 6 6 NF 3 4 3 4 2 3 4 10 184 -1.06 1.12 15.76 10 330 -1.55 2.40 10.0
Iraq IRQ 5 6 NF 7 6 1 4 3 0 4 14 91 -0.75 0.56 19.42 11 295 -1.46 2.14 11.0
Ireland IRL 1 1 F 12 16 11 16 12 15 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Israel ISR 1 2 F 12 15 10 14 12 10 11 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 37 78 0.75 0.57 37.0
Italy ITA 1 1 F 12 15 11 15 12 12 15 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Jamaica JAM 2 3 F 10 13 8 15 9 8 11 31 55 0.58 0.34 34.97 35 47 0.58 0.34 35.0
Japan JPN 1 2 F 12 15 10 13 10 15 13 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 36 61 0.67 0.45 36.0
Jordan JOR 5 4 PF 3 6 5 9 5 6 8 14 91 -0.75 0.56 19.42 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Kazakhstan KAZ 6 5 NF 3 4 3 7 4 4 7 10 184 -1.06 1.12 15.76 18 103 -0.87 0.75 18.0
Kenya KEN 3 3 PF 9 11 5 14 9 8 8 25 2 0.11 0.01 29.48 31 8 0.24 0.06 31.0
Kuwait KWT 4 5 PF 4 9 6 9 6 7 5 19 21 -0.36 0.13 23.99 20 67 -0.70 0.48 20.0
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 5 4 PF 5 7 4 10 8 5 7 16 57 -0.59 0.35 21.25 25 10 -0.27 0.07 25.0
Laos LAO 7 6 NF 0 1 0 4 1 2 5 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 10 330 -1.55 2.40 10.0
Latvia LVA 1 1 F 12 15 9 16 12 12 13 36 155 0.97 0.94 39.55 41 165 1.09 1.20 41.0
Lebanon LBN 4 4 PF 4 8 5 12 8 5 9 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 29 1 0.07 0.01 29.0
Lesotho LSO 2 3 F 9 12 9 15 8 11 9 30 42 0.50 0.25 34.06 32 15 0.33 0.11 32.0
Liberia LBR 3 4 PF 9 10 5 11 7 7 8 24 0 0.03 0.00 28.57 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Libya LBY 7 7 NF 0 1 0 1 0 0 6 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 7 448 -1.80 3.25 7.0
Lithuania LTU 1 1 F 12 15 9 16 11 14 13 36 155 0.97 0.94 39.55 40 140 1.01 1.02 40.0
Luxembourg LUX 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 16 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
Macedonia MKD 3 3 PF 7 10 7 11 7 8 10 24 0 0.03 0.00 28.57 28 0 -0.01 0.00 28.0
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Country Code PR CL Status A B C D E F G PR (A+B+C)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_PR CL (D+E+G)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_CL
Madagascar MDG 3 3 PF 7 9 7 10 8 9 9 23 0 -0.04 0.00 27.65 27 1 -0.10 0.01 27.0
Malawi MWI 4 3 PF 7 10 6 11 8 9 7 23 0 -0.04 0.00 27.65 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Malaysia MYS 4 4 PF 6 7 6 8 6 6 9 19 21 -0.36 0.13 23.99 23 27 -0.44 0.19 23.0
Maldives MDV 6 5 NF 3 4 4 6 3 7 7 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 16 148 -1.04 1.07 16.0
Mali MLI 2 2 F 9 12 9 16 9 10 9 30 42 0.50 0.25 34.06 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
Malta MLT 1 1 F 12 16 11 16 12 16 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Mauritania MRT 5 4 PF 6 7 4 10 8 6 5 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 23 27 -0.44 0.19 23.0
Mauritius MUS 1 2 F 11 15 11 15 12 13 12 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
Mexico MEX 2 2 F 10 14 9 14 10 8 11 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 35 47 0.58 0.34 35.0
Moldova MDA 3 4 PF 9 8 7 10 6 8 9 24 0 0.03 0.00 28.57 25 10 -0.27 0.07 25.0
Mongolia MNG 2 2 F 8 15 10 15 10 12 12 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 37 78 0.75 0.57 37.0
Montenegro MNP 3 3 PF 9 9 6 12 10 8 11 24 0 0.03 0.00 28.57 33 23 0.41 0.17 33.0
Morocco MAR 5 4 PF 4 7 6 8 6 6 8 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Mozambique MOZ 3 4 PF 7 11 7 11 7 7 8 25 2 0.11 0.01 29.48 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Namibia NAM 2 2 F 10 12 9 15 12 10 9 31 55 0.58 0.34 34.97 36 61 0.67 0.45 36.0
Nepal NPL 5 4 PF 4 9 4 9 6 6 7 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 22 38 -0.53 0.28 22.0
Netherlands NLD 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
New Zealand NZL 1 1 F 12 15 12 16 11 15 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Nicaragua NIC 3 3 PF 11 12 5 14 8 7 10 28 20 0.35 0.12 32.23 32 15 0.33 0.11 32.0
Niger NER 3 3 PF 11 10 8 11 9 9 6 29 30 0.42 0.18 33.14 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Nigeria NGA 4 4 PF 6 9 6 11 7 5 7 21 7 -0.20 0.04 25.82 25 10 -0.27 0.07 25.0
North Korea PRK 7 7 NF 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 555 -1.84 3.37 6.61 1 738 -2.31 5.36 1.0
Norway NOR 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 16 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
Oman OMN 6 5 NF 2 2 2 6 3 4 5 6 308 -1.37 1.87 12.10 14 201 -1.21 1.46 14.0
Pakistan PAK 6 5 NF 2 6 3 8 6 4 6 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 20 67 -0.70 0.48 20.0
Panama PAN 1 2 F 12 15 9 15 11 9 12 36 155 0.97 0.94 39.55 38 97 0.84 0.70 38.0
Papua New Guinea PNG 3 3 PF 9 11 6 12 9 7 8 26 6 0.19 0.04 30.40 29 1 0.07 0.01 29.0
Paraguay PRY 3 3 PF 11 11 4 12 8 7 10 26 6 0.19 0.04 30.40 30 3 0.16 0.02 30.0
Peru PER 2 3 F 11 14 7 15 9 8 9 32 71 0.66 0.43 35.89 33 23 0.41 0.17 33.0
Philippines PHL 3 3 PF 7 13 8 14 9 8 10 28 20 0.35 0.12 32.23 33 23 0.41 0.17 33.0
Poland POL 1 1 F 12 16 10 15 11 13 14 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 40 140 1.01 1.02 40.0
Portugal PRT 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 14 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Qatar QAT 6 5 NF 2 1 3 8 2 4 4 6 308 -1.37 1.87 12.10 14 201 -1.21 1.46 14.0
Romania ROM 2 2 F 11 14 7 14 11 12 12 32 71 0.66 0.43 35.89 37 78 0.75 0.57 37.0
Russia RUS 6 5 NF 3 5 3 8 4 4 7 11 158 -0.98 0.96 16.67 19 84 -0.78 0.61 19.0
Rwanda RWA 6 5 NF 3 3 4 7 3 6 7 10 184 -1.06 1.12 15.76 17 125 -0.95 0.90 17.0
Saudi Arabia SAU 7 6 NF 0 0 1 4 0 3 2 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 6 491 -1.89 3.57 6.0
Senegal SEN 2 3 F 11 13 9 15 10 9 9 33 89 0.74 0.54 36.80 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
Serbia YUG 3 2 F 9 13 7 14 11 9 13 29 30 0.42 0.18 33.14 38 97 0.84 0.70 38.0
Sierra Leone SLE 4 3 PF 9 10 4 12 8 8 9 23 0 -0.04 0.00 27.65 29 1 0.07 0.01 29.0
Singapore SGP 5 4 PF 4 6 7 9 3 8 12 17 43 -0.51 0.26 22.16 24 17 -0.35 0.13 24.0
Slovakia SVK 1 1 F 12 15 10 16 12 12 14 37 181 1.05 1.10 40.46 42 191 1.18 1.39 42.0
Slovenia SVN 1 1 F 12 15 11 15 12 14 12 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
Solomon Islands SLB 4 3 PF 6 10 7 13 9 8 12 23 0 -0.04 0.00 27.65 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
Somalia SOM 7 7 NF 0 0 1 3 0 0 0 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 3 633 -2.14 4.60 3.0
South Africa ZAF 2 2 F 12 14 9 15 12 12 12 35 131 0.89 0.80 38.63 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
South Korea KOR 1 2 F 11 15 10 14 12 13 12 36 155 0.97 0.94 39.55 38 97 0.84 0.70 38.0
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Country Code PR CL Status A B C D E F G PR (A+B+C)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_PR CL (D+E+G)=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_FH_CL
Spain ESP 1 1 F 12 15 12 16 12 14 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Sri Lanka LKA 4 4 PF 8 8 6 8 9 6 9 22 2 -0.12 0.01 26.74 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Sweden SWE 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 16 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
Switzerland CHE 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 16 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 44 251 1.35 1.82 44.0
Syria SYR 7 7 NF 0 0 1 2 0 1 5 1 509 -1.76 3.09 7.52 7 448 -1.80 3.25 7.0
Taiwan TWN 2 1 F 10 15 9 16 11 15 13 34 109 0.81 0.66 37.72 40 140 1.01 1.02 40.0
Tajikistan TJK 6 5 NF 2 4 3 6 4 4 6 9 212 -1.13 1.29 14.84 16 148 -1.04 1.07 16.0
Tanzania TZA 4 3 PF 6 10 6 11 7 10 8 22 2 -0.12 0.01 26.74 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Thailand THA 7 4 PF 0 1 3 10 5 6 11 4 382 -1.52 2.32 10.27 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Togo TGO 6 5 NF 2 4 2 7 5 3 6 8 242 -1.21 1.47 13.93 18 103 -0.87 0.75 18.0
Trinidad & Tobago TTO 2 2 F 9 13 9 15 11 10 13 31 55 0.58 0.34 34.97 39 117 0.92 0.85 39.0
Tunisia TUN 6 5 NF 1 3 2 4 2 4 8 6 308 -1.37 1.87 12.10 14 201 -1.21 1.46 14.0
Turkey TUR 3 3 PF 9 12 7 12 7 8 10 28 20 0.35 0.12 32.23 29 1 0.07 0.01 29.0
Turkmenistan TKM 7 7 NF 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 555 -1.84 3.37 6.61 1 738 -2.31 5.36 1.0
Uganda UGA 5 4 PF 4 7 4 11 6 7 7 15 73 -0.67 0.45 20.33 24 17 -0.35 0.13 24.0
Ukraine UKR 3 2 F 9 13 6 13 10 11 11 28 20 0.35 0.12 32.23 34 34 0.50 0.25 34.0
United Arab Emirates ARE 6 6 NF 1 1 2 6 3 4 4 4 382 -1.52 2.32 10.27 13 230 -1.29 1.67 13.0
United Kingdom GBR 1 1 F 12 16 12 16 12 15 15 40 270 1.28 1.64 43.21 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
United States of America USA 1 1 F 11 16 11 16 10 14 15 38 209 1.13 1.27 41.38 41 165 1.09 1.20 41.0
Uruguay URY 1 1 F 12 16 11 16 12 15 15 39 238 1.20 1.45 42.29 43 220 1.26 1.60 43.0
Uzbekistan UZB 7 7 NF 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 555 -1.84 3.37 6.61 3 633 -2.14 4.60 3.0
Venezuela VEN 4 4 PF 8 8 4 11 7 5 8 20 13 -0.28 0.08 24.91 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Vietnam VNM 7 5 NF 0 1 1 5 2 4 8 2 465 -1.68 2.82 8.44 15 173 -1.12 1.26 15.0
Yemen YEM 5 5 PF 4 7 3 7 3 4 5 14 91 -0.75 0.56 19.42 15 173 -1.12 1.26 15.0
Zambia ZMB 4 4 PF 8 11 6 11 8 8 7 25 2 0.11 0.01 29.48 26 5 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Zimbabwe ZWE 7 6 NF 1 3 0 5 2 1 1 4 382 -1.52 2.32 10.27 8 406 -1.72 3 8.0
23.56 27475.21 0.00 167.00 28.16 22998.63 0.00 167.00
Z-Transformation variables: µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con
12.83 1.00 11.74 1.00
σ σ_con σ σ_con
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G. Vanhanen’s Index of Democratization – Replication for 2006 
 
 
Key : 
Parl.....................parliamentary dominance  
Exec. ..................executive dominance 
P=x.....................Vanhanen’s participation indicator, (0-100%), initial values 
z .........................z-transformed “P=x”-values226 
x_V_P ................re-transformed z-values227 
LP % ..................largest party’s share 
SP %..................smaller parties’ share 
LPS ....................number of seats of largest party in parliament 
TS ......................number of total seats in parliament 
SS %..................smaller parties’ share of seats in parliament, [(TS-LPS)/TS] 
MPC %...............mean parliamentary competition, [SP%; SS%; (SP%+SS%)/2] 
ELP %................executive largest party’s share 
EC %..................executive competition, [1-ELP%] 
TC %..................total competition, [MPC%; EC%; (MPC%+EC%)/2], (0-100%) 
C=x ....................Vanhanen’s competition indicator, (0-70%) 
z .........................z-transformed “C=x”-values226 
x_V_C ................re-transformed z-values227 
Angola................country values taken over from Vanhanen (2003) 
Burundi...............country values explicitly differing from Vanhanen (2003) 
µ_con .................control mean value228 
σ_con.................control standard deviation228 
 
Eplanation: 
 
The mean value and the standard deviation (µ=28.16; σ=11.74) of the FH scale is used 
for the re-transformation calculations.229 
 
 
                                               
226
 See Tab. 3: Formulas for Z-Transformation, 84 
227
 See Tab. 4: Re-Transformation of z-values, 84 
228
 The z-transformation transforms a random distribution into a distribution with a mean value of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (Bortz 1999, 756). 
229
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
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Source: 
a.........................www.electionguide.org 
b.........................www.parties-and-elections.de 
c .........................Vanhanen (2003) 
d.........................africanelections.tripod.com 
e.........................www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook 
f..........................www.idea.int/vt 
g.........................psephos.adam-carr.net 
h.........................www.worldpress.org 
i ..........................library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/ghana/03610.pdf 
j ..........................english.aljazeera.net 
k .........................www.unrisd.org 
l ..........................www.europeanforum.net 
m........................www.presidency.ucsb.edu 
n.........................www.npr.org 
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Country Code Year Election Type Parl. Exec. P=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_P Party LP %
Afghanistan AFG 2004 Executive 83.7% 83.7% 0.05 0.86 0.74 38.3
Albania ALB 2005 Parliamentary 49.2% 49.2% 0.02 -0.52 0.27 22.0 Democratic Party
Algeria DZA 2002/2004 CP (50%-50%) 46.2% 58.1% 52.1% 0.01 -0.40 0.16 23.4 National Liberation Front 35.3%
Angola AGO 1992 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Argentina ARG 2003 Executive 77.5% 77.5% 0.02 0.62 0.38 35.4
Armenia ARM 2003/2003 CP (50%-50%) 51.1% 67.0% 59.0% 0.00 -0.13 0.02 26.7 Republican Party of Armenia 23.7%
Australia AUS 2004 Parliamentary 94.6% 94.6% 0.10 1.30 1.69 43.4 Liberal Party of Australia 40.5%
Austria AUT 2006 Parliamentary 78.5% 78.5% 0.03 0.65 0.43 35.8 Social Democratic Party  35.3%
Azerbaijan AZE 2005/2003 CP (50%-50%) 40.5% 61.8% 51.1% 0.01 -0.44 0.20 23.0 New Azerbaijan Party 
Bahamas BHS 2002 Parliamentary 90.2% 90.2% 0.08 1.12 1.26 41.4 Progressive Liberal Party 51.8%
Bahrain BHR 1999 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Bangladesh BGD 2001 Parliamentary 75.0% 75.0% 0.02 0.51 0.26 34.2 Bangladesh Nationalist Party 41.0%
Barbados BRB 2003 Parliamentary 56.9% 56.9% 0.00 -0.21 0.05 25.7 Barbados Labor Party 55.8%
Belarus BLR 2006 Executive 92.9% 92.9% 0.09 1.24 1.53 42.7
Belgium BEL 2003 Parliamentary 91.6% 91.6% 0.09 1.18 1.40 42.0 Flemish Liberal Democrats 15.4%
Belize BLZ 2003 Parliamentary 79.5% 79.5% 0.03 0.69 0.48 36.3 People's United Party 53.2%
Benin BEN 2003/2006 CP (50%-50%) 55.9% 69.5% 62.7% 0.00 0.02 0.00 28.4 Presidential Movement 
Bhutan BTN 2006 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Bolivia BOL 2005 Executive 84.5% 84.5% 0.05 0.90 0.80 38.7
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 2006 Parliamentary 54.5% 54.5% 0.01 -0.31 0.10 24.5 Alliance of Ind. Social Democrats 19.1%
Botswana BWA 2004 Parliamentary 76.2% 76.2% 0.02 0.56 0.32 34.8 Botswana Democratic Party 
Brazil BRA 2006/2006 CP (50%-50%) 83.3% 81.0% 82.2% 0.04 0.80 0.64 37.6 Party of the Brazilian Dem.Movement 14.6%
Brunei BRN 1967 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Bulgaria BGR 2005 Parliamentary 55.8% 55.8% 0.00 -0.26 0.07 25.1 Coalition for Bulgaria 31.0%
Burkina Faso BFA 2005 Executive 57.7% 57.7% 0.00 -0.18 0.03 26.0
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 1988 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Burundi BDI 2005 Parliamentary 77.2% 77.2% 0.02 0.60 0.37 35.3 National Council for the Defense of Dem. 58.6%
Cambodia KHM 2003/1993 CP (50%-50%) 83.2% 0.0% 41.6% 0.04 -0.83 0.68 18.5 Cambodian People's Party 47.4%
Cameroon CMR 2004 Executive 79.5% 79.5% 0.03 0.70 0.48 36.3
Canada CAN 2006 Parliamentary 64.9% 64.9% 0.00 0.11 0.01 29.5 Conservative Party of Canada 36.3%
Cape Verde CPV 2006 Parliamentary 54.2% 54.2% 0.01 -0.32 0.10 24.4 African Party for Ind. of Cape Verde 52.3%
Central African Republic CAF 2005/2005 CP (50%-50%) 72.7% 67.3% 70.0% 0.01 0.31 0.10 31.8 National Convergence "Kwa Na Kwa"
Chad TCD 2006 Executive 53.1% 53.1% 0.01 -0.36 0.13 23.9
Chile CHL 2006 Executive 84.4% 84.4% 0.05 0.89 0.80 38.6
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Country Code Year SP % LPS TS SS% MPC % Executive ELP % EC % TC % C=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_C Source
Afghanistan AFG 2004 KARZAI 55.4% 44.6% 44.6% 44.6% 0.00 0.20 0.04 30.52 a
Albania ALB 2005 56 140 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 0.04 0.92 0.85 39.00 b
Algeria DZA 2002/2004 64.7% 199 389 48.8% 56.8% BOUTEFLIKA 85.0% 15.0% 35.9% 35.9% 0.00 -0.21 0.04 25.70 a
Angola AGO 1992 DOS SANTOS 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/d
Argentina ARG 2003 MENEM 24.3% 75.7% 75.7% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Armenia ARM 2003/2003 76.3% 33 131 74.8% 75.6% KOCHARIA 67.5% 32.6% 54.1% 54.1% 0.02 0.64 0.42 35.73 a
Australia AUS 2004 59.5% 74 150 50.7% 55.1% 55.1% 55.1% 0.02 0.69 0.48 36.30 a
Austria AUT 2006 64.7% 68 183 62.8% 63.8% 63.8% 63.8% 0.05 1.10 1.21 41.07 a
Azerbaijan AZE 2005/2003 60 125 52.0% 52.0% ALIYEV 76.8% 23.2% 37.6% 37.6% 0.00 -0.13 0.02 26.64 e/a/f
Bahamas BHS 2002 48.2% 29 40 27.5% 37.9% 37.9% 37.9% 0.00 -0.12 0.01 26.78 a
Bahrain BHR 1999 HAMAD 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Bangladesh BGD 2001 59.0% 193 330 41.5% 50.3% 50.3% 50.3% 0.01 0.47 0.22 33.64 a
Barbados BRB 2003 44.2% 23 30 23.3% 33.8% 33.8% 33.8% 0.00 -0.31 0.10 24.53 a
Belarus BLR 2006 LUKASHENKO 83.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.0% 0.05 -1.10 1.21 15.28 a
Belgium BEL 2003 84.6% 25 150 83.3% 84.0% 84.0% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Belize BLZ 2003 46.8% 22 29 24.1% 35.5% 35.5% 35.5% 0.00 -0.23 0.05 25.48 a
Benin BEN 2003/2006 52 83 37.3% 37.3% YAYI 74.6% 25.4% 31.4% 31.4% 0.01 -0.42 0.18 23.21 d/e
Bhutan BTN 2006 WANGCHUCK 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Bolivia BOL 2005 MORALES 53.7% 46.3% 46.3% 46.3% 0.00 0.28 0.08 31.42 a
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH 2006 80.9% 7 42 83.3% 82.1% 82.1% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 b
Botswana BWA 2004 44 57 22.8% 22.8% 22.8% 22.8% 0.03 -0.82 0.68 18.48 d
Brazil BRA 2006/2006 85.4% 89 513 82.7% 84.0% DA SILVA 60.8% 39.2% 61.6% 61.6% 0.05 1.00 1.00 39.89 f/g
Brunei BRN 1967 BOLKIAH 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Bulgaria BGR 2005 69.1% 82 240 65.8% 67.4% 67.4% 67.4% 0.07 1.27 1.62 43.11 a
Burkina Faso BFA 2005 COMPAORE 80.4% 19.7% 19.7% 19.7% 0.04 -0.97 0.95 16.74 a
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 1988 THAN SHWE 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Burundi BDI 2005 41.5% 64 118 45.8% 43.6% 43.6% 43.6% 0.00 0.15 0.02 29.96 d/e
Cambodia KHM 2003/1993 52.7% 73 123 40.7% 46.7% SIHAMONI 100.0% 0.0% 23.3% 23.3% 0.03 -0.80 0.64 18.77 c/a
Cameroon CMR 2004 BIYA 75.2% 24.8% 24.8% 24.8% 0.02 -0.73 0.54 19.56 a
Canada CAN 2006 63.8% 124 308 59.7% 61.7% 61.7% 61.7% 0.05 1.01 1.01 39.96 a
Cape Verde CPV 2006 47.7% 41 72 43.1% 45.4% 45.4% 45.4% 0.00 0.24 0.06 30.94 a
Central African Republic CAF 2005/2005 42 105 60.0% 60.0% BOZIZE 64.6% 35.4% 47.7% 47.7% 0.01 0.35 0.12 32.22 d/e/f
Chad TCD 2006 ITNO 64.7% 35.3% 35.3% 35.3% 0.00 -0.24 0.06 25.39 d
Chile CHL 2006 BACHELET 53.5% 46.5% 46.5% 46.5% 0.00 0.29 0.08 31.56 a/e
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Country Code Year Election Type Parl. Exec. P=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_P Party LP %
China CHN 2003 Parliamentary 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1 Chinese Communist Party 100.0%
Colombia COL 2006 Executive 45.1% 45.1% 0.03 -0.69 0.47 20.1
Comoros COM 2006 Executive 57.3% 57.3% 0.00 -0.20 0.04 25.8
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 2002 Executive 74.7% 74.7% 0.02 0.50 0.25 34.1
Costa Rica CRI 2006 Executive 65.2% 65.2% 0.00 0.12 0.01 29.6
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 2000 Executive 37.4% 37.4% 0.06 -1.00 0.99 16.5
Croatia HRV 2003/2005 CP (50%-50%) 61.7% 51.0% 56.3% 0.00 -0.23 0.06 25.4 Croatian Democratic Union 33.9%
Cuba CUB 2003 Parliamentary 96.0% 96.0% 0.11 1.36 1.84 44.1 Cuban Communist Party 100.0%
Cyprus CYP 2006 Parliamentary 89.0% 89.0% 0.07 1.08 1.16 40.8 Progessive P. for the Working People 31.2%
Czech Republic CZE 2006 Parliamentary 64.4% 64.4% 0.00 0.09 0.01 29.2 Civic Democratic Party 35.4%
Denmark DNK 2005 Parliamentary 84.5% 84.5% 0.05 0.90 0.81 38.7 Liberal Party 29.0%
Djibouti DJI 2003 Parliamentary 48.4% 48.4% 0.02 -0.55 0.31 21.7 Union for a Presidential Majority 62.7%
Dominican Republic DOM 2004 Executive 72.8% 72.8% 0.01 0.43 0.18 33.2
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 2006 Executive 65.4% 65.4% 0.00 0.13 0.02 29.7
Ecuador ECU 2006 Executive 76.0% 76.0% 0.02 0.56 0.31 34.7
Egypt EGY 2005/2005 CP (50%-50%) 94.1% 23.0% 58.5% 0.00 -0.15 0.02 26.4 National Democratic Party
El Salvador SLV 2004 Executive 66.2% 66.2% 0.00 0.16 0.03 30.0
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 2002 Executive 98.0% 98.0% 0.13 1.44 2.07 45.0
Eritrea ERI 1993 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Estonia EST 2003 Parliamentary 58.2% 58.2% 0.00 -0.16 0.03 26.3 Center Party 25.4%
Ethiopia ETH 2005 Parliamentary 82.6% 82.6% 0.04 0.82 0.67 37.8 Ethiopian People’s Rev. Dem. Front
Fiji FJI 2006 Parliamentary 88.0% 88.0% 0.07 1.04 1.07 40.3 Fiji United Party
Finland FIN 2003/2006 CP (50%-50%) 66.7% 74.1% 70.4% 0.01 0.33 0.11 32.0 Center Party of Finland 24.7%
France FRA 2002/2002 CP (50%-50%) 60.3% 79.7% 70.0% 0.01 0.31 0.10 31.8 Union for the Presidential Majority 47.3%
Gambia, The GMB 2002/2006 CP (50%-50%) 56.4% 58.6% 57.5% 0.00 -0.19 0.04 25.9 Alliance for Patriotic R. and C. 
Georgia GEO 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 63.9% 88.0% 76.0% 0.02 0.55 0.31 34.6 National Movement Democratic Front 67.8%
Germany DEU 2005 Parliamentary 77.7% 77.7% 0.02 0.62 0.39 35.4 Christian Dem. Union/Chr. Soci. Union 35.2%
Ghana GHA 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 85.1% 85.6% 85.4% 0.05 0.93 0.87 39.1 New Patriotic Party 
Greece GRC 2005 Parliamentary 76.5% 76.5% 0.02 0.57 0.33 34.9 New Democracy 45.4%
Guatemala GTM 2003 Executive 46.8% 46.8% 0.02 -0.62 0.38 20.9
Guinea GIN 2002/2003 CP (50%-50%) 71.6% 82.8% 77.2% 0.02 0.60 0.36 35.2 Party of Unity and Progress 61.6%
Guinea-Bissau GNB 2004/2005 CP (50%-50%) 76.2% 78.6% 77.4% 0.02 0.61 0.37 35.3 Afr. P. for the Ind. of Guinea/Cape Verde 33.9%
Guyana GUY 2006 Parliamentary 68.8% 68.8% 0.00 0.27 0.07 31.3 People's Progressive Party-Civic 54.6%
Haiti HTI 2006 Executive 59.3% 59.3% 0.00 -0.12 0.01 26.8
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Country Code Year SP % LPS TS SS% MPC % Executive ELP % EC % TC % C=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_C Source
China CHN 2003 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Colombia COL 2006 URIBE 62.4% 37.7% 37.7% 37.7% 0.00 -0.13 0.02 26.67 a
Comoros COM 2006 SAMBI 58.0% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 0.00 0.08 0.01 29.06 a
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 2002 SASSOU-N. 89.4% 10.6% 10.6% 10.6% 0.09 -1.40 1.96 11.74 a
Costa Rica CRI 2006 ARIAS SANCHEZ 40.9% 59.1% 59.1% 59.1% 0.04 0.88 0.78 38.49 a
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 2000 GBAGBO 59.4% 40.6% 40.6% 40.6% 0.00 0.01 0.00 28.30 d/e
Croatia HRV 2003/2005 66.1% 66 152 56.6% 61.3% MESIC 65.9% 34.1% 47.7% 47.7% 0.01 0.35 0.12 32.22 a
Cuba CUB 2003 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Cyprus CYP 2006 68.8% 18 56 67.9% 68.3% 68.3% 68.3% 0.08 1.32 1.73 43.61 a
Czech Republic CZE 2006 64.6% 81 200 59.5% 62.1% 62.1% 62.1% 0.05 1.02 1.04 40.14 a
Denmark DNK 2005 71.0% 52 179 70.9% 71.0% 71.0% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Djibouti DJI 2003 37.3% 65 65 0.0% 18.6% 18.6% 18.6% 0.05 -1.02 1.04 16.18 a
Dominican Republic DOM 2004 FERNANDEZ R. 57.1% 42.9% 42.9% 42.9% 0.00 0.12 0.01 29.56 a
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 2006 KABILA 58.1% 42.0% 42.0% 42.0% 0.00 0.08 0.01 29.04 d/e
Ecuador ECU 2006 CORREA 56.7% 43.3% 43.3% 43.3% 0.00 0.14 0.02 29.80 a
Egypt EGY 2005/2005 311 444 30.0% 30.0% MUBARAK 88.6% 11.4% 20.7% 20.7% 0.04 -0.93 0.86 17.31 e/g/a
El Salvador SLV 2004 SACA 57.7% 42.3% 42.3% 42.3% 0.00 0.09 0.01 29.22 a
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 2002 NGUEMA M. 97.1% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 0.14 -1.76 3.10 7.50 d/e
Eritrea ERI 1993 ISAIAS 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Estonia EST 2003 74.6% 28 101 72.3% 73.4% 73.4% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Ethiopia ETH 2005 327 547 40.2% 40.2% 40.2% 40.2% 0.00 -0.01 0.00 28.09 d/f
Fiji FJI 2006 36 71 49.3% 49.3% 49.3% 49.3% 0.01 0.42 0.18 33.10 g/h
Finland FIN 2003/2006 75.3% 55 200 72.5% 73.9% HALONEN 51.8% 48.2% 61.1% 61.1% 0.04 0.97 0.95 39.59 a
France FRA 2002/2002 52.7% 309 577 46.4% 49.6% CHIRAC 82.2% 17.8% 33.7% 33.7% 0.00 -0.31 0.10 24.49 a
Gambia, The GMB 2002/2006 45 48 6.3% 6.3% JAMMEH 67.3% 32.7% 19.5% 19.5% 0.04 -0.98 0.96 16.63 a/d/e
Georgia GEO 2004/2004 32.3% 135 235 42.6% 37.4% SAAKASHVILI 96.9% 3.1% 20.2% 20.2% 0.04 -0.95 0.89 17.06 a
Germany DEU 2005 64.8% 226 603 62.5% 63.7% 63.7% 63.7% 0.05 1.10 1.20 41.03 a
Ghana GHA 2004/2004 128 230 44.3% 44.3% KUFUOR 52.5% 47.6% 45.9% 45.9% 0.00 0.26 0.07 31.25 a/d/e/i
Greece GRC 2005 54.6% 165 300 45.0% 49.8% 49.8% 49.8% 0.01 0.44 0.20 33.38 a
Guatemala GTM 2003 BERGER 54.1% 45.9% 45.9% 45.9% 0.00 0.26 0.07 31.21 a
Guinea GIN 2002/2003 38.4% 85 114 25.4% 31.9% CONTE 95.3% 4.8% 18.3% 18.3% 0.05 -1.03 1.07 16.02 a/d/e
Guinea-Bissau GNB 2004/2005 66.1% 45 100 55.0% 60.6% VIEIRA 52.4% 47.7% 54.1% 54.1% 0.02 0.65 0.42 35.75 d/e
Guyana GUY 2006 45.4% 36 65 44.6% 45.0% 45.0% 45.0% 0.00 0.22 0.05 30.73 a/e/g/f
Haiti HTI 2006 PREVAL 51.2% 48.8% 48.8% 48.8% 0.01 0.40 0.16 32.82 a
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Country Code Year Election Type Parl. Exec. P=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_P Party LP %
Honduras HND 2005 Executive 46.0% 46.0% 0.03 -0.65 0.42 20.5
Hungary HUN 2006 Parliamentary 67.8% 67.8% 0.00 0.23 0.05 30.8 Hungarian Socialist Party 43.2%
Iceland ISL 2003 Parliamentary 87.7% 87.7% 0.07 1.02 1.05 40.2 Independence Party 33.7%
India IND 2004 Parliamentary 57.8% 57.8% 0.00 -0.18 0.03 26.1 India National Congress 26.7%
Indonesia IDN 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 84.1% 75.2% 79.7% 0.03 0.70 0.49 36.4 Federation of Functional Groups 21.6%
Iran IRN 2004/2005 CP (50%-50%) 67.0% 29.9% 48.4% 0.02 -0.55 0.30 21.7 The United Front of Conservatives
Iraq IRQ 2005 Parliamentary 79.8% 79.8% 0.03 0.71 0.50 36.5 Unified Iraqi Coalition 41.2%
Ireland IRL 2002 Parliamentary 63.0% 63.0% 0.00 0.03 0.00 28.5 The Republican Party 41.5%
Israel ISR 2006 Parliamentary 63.6% 63.6% 0.00 0.05 0.00 28.8 Kadima 22.0%
Italy ITA 2006 Parliamentary 83.6% 83.6% 0.05 0.86 0.74 38.3 The Union 49.8%
Jamaica JAM 2002 Parliamentary 56.8% 56.8% 0.00 -0.22 0.05 25.6 People's National Party 52.4%
Japan JPN 2005 Parliamentary 67.5% 67.5% 0.00 0.21 0.05 30.7 Liberal Democratic Party 38.2%
Jordan JOR 2003/1999 CP (50%-50%) 81.8% 0.0% 40.9% 0.05 -0.85 0.73 18.1 Islamic Action Front 10.4%
Kazakhstan KAZ 2005 Executive 76.8% 76.8% 0.02 0.59 0.34 35.0
Kenya KEN 2002 Parliamentary 57.2% 57.2% 0.00 -0.20 0.04 25.8 National Rainbow Coalition 
Kuwait KWT 2006/2006 CP (50%-50%) 91.9% 0.0% 46.0% 0.03 -0.65 0.43 20.5 Islamic Bloc 
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 2005 Executive 75.0% 75.0% 0.02 0.51 0.26 34.2
Laos LAO 2006 Parliamentary 99.8% 99.8% 0.14 1.51 2.28 45.9 LPRP
Latvia LVA 2006 Parliamentary 60.1% 60.1% 0.00 -0.08 0.01 27.2 People's Party 19.6%
Lebanon LBN 2005 Parliamentary 46.5% 46.5% 0.02 -0.63 0.40 20.8 Current of the Future/Hariri Alliance  
Lesotho LSO 2002 Parliamentary 66.7% 66.7% 0.00 0.18 0.03 30.3 Lesotho Congress for Democracy 54.9%
Liberia LBR 2005/2005 CP (50%-50%) 76.5% 62.3% 69.4% 0.01 0.29 0.08 31.6 Congress for Democratic Change 
Libya LBY 1969 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Lithuania LTU 2004 Parliamentary 45.9% 45.9% 0.03 -0.65 0.43 20.5 Labour Party 28.6%
Luxembourg LUX 2004 Parliamentary 91.7% 91.7% 0.09 1.19 1.40 42.1 Christian Social People's Party 36.1%
Macedonia MKD 2006/2004 CP (50%-50%) 56.0% 55.2% 55.6% 0.00 -0.27 0.07 25.0 Dem.P. for Macedonian National Unity 32.5%
Madagascar MDG 2006 Executive 61.9% 61.9% 0.00 -0.01 0.00 28.0
Malawi MWI 2004 Executive 54.3% 54.3% 0.01 -0.32 0.10 24.5
Malaysia MYS 2004 Parliamentary 73.9% 73.9% 0.01 0.47 0.22 33.7 National Front/ Barisan Nasional 62.4%
Maldives MDV 2003 Executive 77.5% 77.5% 0.02 0.61 0.38 35.4
Mali MLI 2002 Executive 38.3% 38.3% 0.06 -0.96 0.92 16.9
Malta MLT 2003 Parliamentary 97.0% 97.0% 0.12 1.40 1.95 44.5 Nationalist Party 51.8%
Mauritania MRT 2006/2003 CP (50%-50%) 69.5% 61.7% 65.6% 0.00 0.14 0.02 29.8 Rally of Democratic Forces 
Mauritius MUS 2005 Parliamentary 81.5% 81.5% 0.04 0.78 0.60 37.3 Social Alliance 
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Country Code Year SP % LPS TS SS% MPC % Executive ELP % EC % TC % C=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_C Source
Honduras HND 2005 ZELAYA 49.8% 50.2% 50.2% 50.2% 0.01 0.46 0.21 33.60 e/g
Hungary HUN 2006 56.8% 190 386 50.8% 53.8% 53.8% 53.8% 0.02 0.63 0.40 35.58 b
Iceland ISL 2003 66.3% 22 63 65.1% 65.7% 65.7% 65.7% 0.06 1.19 1.42 42.15 a
India IND 2004 73.3% 145 543 73.3% 73.3% 73.3% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Indonesia IDN 2004/2004 78.4% 128 550 76.7% 77.6% YUDHOYONO/K. 60.6% 39.4% 58.5% 58.5% 0.03 0.85 0.73 38.16 a
Iran IRN 2004/2005 156 290 46.2% 46.2% AHMADINEJAD 80.8% 19.2% 32.7% 32.7% 0.01 -0.36 0.13 23.93 n/a/e
Iraq IRQ 2005 58.8% 128 275 53.5% 56.1% 56.1% 56.1% 0.02 0.74 0.55 36.87 a
Ireland IRL 2002 58.5% 81 166 51.2% 54.9% 54.9% 54.9% 0.02 0.68 0.46 36.16 b
Israel ISR 2006 78.0% 29 120 75.8% 76.9% 76.9% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Italy ITA 2006 50.2% 348 630 44.8% 47.5% 47.5% 47.5% 0.01 0.33 0.11 32.09 a
Jamaica JAM 2002 47.6% 35 60 41.7% 44.6% 44.6% 44.6% 0.00 0.20 0.04 30.52 a
Japan JPN 2005 61.8% 296 480 38.3% 50.1% 50.1% 50.1% 0.01 0.46 0.21 33.52 a/f/g
Jordan JOR 2003/1999 89.6% 17 110 84.5% 87.1% ABDALLAH II 100.0% 0.0% 43.5% 43.5% 0.00 0.15 0.02 29.92 c/a/e/g
Kazakhstan KAZ 2005 NAZARBAYEV 91.2% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 0.10 -1.48 2.19 10.78 a
Kenya KEN 2002 132 224 41.1% 41.1% 41.1% 41.1% 0.00 0.03 0.00 28.56 d/f
Kuwait KWT 2006/2006 17 50 66.0% 66.0% SABAH 100.0% 0.0% 33.0% 33.0% 0.01 -0.35 0.12 24.11 c/a
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 2005 BAKIEV 88.7% 11.3% 11.3% 11.3% 0.08 -1.37 1.87 12.12 a
Laos LAO 2006 113 115 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 0.15 -1.82 3.30 6.86 e/f
Latvia LVA 2006 80.4% 23 100 77.0% 78.7% 78.7% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Lebanon LBN 2005 72 128 43.8% 43.8% 43.8% 43.8% 0.00 0.16 0.03 30.04 g/f
Lesotho LSO 2002 45.1% 77 120 35.8% 40.5% 40.5% 40.5% 0.00 0.01 0.00 28.23 d
Liberia LBR 2005/2005 15 65 76.9% 76.9% JOHNSON S. 59.4% 40.6% 58.8% 58.8% 0.03 0.87 0.75 38.32 a/d/e
Libya LBY 1969 al-QADHAFI 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Lithuania LTU 2004 71.4% 39 141 72.3% 71.9% 71.9% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 b
Luxembourg LUX 2004 63.9% 24 60 60.0% 62.0% 62.0% 62.0% 0.05 1.02 1.03 40.08 b
Macedonia MKD 2006/2004 67.5% 45 120 62.5% 65.0% CRVENKOVSKI 42.5% 57.5% 61.3% 61.3% 0.04 0.98 0.97 39.70 a
Madagascar MDG 2006 RAVALOMANANA 54.8% 45.2% 45.2% 45.2% 0.00 0.23 0.05 30.84 d/e
Malawi MWI 2004 MUTHARIKA 35.9% 64.1% 64.1% 64.1% 0.06 1.12 1.25 41.26 d
Malaysia MYS 2004 37.6% 199 219 9.1% 23.4% 23.4% 23.4% 0.03 -0.80 0.64 18.80 a/f
Maldives MDV 2003 GAYOOM 90.3% 9.7% 9.7% 9.7% 0.09 -1.44 2.07 11.26 a/e
Mali MLI 2002 TOURÉ 64.4% 35.6% 35.6% 35.6% 0.00 -0.22 0.05 25.54 a
Malta MLT 2003 48.2% 35 65 46.2% 47.2% 47.2% 47.2% 0.00 0.32 0.10 31.93 a
Mauritania MRT 2006/2003 15 95 84.2% 84.2% TAYA 67.4% 32.6% 58.4% 58.4% 0.03 0.85 0.72 38.13 d/f
Mauritius MUS 2005 42 70 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 40.0% 0.00 -0.02 0.00 27.97 d
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Country Code Year Election Type Parl. Exec. P=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_P Party LP %
Mexico MEX 2006 Executive 58.6% 58.6% 0.00 -0.14 0.02 26.5
Moldova MDA 2005/2005 CP (50%-50%) 64.8% 75.3% 70.0% 0.01 0.32 0.10 31.9 Communist P. of the R. of Moldova 46.0%
Mongolia MNG 2004 Parliamentary 81.8% 81.8% 0.04 0.79 0.62 37.4 Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party 48.8%
Montenegro MNP 2006/2003 CP (50%-50%) 71.1% 48.4% 59.7% 0.00 -0.10 0.01 27.0 Social Democratic Party of Montenegro 48.9%
Morocco MAR 2002/1999 CP (50%-50%) 51.6% 0.0% 25.8% 0.13 -1.46 2.14 11.0 Socialist Union of Popular Forces 15.4%
Mozambique MOZ 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 36.3% 36.4% 36.4% 0.07 -1.04 1.08 16.0 Mozambique Liberation Front 62.0%
Namibia NAM 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 84.5% 84.9% 84.7% 0.05 0.90 0.82 38.8 South West Africa People's Organization 76.3%
Nepal NPL 1999 Parliamentary 65.8% 65.8% 0.00 0.14 0.02 29.9 Nepali Congress (NCP) 37.2%
Netherlands NLD 2006 Parliamentary 80.4% 80.4% 0.03 0.73 0.53 36.7 Christian Democratic Appeal 26.5%
New Zealand NZL 2005 Parliamentary 81.0% 81.0% 0.04 0.76 0.57 37.0 Labour Party 41.1%
Nicaragua NIC 2006 Executive 66.8% 66.8% 0.00 0.19 0.03 30.4
Niger NER 2004 Executive 45.0% 45.0% 0.03 -0.69 0.48 20.1
Nigeria NGA 2003 Executive 69.1% 69.1% 0.00 0.28 0.08 31.4
North Korea PRK 1994 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Norway NOR 2005 Parliamentary 77.4% 77.4% 0.02 0.61 0.38 35.4 Labour Party 32.7%
Oman OMN 1970 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Pakistan PAK 1999 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Panama PAN 2004 Executive 76.9% 76.9% 0.02 0.59 0.35 35.1
Papa New Guinea PNG 2002 Parliamentary 75.0% 75.0% 0.02 0.51 0.26 34.2 National Alliance Party
Paraguay PRY 2003 Executive 64.2% 64.2% 0.00 0.08 0.01 29.1
Peru PER 2006 Executive 87.7% 87.7% 0.07 1.03 1.05 40.2
Philippines PHL 2004 Executive 84.1% 84.1% 0.05 0.88 0.77 38.5
Poland POL 2005/2005 CP (50%-50%) 40.6% 51.0% 45.8% 0.03 -0.66 0.43 20.4 Law and Justice 27.0%
Portugal PRT 2005/2006 CP (50%-50%) 65.0% 61.5% 63.3% 0.00 0.04 0.00 28.7 Socialist Party 46.4%
Qatar QAT 1995 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Romania ROM 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 58.5% 54.8% 56.7% 0.00 -0.22 0.05 25.6 Social Dem. P./Humanist P. of Romania 36.6%
Russia RUS 2003/2004 CP (50%-50%) 55.7% 64.4% 60.0% 0.00 -0.09 0.01 27.1 United Russia 38.2%
Rwanda RWA 2003 Executive 96.6% 96.6% 0.12 1.38 1.90 44.4
Saudi Arabia SAU 2005 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Senegal SEN 2000 Executive 60.8% 60.8% 0.00 -0.06 0.00 27.5
Serbia YUG 2003/2004 CP (50%-50%) 58.8% 48.4% 53.6% 0.01 -0.35 0.12 24.1 Serbian Radical Party 28.0%
Sierra Leone SLE 2002/2002 CP (50%-50%) 83.3% 81.4% 82.4% 0.04 0.81 0.66 37.7 Sierra Leone People’s Party 69.9%
Singapore SGP 2006 Parliamentary 94.0% 94.0% 0.10 1.28 1.63 43.2 People's Action Party 66.7%
Slovakia SVK 2006/2004 CP (50%-50%) 54.7% 43.5% 49.1% 0.02 -0.53 0.28 22.0 Direction 29.1%
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Country Code Year SP % LPS TS SS% MPC % Executive ELP % EC % TC % C=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_C Source
Mexico MEX 2006 CALDERON 35.9% 64.1% 64.1% 64.1% 0.06 1.12 1.25 41.27 e/f
Moldova MDA 2005/2005 54.0% 56 101 44.6% 49.3% VORONIN 98.7% 1.3% 25.3% 25.3% 0.02 -0.71 0.50 19.86 a
Mongolia MNG 2004 51.2% 37 76 51.3% 51.3% 51.3% 51.3% 0.01 0.51 0.26 34.18 a/e/f
Montenegro MNP 2006/2003 51.1% 41 81 49.4% 50.2% VUJANOVIC 64.3% 35.8% 43.0% 43.0% 0.00 0.12 0.02 29.62 a/e
Morocco MAR 2002/1999 84.6% 50 325 84.6% 84.6% MOHAMED VI 100.0% 0.0% 42.3% 42.3% 0.00 0.09 0.01 29.24 c/e
Mozambique MOZ 2004/2004 38.0% 160 250 36.0% 37.0% GUEBUZA 63.7% 36.3% 36.6% 36.6% 0.00 -0.18 0.03 26.10 d/e
Namibia NAM 2004/2004 23.7% 55 72 23.6% 23.6% POHAMBA 76.3% 23.7% 23.7% 23.7% 0.03 -0.78 0.62 18.96 d/e
Nepal NPL 1999 62.8% 111 205 45.9% 54.3% 54.3% 54.3% 0.02 0.66 0.43 35.88 a
Netherlands NLD 2006 73.5% 41 150 72.7% 73.1% 73.1% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
New Zealand NZL 2005 58.9% 50 120 58.3% 58.6% 58.6% 58.6% 0.03 0.86 0.74 38.24 a
Nicaragua NIC 2006 ORTEGA 38.0% 62.0% 62.0% 62.0% 0.05 1.02 1.04 40.11 a
Niger NER 2004 TANDJA 65.5% 34.5% 34.5% 34.5% 0.00 -0.28 0.08 24.92 a
Nigeria NGA 2003 OBASANJO 61.9% 38.1% 38.1% 38.1% 0.00 -0.11 0.01 26.90 a
North Korea PRK 1994 KIM Jong Il 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e/f/j
Norway NOR 2005 67.3% 61 169 63.9% 65.6% 65.6% 65.6% 0.06 1.19 1.41 42.10 a
Oman OMN 1970 QABOOS 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Pakistan PAK 1999 MUSHARRAF 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Panama PAN 2004 TORRIJOS 47.5% 52.5% 52.5% 52.5% 0.01 0.57 0.33 34.89 a
Papa New Guinea PNG 2002 19 109 82.6% 82.6% 82.6% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 g/k
Paraguay PRY 2003 DUARTE FRUTOS 37.1% 62.9% 62.9% 62.9% 0.05 1.06 1.12 40.58 a
Peru PER 2006 GARCIA 52.6% 47.4% 47.4% 47.4% 0.00 0.33 0.11 32.03 a
Philippines PHL 2004 MACAPAGAL-A. 40.0% 60.0% 60.0% 60.0% 0.04 0.92 0.85 39.01 a
Poland POL 2005/2005 73.0% 155 460 66.3% 69.7% KACZYNSKI 54.0% 46.0% 57.8% 57.8% 0.03 0.82 0.67 37.79 a
Portugal PRT 2005/2006 53.6% 120 230 47.8% 50.7% SILVA 50.5% 49.5% 50.1% 50.1% 0.01 0.46 0.21 33.53 a
Qatar QAT 1995 HAMAD 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Romania ROM 2004/2004 63.4% 132 345 61.7% 62.6% BASESCU 51.2% 48.8% 55.7% 55.7% 0.02 0.72 0.52 36.61 a
Russia RUS 2003/2004 61.8% 221 450 50.9% 56.4% PUTIN 71.9% 28.1% 42.2% 42.2% 0.00 0.09 0.01 29.19 a
Rwanda RWA 2003 KAGAME 95.1% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.13 -1.66 2.77 8.63 a
Saudi Arabia SAU 2005 AL-AZIZ AL SAUD 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Senegal SEN 2000 WADE 58.5% 41.5% 41.5% 41.5% 0.00 0.05 0.00 28.80 d/e
Serbia YUG 2003/2004 72.0% 82 250 67.2% 69.6% TADIC 54.0% 46.0% 57.8% 57.8% 0.03 0.82 0.67 37.80 a
Sierra Leone SLE 2002/2002 30.1% 83 112 25.9% 28.0% KABBAH 70.0% 30.0% 29.0% 29.0% 0.01 -0.53 0.29 21.89 d
Singapore SGP 2006 33.3% 45 84 46.4% 39.9% 39.9% 39.9% 0.00 -0.02 0.00 27.89 g/f
Slovakia SVK 2006/2004 70.9% 50 150 66.7% 68.8% GAŠPAROVIC 59.9% 40.1% 54.4% 54.4% 0.02 0.66 0.44 35.93 a
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Country Code Year Election Type Parl. Exec. P=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_P Party LP %
Slovenia SVN 2004/2002 CP (50%-50%) 60.7% 65.1% 62.9% 0.00 0.03 0.00 28.5 Social Democrats 29.1%
Solomon Islands SLB 2006 Parliamentary 57.0% 57.0% 0.00 -0.21 0.04 25.7 Rural Advancement Party 6.3%
Somalia SOM 2004 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
South Africa ZAF 2004 Parliamentary 76.7% 76.7% 0.02 0.58 0.34 35.0 African National Congress 69.7%
South Korea KOR 2004/2002 CP (50%-50%) 60.0% 70.8% 65.4% 0.00 0.13 0.02 29.7 The Uri Party 38.3%
Spain ESP 2004 Parliamentary 77.2% 77.2% 0.02 0.60 0.36 35.2 Spanish Socialist Workers' Party 43.3%
Sri Lanka LKA 2004/2005 CP (50%-50%) 76.0% 73.7% 74.9% 0.02 0.51 0.26 34.1 United People's Freedom Alliance 45.6%
Sweden SWE 2006 Parliamentary 82.0% 82.0% 0.04 0.80 0.63 37.5 Social Democrats 35.0%
Switzerland CHE 2003 Parliamentary 45.4% 45.4% 0.03 -0.67 0.45 20.3 Swiss People's Party 26.6%
Syria SYR 2000 Executive 74.6% 74.6% 0.02 0.50 0.25 34.0
Taiwan TWN 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 53.2% 80.3% 66.7% 0.00 0.18 0.03 30.3 Minjindang (Dem. Progressive P.) 38.0%
Tajikistan TJK 2005/2006 CP (50%-50%) 93.2% 91.0% 92.1% 0.09 1.20 1.44 42.3 People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan 64.5%
Tanzania TZA 2005/2005 CP (50%-50%) 66.0% 72.4% 69.2% 0.00 0.28 0.08 31.5 Chama Cha Mapinduzi 70.0%
Thailand THA 2005/1946 CP (75%-25%) 72.3% 0.0% 54.2% 0.01 -0.32 0.10 24.4 Thai Rak Thai 56.4%
Togo TGO 2002/2005 CP (50%-50%) 67.4% 63.6% 65.5% 0.00 0.13 0.02 29.7 Rally of the Togolese People
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 2002 Parliamentary 69.6% 69.6% 0.01 0.30 0.09 31.6 People's National Movement 50.7%
Tunisia TUN 2004/2004 CP (50%-50%) 86.4% 91.5% 89.0% 0.07 1.08 1.16 40.8 Constitutional Dem. Rally Party 87.6%
Turkey TUR 2002/2000 CP (75%-25%) 79.4% 0.0% 59.6% 0.00 -0.11 0.01 26.9 Justice and Developement Party 34.3%
Turkmenistan TKM 1999 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
Uganda UGA 2006 Executive 69.2% 69.2% 0.00 0.28 0.08 31.5
Ukraine UKR 2006/2004 CP (50%-50%) 67.7% 77.3% 72.5% 0.01 0.41 0.17 33.0 Party of Regions 32.1%
United Arab Emirates ARE 2004 Executive 0.0% 0.0% 0.39 -2.50 6.24 -1.1
United Kingdom GBR 2005 Parliamentary 61.3% 61.3% 0.00 -0.04 0.00 27.7 Labour Party 35.2%
United States of America USA 2004 Executive 58.1% 58.1% 0.00 -0.16 0.03 26.2
Uruguay URY 2004 Executive 88.3% 88.3% 0.07 1.05 1.10 40.5
Uzbekistan UZB 2000 Executive 95.1% 95.1% 0.11 1.32 1.75 43.7
Venezuela VEN 2006 Executive 74.1% 74.1% 0.01 0.48 0.23 33.8
Vietnam VNM 2002 Parliamentary 98.9% 98.9% 0.13 1.47 2.17 45.5 Vietnam Fatherland Front 100.0%
Yemen YEM 2003/2006 CP (50%-50%) 76.0% 65.2% 70.6% 0.01 0.34 0.11 32.1 General People's Congress 58.0%
Zambia ZMB 2006/2006 CP (50%-50%) 70.6% 70.8% 70.7% 0.01 0.34 0.12 32.2 Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
Zimbabwe ZWE 2005/2002 CP (50%-50%) 47.7% 56.0% 51.8% 0.01 -0.42 0.17 23.3 African National Union-Patriotic Front 59.6%
0.62 10.35 0.00 167.00
Z-Transformation variables: µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con
0.25 1.00
σ σ_con
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Country Code Year SP % LPS TS SS% MPC % Executive ELP % EC % TC % C=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_V_C Source
Slovenia SVN 2004/2002 70.9% 29 90 67.8% 69.3% DRNOVŠEK 56.5% 43.5% 56.4% 56.4% 0.03 0.75 0.57 37.02 a
Solomon Islands SLB 2006 93.7% 4 50 92.0% 92.9% 92.9% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 g
Somalia SOM 2004 YUSUF 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/d/e
South Africa ZAF 2004 30.3% 279 400 30.3% 30.3% 30.3% 30.3% 0.01 -0.47 0.22 22.60 d
South Korea KOR 2004/2002 61.7% 152 299 49.2% 55.4% ROH Moo-hyun 48.9% 51.1% 53.3% 53.3% 0.02 0.61 0.37 35.29 a
Spain ESP 2004 56.7% 164 350 53.1% 54.9% 54.9% 54.9% 0.02 0.68 0.47 36.19 a
Sri Lanka LKA 2004/2005 54.4% 105 225 53.3% 53.9% RAJAPAKSHA 50.3% 49.7% 51.8% 51.8% 0.01 0.54 0.29 34.47 a
Sweden SWE 2006 65.0% 130 349 62.8% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 0.06 1.11 1.22 41.14 a
Switzerland CHE 2003 73.4% 55 200 72.5% 73.0% 73.0% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 a
Syria SYR 2000 al-ASAD 97.3% 2.7% 97.3% 70.0% 0.09 1.39 1.94 44.52 c/e/a
Taiwan TWN 2004/2004 62.0% 89 225 60.4% 61.2% CHEN 50.1% 49.9% 55.6% 55.6% 0.02 0.71 0.51 36.55 a/g
Tajikistan TJK 2005/2006 35.5% 52 63 17.5% 26.5% RAHMON 79.3% 20.7% 23.6% 23.6% 0.03 -0.79 0.62 18.91 a/e/l
Tanzania TZA 2005/2005 30.0% 275 323 14.9% 22.4% KIKWETE 80.3% 19.7% 21.1% 21.1% 0.04 -0.91 0.82 17.53 d/e
Thailand THA 2005/1946 43.6% 377 500 24.6% 34.1% PHUMIPHON 100.0% 0.0% 25.6% 25.6% 0.02 -0.69 0.48 20.01 c/e/g
Togo TGO 2002/2005 72 81 11.1% 11.1% GNASSINGBE 60.2% 39.9% 25.5% 25.5% 0.02 -0.70 0.49 19.96 a/d/e
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 2002 49.3% 20 36 44.4% 46.9% 46.9% 46.9% 0.00 0.31 0.09 31.75 a
Tunisia TUN 2004/2004 12.4% 152 189 19.6% 16.0% BEN ALI 94.5% 5.5% 10.8% 10.8% 0.09 -1.39 1.94 11.83 a
Turkey TUR 2002/2000 65.7% 363 550 34.0% 49.9% SEZER 61.9% 38.1% 46.9% 46.9% 0.00 0.31 0.10 31.78 c/a  
Turkmenistan TKM 1999 NIYAZOV 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/a
Uganda UGA 2006 MUSEVENI 59.3% 40.7% 40.7% 40.7% 0.00 0.02 0.00 28.38 a
Ukraine UKR 2006/2004 67.9% 186 450 58.7% 63.3% YUSHCHENKO 54.0% 46.0% 54.6% 54.6% 0.02 0.67 0.45 36.03 a/b
United Arab Emirates ARE 2004 KHALIFA 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
United Kingdom GBR 2005 64.8% 356 645 44.8% 54.8% 54.8% 54.8% 0.02 0.68 0.46 36.13 b
United States of America USA 2004 BUSH 50.7% 49.3% 49.3% 49.3% 0.01 0.42 0.18 33.10 m
Uruguay URY 2004 VAZQUEZ 51.9% 48.1% 48.1% 48.1% 0.01 0.36 0.13 32.41 a
Uzbekistan UZB 2000 KARIMOV 91.9% 8.1% 8.1% 8.1% 0.10 -1.52 2.30 10.37 c  
Venezuela VEN 2006 CHAVEZ 62.9% 37.2% 37.2% 37.2% 0.00 -0.15 0.02 26.39 a
Vietnam VNM 2002 0.0% 500 500 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 -1.90 3.60 5.90 c/e
Yemen YEM 2003/2006 42.0% 238 301 20.9% 31.5% SALEH 77.2% 22.8% 27.1% 27.1% 0.02 -0.62 0.39 20.87 a
Zambia ZMB 2006/2006 74 150 50.7% 50.7% MWANAWASA 43.0% 57.0% 53.8% 53.8% 0.02 0.63 0.40 35.61 d/e/f
Zimbabwe ZWE 2005/2002 40.4% 78 120 35.0% 37.7% MUGABE 56.0% 44.0% 40.9% 40.9% 0.00 0.02 0.00 28.44 a
0.40 7.56 0.00 167.00
Z-Transformation variables: µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con
0.21 1.00
σ σ_con
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H. Correlation Data for GDP PPP 2006 
 
 
Key: 
 
GDP PPP=x .......gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity per 
...........................capita230 
z .........................z-transformed “GDP PPP=x”-values231 
x_GDP_PPP ......re-transformed z-values232 
µ_con .................control mean value238 
σ_con.................control standard deviation233 
Cuba ..................missing values 
 
Explanation: 
 
The mean value and the standard deviation (µ=28.16; σ=11.74) of the FH scale is used 
for the re-transformation calculations.234 
 
                                               
230
 See IMF 2008 
231
 See Tab. 3: Formulas for Z-Transformation, 84 
232
 See Tab. 4: Re-Transformation of z-values, 84 
233
 The z-transformation transforms a random distribution into a distribution with a mean value of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (Bortz 1999, 756). 
234
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
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Country Code GDP PPP=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_GDP_PPP
Afghanistan AFG 658 140197699.7 -0.82 0.67 18.58
Albania ALB 5,815 44662795.84 -0.46 0.21 22.76
Algeria DZA 6,195 39725073 -0.43 0.19 23.06
Angola AGO 4,630 61910285.84 -0.54 0.29 21.80
Argentina ARG 12,054 197294.0575 -0.03 0.00 27.80
Armenia ARM 4,328 66746333.94 -0.56 0.32 21.55
Australia AUS 34,386 479095227.3 1.51 2.28 45.87
Austria AUT 36,133 558623059.2 1.63 2.65 47.28
Azerbaijan AZE 6,061 41441727.57 -0.44 0.20 22.95
Bahamas BHS 23,930 130681753.9 0.79 0.62 37.41
Bahrain BHR 29,892 302543479.8 1.20 1.44 42.23
Bangladesh BGD 1,223 127128533 -0.78 0.60 19.04
Barbados BRB 17,555 25572581.91 0.35 0.12 32.25
Belarus BLR 9,759 7503627.29 -0.19 0.04 25.95
Belgium BEL 33,742 451300527.3 1.46 2.14 45.35
Belize BLZ 7,667 23339169.3 -0.33 0.11 24.25
Benin BEN 1,486 121259826.4 -0.76 0.58 19.25
Bhutan BTN 4,057 71253215.19 -0.58 0.34 21.33
Bolivia BOL 3,882 74245725.89 -0.59 0.35 21.19
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 6,501 35966251.4 -0.41 0.17 23.31
Botswana BWA 15,089 6713390.045 0.18 0.03 30.26
Brazil BRA 9,086 11640542.71 -0.24 0.06 25.40
Brunei BRN 50,147 1417449087 2.60 6.73 58.62
Bulgaria BGR 10,300 4829792.798 -0.15 0.02 26.38
Burkina Faso BFA 1,160 128543372.3 -0.78 0.61 18.99
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 980 132671464.3 -0.79 0.63 18.84
Burundi BDI 356 147419712.2 -0.84 0.70 18.34
Cambodia KHM 1,626 118200557 -0.75 0.56 19.37
Cameroon CMR 2,025 109689153.2 -0.72 0.52 19.69
Canada CAN 37,001 600400343.5 1.69 2.85 47.98
Cape Verde CPV 3,035 89559705.22 -0.65 0.43 20.51
Central African Republic CAF 692 139374764 -0.81 0.66 18.61
Chad TCD 1,663 117409771.3 -0.75 0.56 19.40
Chile CHL 13,032 284999.0715 0.04 0.00 28.59
China CHN 4,657 61479100.55 -0.54 0.29 21.82
Colombia COL 7,317 26840760.73 -0.36 0.13 23.97
Comoros COM 1,131 129216349.5 -0.78 0.61 18.97
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 3,800 75651724.09 -0.60 0.36 21.13
Costa Rica CRI 9,590 8454806.271 -0.20 0.04 25.81
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 1,690 116819629 -0.74 0.56 19.42
Croatia HRV 14,318 3311970.65 0.13 0.02 29.63
Cuba CUB
Cyprus CYP 25,844 178113715.3 0.92 0.85 38.96
Czech Republic CZE 22,258 95262871.31 0.67 0.45 36.06
Denmark DNK 35,856 545610741.5 1.61 2.59 47.06
Djibouti DJI 2,156 106964637 -0.71 0.51 19.80
Dominican Republic DOM 7,391 26080590.59 -0.35 0.12 24.03
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 294 148939055 -0.84 0.71 18.29
Ecuador ECU 6,978 30473810.98 -0.38 0.14 23.70
Egypt EGY 5,097 54780055.2 -0.51 0.26 22.17
El Salvador SLV 5,533 48513662.18 -0.48 0.23 22.53
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 13,461 926521.8363 0.07 0.00 28.94
Eritrea ERI 742 138209083.9 -0.81 0.66 18.65
Estonia EST 18,819 39952829.22 0.44 0.19 33.27
Ethiopia ETH 725 138616078.3 -0.81 0.66 18.64
Fiji FJI 4,334 66657410.33 -0.56 0.32 21.56
Finland FIN 32,880 415412759.1 1.40 1.97 44.65
France FRA 32,121 385039603.8 1.35 1.83 44.03
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Country Code GDP PPP=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_GDP_PPP
Gambia, The GMB 1,238 126780617.9 -0.78 0.60 19.05
Georgia GEO 4,038 71568316.83 -0.58 0.34 21.32
Germany DEU 32,463 398581222 1.38 1.89 44.31
Ghana GHA 1,340 124509197.8 -0.77 0.59 19.14
Greece GRC 27,350 220569637.7 1.02 1.05 40.17
Guatemala GTM 4,441 64924884.84 -0.56 0.31 21.64
Guinea GIN 962 133082663.5 -0.80 0.63 18.83
Guinea-Bissau GNB 474 144589633.3 -0.83 0.69 18.44
Guyana GUY 3,559 79915052.82 -0.62 0.38 20.93
Haiti HTI 1,241 126724505.8 -0.78 0.60 19.06
Honduras HND 3,821 75297512.98 -0.60 0.36 21.14
Hungary HUN 18,262 33221379.41 0.40 0.16 32.82
Iceland ISL 37,049 602729900.2 1.69 2.86 48.02
India IND 2,317 103651721.7 -0.70 0.49 19.93
Indonesia IDN 3,459 81713192.24 -0.62 0.39 20.85
Iran IRN 9,838 7076094.54 -0.18 0.03 26.01
Iraq IRQ
Ireland IRL 40,806 801306519.4 1.95 3.81 51.06
Israel ISR 25,640 172709720.7 0.91 0.82 38.79
Italy ITA 29,366 284534688.3 1.16 1.35 41.81
Jamaica JAM 7,436 25623630.96 -0.35 0.12 24.07
Japan JPN 32,052 382346012.1 1.35 1.82 43.98
Jordan JOR 4,608 62257575.1 -0.54 0.30 21.78
Kazakhstan KAZ 9,779 7395070.861 -0.19 0.04 25.96
Kenya KEN 1,549 119882614.7 -0.75 0.57 19.31
Kuwait KWT 38,096 655257299 1.76 3.11 48.87
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 1,820 114022416.7 -0.74 0.54 19.52
Laos LAO 1,889 112556248.3 -0.73 0.53 19.58
Latvia LVA 15,350 8130493.611 0.20 0.04 30.47
Lebanon LBN 10,699 3238376.449 -0.12 0.02 26.71
Lesotho LSO 1,215 127302635.5 -0.78 0.60 19.04
Liberia LBR 333 147979803.4 -0.84 0.70 18.32
Libya LBY 12,640 20204.07609 0.01 0.00 28.28
Lithuania LTU 15,774 10728625.39 0.23 0.05 30.81
Luxembourg LUX 75,442 3961975970 4.34 18.82 79.08
Macedonia MKD 7,899 21151058.15 -0.32 0.10 24.44
Madagascar MDG 921 134031605.2 -0.80 0.64 18.80
Malawi MWI 729 138502628.2 -0.81 0.66 18.64
Malaysia MYS 12,465 1119.568726 0.00 0.00 28.13
Maldives MDV 4,166 69427172.58 -0.57 0.33 21.42
Mali MLI 1,003 132139323.2 -0.79 0.63 18.86
Malta MLT 21,821 86915775.32 0.64 0.41 35.70
Mauritania MRT 1,985 110516418.9 -0.72 0.53 19.66
Mauritius MUS 10,462 4147759.751 -0.14 0.02 26.51
Mexico MEX 13,457 918730.0003 0.07 0.00 28.94
Moldova MDA 2,713 95750647.03 -0.67 0.45 20.25
Mongolia MNG 2,895 92216302.17 -0.66 0.44 20.39
Montenegro MNP 8,909 12879528.2 -0.25 0.06 25.26
Morocco MAR 3,946 73145683.14 -0.59 0.35 21.24
Mozambique MOZ 782 137260999.6 -0.81 0.65 18.68
Namibia NAM 5,021 55907442.49 -0.52 0.27 22.11
Nepal NPL 1,028 131575374.6 -0.79 0.63 18.88
Netherlands NLD 37,311 615688196.8 1.71 2.93 48.23
New Zealand NZL 25,364 165519418.8 0.89 0.79 38.57
Nicaragua NIC 2,525 99461246.74 -0.69 0.47 20.09
Niger NER 649 140397686.2 -0.82 0.67 18.58
Nigeria NGA 1,916 111987718 -0.73 0.53 19.60
North Korea PRK
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Country Code GDP PPP=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_GDP_PPP
Norway NOR 50,235 1424040341 2.60 6.77 58.69
Oman OMN 22,165 93456980.14 0.67 0.44 35.98
Pakistan PAK 2,417 101633274.2 -0.69 0.48 20.01
Panama PAN 9,200 10880636.33 -0.23 0.05 25.49
Papa New Guinea PNG 1,852 113340296 -0.73 0.54 19.55
Paraguay PRY 4,194 68956880.31 -0.57 0.33 21.44
Peru PER 7,094 29203226.34 -0.37 0.14 23.79
Philippines PHL 3,130 87756481.67 -0.65 0.42 20.58
Poland POL 14,890 5722716.734 0.16 0.03 30.10
Portugal PRT 20,868 70062023.25 0.58 0.33 34.93
Qatar QAT 79,838 4534686784 4.64 21.54 82.63
Romania ROM 10,433 4264836.085 -0.14 0.02 26.49
Russia RUS 13,182 467318.5892 0.05 0.00 28.71
Rwanda RWA 843 135835457.6 -0.80 0.65 18.73
Saudi Arabia SAU 22,033 90913842.08 0.66 0.43 35.87
Senegal SEN 1,610 118545124.3 -0.75 0.56 19.35
Serbia YUG 9,141 11270046.27 -0.23 0.05 25.45
Sierra Leone SLE 648 140432334.7 -0.82 0.67 18.58
Singapore SGP 46,893 1182985004 2.37 5.62 55.98
Slovakia SVK 17,882 28989287.05 0.37 0.14 32.52
Slovenia SVN 24,987 155962733.2 0.86 0.74 38.26
Solomon Islands SLB 1,743 115674627.3 -0.74 0.55 19.46
Somalia SOM
South Africa ZAF 9,136 11304415.45 -0.23 0.05 25.44
South Korea KOR 23,084 112070129.7 0.73 0.53 36.72
Spain ESP 28,809 266050745 1.12 1.26 41.36
Sri Lanka LKA 3,920 73589649.25 -0.59 0.35 21.22
Sweden SWE 34,887 501269024.5 1.54 2.38 46.27
Switzerland CHE 38,953 699882582.9 1.82 3.33 49.56
Syria SYR 4,314 66986923.48 -0.56 0.32 21.54
Taiwan TWN 28,028 241190840.6 1.07 1.15 40.72
Tajikistan TJK 1,674 117151355.1 -0.75 0.56 19.41
Tanzania TZA 1,164 128465176.8 -0.78 0.61 18.99
Thailand THA 7,402 25972201.9 -0.35 0.12 24.04
Togo TGO 789 137106230.1 -0.81 0.65 18.69
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 17,015 20398573.91 0.31 0.10 31.82
Tunisia TUN 6,968 30580269.11 -0.38 0.15 23.69
Turkey TUR 12,102 156550.7582 -0.03 0.00 27.84
Turkmenistan TKM 4,585 62617404.15 -0.55 0.30 21.76
Uganda UGA 991 132421450.5 -0.79 0.63 18.85
Ukraine UKR 6,269 38801574.15 -0.43 0.18 23.12
United Arab Emirates ARE 36,498 576006530.1 1.65 2.74 47.58
United Kingdom GBR 33,849 455866825.5 1.47 2.17 45.43
United States USA 44,063 996361664.4 2.18 4.73 53.69
Uruguay URY 10,585 3660999.9 -0.13 0.02 26.61
Uzbekistan UZB 2,155 106971173.5 -0.71 0.51 19.80
Venezuela VEN 11,157 1797597.04 -0.09 0.01 27.08
Vietnam VNM 2,357 102842415.4 -0.70 0.49 19.96
Yemen YEM 2,276 104495171.1 -0.70 0.50 19.89
Zambia ZMB 1,241 126721218.8 -0.78 0.60 19.06
Zimbabwe ZWE 195 151356696.9 -0.85 0.72 18.21
12,498.14 34,307,829,522.21 0.00 163.00
Z-Transformation variables: µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con
14507.84 1.00
σ σ_con
 
 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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I. Correlation Data for Life Expectancy 2006 
 
 
Key: 
 
GDP PPP=x .......gross domestic product based on purchasing-power-parity per 
...........................capita235 
z .........................z-transformed “GDP PPP=x”-values236 
x_GDP_PPP ......re-transformed z-values237 
µ_con .................control mean value238 
σ_con.................control standard deviation238 
Afghanistan ........missing values 
 
Explanation: 
 
The mean value and the standard deviation (µ=28.16; σ=11.74) of the FH scale is used 
for the re-transformation calculations.239 
 
 
 
 
                                               
235
 See WDI 2008 
236
 See Tab. 3: Formulas for Z-Transformation, 84 
237
 See Tab. 4: Re-Transformation of z-values, 84 
238
 The z-transformation transforms a random distribution into a distribution with a mean value of 
zero and a standard deviation of one (Bortz 1999, 756). 
239
 See Appendix F. Freedom House – Operationalization for 2006, 121 
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Country Code LE=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_LE
Afghanistan AFG
Albania ALB 76.34 77.27 0.80 0.64 37.55
Algeria DZA 71.99 19.72 0.40 0.16 32.90
Angola AGO 42.36 634.52 -2.29 5.25 1.27
Argentina ARG 75.03 55.95 0.68 0.46 36.15
Armenia ARM 71.6 16.40 0.37 0.14 32.49
Australia AUS 81 180.91 1.22 1.50 42.52
Austria AUT 79.84 151.05 1.12 1.25 41.28
Azerbaijan AZE 72.33 22.85 0.43 0.19 33.27
Bahamas BHS 72.91 28.73 0.49 0.24 33.88
Bahrain BHR 75.66 65.78 0.74 0.54 36.82
Bangladesh BGD 63.66 15.13 -0.35 0.13 24.01
Barbados BRB 76.77 85.01 0.84 0.70 38.01
Belarus BLR 68.59 1.08 0.09 0.01 29.27
Belgium BEL 79.48 142.33 1.09 1.18 40.90
Belize BLZ 71.9 18.92 0.40 0.16 32.81
Benin BEN 56.2 128.82 -1.03 1.07 16.04
Bhutan BTN 65.26 5.24 -0.21 0.04 25.72
Bolivia BOL 65.18 5.62 -0.22 0.05 25.63
Bosnia-Herzegovina BIH 74.57 49.28 0.64 0.41 35.66
Botswana BWA 49.78 315.76 -1.62 2.61 9.19
Brazil BRA 72.08 20.52 0.41 0.17 33.00
Brunei BRN 77.13 91.78 0.87 0.76 38.39
Bulgaria BGR 72.61 25.61 0.46 0.21 33.56
Burkina Faso BFA 51.87 245.85 -1.43 2.04 11.42
Burma (Myanmar) MMR 61.65 34.81 -0.54 0.29 21.86
Burundi BDI 49.05 342.24 -1.68 2.83 8.41
Cambodia KHM 58.93 74.30 -0.78 0.62 18.96
Cameroon CMR 50.28 298.24 -1.57 2.47 9.72
Canada CAN 80.36 164.10 1.17 1.36 41.84
Cape Verde CPV 71 11.90 0.31 0.10 31.85
Central African Republic CAF 44.38 536.84 -2.11 4.44 3.42
Chad TCD 50.6 287.29 -1.54 2.38 10.06
Chile CHL 78.29 115.35 0.98 0.95 39.63
China CHN 72 19.80 0.40 0.16 32.91
Colombia COL 72.59 25.40 0.46 0.21 33.54
Comoros COM 63.24 18.57 -0.39 0.15 23.56
Congo (Brazzaville) COG 54.79 162.81 -1.16 1.35 14.54
Costa Rica CRI 78.66 123.44 1.01 1.02 40.02
Cote D'Ivoire CIV 48.08 379.07 -1.77 3.14 7.37
Croatia HRV 75.82 68.40 0.75 0.57 36.99
Cuba CUB 78.04 110.05 0.95 0.91 39.36
Cyprus CYP 79.29 137.83 1.07 1.14 40.70
Czech Republic CZE 76.48 79.75 0.81 0.66 37.70
Denmark DNK 78.1 111.31 0.96 0.92 39.43
Djibouti DJI 54.48 170.82 -1.19 1.41 14.21
Dominican Republic DOM 72.03 20.07 0.41 0.17 32.95
DR Congo (Zaire) ZAR 46.12 459.23 -1.95 3.80 5.28
Ecuador ECU 74.83 53.00 0.66 0.44 35.94
Egypt EGY 71.01 11.97 0.31 0.10 31.86
El Salvador SLV 71.54 15.92 0.36 0.13 32.42
Equatorial Guinea GNQ 51.1 270.59 -1.50 2.24 10.60
Eritrea ERI 57.31 104.85 -0.93 0.87 17.23
Estonia EST 72.57 25.20 0.46 0.21 33.52
Ethiopia ETH 52.48 227.10 -1.37 1.88 12.07
Fiji FJI 68.59 1.08 0.09 0.01 29.27
Finland FIN 79.23 136.43 1.06 1.13 40.63
France FRA 80.56 169.27 1.18 1.40 42.05
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Country Code LE=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_LE
Gambia, The GMB 59.15 70.56 -0.76 0.58 19.19
Georgia GEO 70.72 10.05 0.29 0.08 31.55
Germany DEU 79.13 134.10 1.05 1.11 40.53
Ghana GHA 59.7 61.62 -0.71 0.51 19.78
Greece GRC 79.41 140.67 1.08 1.16 40.83
Guatemala GTM 69.91 5.57 0.21 0.05 30.68
Guinea GIN 55.52 144.72 -1.09 1.20 15.32
Guinea-Bissau GNB 46.19 456.24 -1.94 3.78 5.36
Guyana GUY 66.28 1.61 -0.12 0.01 26.81
Haiti HTI 60.32 52.27 -0.66 0.43 20.44
Honduras HND 69.89 5.48 0.21 0.05 30.66
Hungary HUN 73.09 30.69 0.50 0.25 34.08
Iceland ISL 81.17 185.51 1.24 1.54 42.70
India IND 64.47 9.48 -0.28 0.08 24.87
Indonesia IDN 68.16 0.37 0.06 0.00 28.81
Iran IRN 70.65 9.61 0.28 0.08 31.47
Iraq IRQ
Ireland IRL 79.39 140.19 1.08 1.16 40.80
Israel ISR 80.02 155.51 1.13 1.29 41.48
Italy ITA 81.08 183.07 1.23 1.52 42.61
Jamaica JAM 71.12 12.75 0.32 0.11 31.97
Japan JPN 82.32 218.16 1.34 1.81 43.93
Jordan JOR 72.2 21.62 0.42 0.18 33.13
Kazakhstan KAZ 66.16 1.93 -0.13 0.02 26.68
Kenya KEN 53.44 199.09 -1.28 1.65 13.10
Kuwait KWT 77.66 102.22 0.92 0.85 38.96
Kyrgyzstan KGZ 67.7 0.02 0.01 0.00 28.32
Laos LAO 63.86 13.61 -0.34 0.11 24.22
Latvia LVA 70.86 10.96 0.30 0.09 31.70
Lebanon LBN 71.78 17.89 0.38 0.15 32.68
Lesotho LSO 42.93 606.13 -2.24 5.02 1.87
Liberia LBR 45.27 496.39 -2.03 4.11 4.37
Libya LBY 73.98 41.35 0.59 0.34 35.03
Lithuania LTU 71.04 12.18 0.32 0.10 31.89
Luxembourg LUX 79.18 135.26 1.06 1.12 40.58
Macedonia MKD 73.99 41.48 0.59 0.34 35.04
Madagascar MDG 58.99 73.27 -0.78 0.61 19.02
Malawi MWI 47.61 397.59 -1.81 3.29 6.87
Malaysia MYS 74.05 42.25 0.59 0.35 35.10
Maldives MDV 67.92 0.14 0.03 0.00 28.56
Mali MLI 53.78 189.61 -1.25 1.57 13.46
Malta MLT 78.55 121.01 1.00 1.00 39.91
Mauritania MRT 63.75 14.44 -0.35 0.12 24.10
Mauritius MUS 73.17 31.59 0.51 0.26 34.16
Mexico MEX 74.47 47.89 0.63 0.40 35.55
Moldova MDA 68.53 0.96 0.09 0.01 29.21
Mongolia MNG 67.17 0.14 -0.03 0.00 27.76
Montenegro MNP 74.42 47.20 0.63 0.39 35.50
Morocco MAR 70.7 9.92 0.29 0.08 31.53
Mozambique MOZ 42.46 629.50 -2.28 5.21 1.37
Namibia NAM 52.5 226.50 -1.37 1.87 12.09
Nepal NPL 63.23 18.66 -0.39 0.15 23.55
Netherlands NLD 79.7 147.63 1.11 1.22 41.13
New Zealand NZL 79.93 153.27 1.13 1.27 41.38
Nicaragua NIC 72.48 24.31 0.45 0.20 33.43
Niger NER 56.42 123.87 -1.01 1.03 16.28
Nigeria NGA 46.78 431.38 -1.89 3.57 5.99
North Korea PRK 66.97 0.34 -0.05 0.00 27.54
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Country Code LE=x (x - µ)^2 z (z - µ_con)^2 x_LE
Norway NOR 80.33 163.33 1.16 1.35 41.81
Oman OMN 75.51 63.37 0.72 0.52 36.66
Pakistan PAK 65.21 5.47 -0.21 0.05 25.66
Panama PAN 75.4 61.63 0.71 0.51 36.54
Papa New Guinea PNG 57.32 104.65 -0.93 0.87 17.24
Paraguay PRY 71.65 16.81 0.37 0.14 32.54
Peru PER 71.12 12.75 0.32 0.11 31.97
Philippines PHL 71.39 14.75 0.35 0.12 32.26
Poland POL 75.14 57.61 0.69 0.48 36.27
Portugal PRT 78.38 117.29 0.99 0.97 39.73
Qatar QAT 75.5 63.21 0.72 0.52 36.65
Romania ROM 72.18 21.44 0.42 0.18 33.11
Russia RUS 65.56 3.96 -0.18 0.03 26.04
Rwanda RWA 45.59 482.23 -2.00 3.99 4.71
Saudi Arabia SAU 72.58 25.30 0.46 0.21 33.53
Senegal SEN 62.76 22.94 -0.44 0.19 23.05
Serbia YUG 72.78 27.36 0.48 0.23 33.75
Sierra Leone SLE 42.24 640.58 -2.30 5.30 1.14
Singapore SGP 79.85 151.30 1.12 1.25 41.30
Slovakia SVK 74.2 44.23 0.61 0.37 35.26
Slovenia SVN 77.67 102.42 0.92 0.85 38.97
Solomon Islands SLB 63.33 17.81 -0.38 0.15 23.66
Somalia SOM 47.69 394.41 -1.81 3.27 6.96
South Africa ZAF 50.71 283.58 -1.53 2.35 10.18
South Korea KOR 78.5 119.91 1.00 0.99 39.85
Spain ESP 80.8 175.57 1.21 1.45 42.31
Sri Lanka LKA 74.97 55.06 0.68 0.46 36.08
Sweden SWE 80.77 174.77 1.20 1.45 42.28
Switzerland CHE 81.51 194.89 1.27 1.61 43.07
Syria SYR 73.9 40.33 0.58 0.33 34.94
Taiwan TWN
Tajikistan TJK 66.51 1.08 -0.09 0.01 27.05
Tanzania TZA 51.89 245.23 -1.42 2.03 11.44
Thailand THA 70.24 7.24 0.24 0.06 31.03
Togo TGO 58.2 87.42 -0.85 0.72 18.18
Trinidad and Tobago TTO 69.58 4.12 0.18 0.03 30.33
Tunisia TUN 73.62 36.85 0.55 0.31 34.64
Turkey TUR 71.49 15.53 0.36 0.13 32.37
Turkmenistan TKM 63.01 20.61 -0.41 0.17 23.31
Uganda UGA 50.74 282.57 -1.53 2.34 10.21
Ukraine UKR 68.04 0.24 0.04 0.00 28.69
United Arab Emirates ARE 79.32 138.54 1.07 1.15 40.73
United Kingdom GBR 79.14 134.33 1.05 1.11 40.54
United States USA 77.85 106.10 0.94 0.88 39.16
Uruguay URY 75.73 66.92 0.74 0.55 36.90
Uzbekistan UZB 67.5 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.11
Venezuela VEN 74.4 46.93 0.62 0.39 35.48
Vietnam VNM 70.85 10.89 0.30 0.09 31.69
Yemen YEM 62.21 28.51 -0.49 0.24 22.46
Zambia ZMB 41.67 669.76 -2.35 5.54 0.53
Zimbabwe ZWE 42.69 618.01 -2.26 5.12 1.62
67.55 19810.84 0.00 164.00
Z-Transformation variables: µ ∑ µ_con ∑_con
10.99 1.00
σ σ_con
 
 
(Source: Own illustration) 
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Abstract  
 
Indexkombination stellt die neueste Entwicklung im Forschungsbereich der 
Demokratiemessung dar. Im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit wird ein experimenteller 
Meta-Index, der QD-Index, sowohl theoretisch konzeptualisiert als auch praktisch 
operationalisiert. Dazu werden Indices wie Worldwide Governance Indicators, Freedom 
House sowie der Vanhanen Index für das Untersuchungsjahr 2006 kombiniert.  
Der QD-Index ermöglicht einer reliablere und validere Messung von Demokratiequalität 
auf globaler Ebene, da er die Stärken der jeweiligen Ausgangsindices miteinander 
vereint. Dennoch bleibt ein gewisser Bias der Ergebnisse erhalten, welcher auf die 
methodischen Besonderheiten der verarbeiteten Indices zurückzuführen ist. 
 
Kernbegriffe:  Demokratiequalität, Freedom House, Indexkombination, 
Konzeptvalidierung, QD-Index (QDI), Vanhanen Index, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
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